Date of This Version
January 2009
Abstract
We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure is NP-hard in the strong sense. Furthermore, the corresponding decision problems with respect to the existence of a Nash stable coalition structure and of an individually stable coalition structure turn out to be NP-complete in the strong sense.
Recommended Citation
Dimitrov, Dinko and Sung, Shao-Chin, "Computational Complexity in Additive Hedonic Games" (January 16, 2009). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers. Paper 257.
https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper257