Is Environmentalism the Right Strategy to Decarbonize the World?

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Summary

We study how the supply of environmentalism, which is defined by psychic benefits (costs) associated with the purchase of high-environmental (low-environmental) qualities, affects the way firms choose their products and the ensuing consequences for the global level of pollution. Contrary to general belief, a high supply of environmentalism does not give rise to a better environmental outcome because it endows firms with more market power which they use to maximize profits. By contrast, standard policy instruments such as a minimum quality standard or the use of greener technologies leads to a better ecological footprint.

Keywords: Environmentalism, Psychic Costs and Benefits, Vertical Product Differentiation, Environmental Policy

JEL Classification: D11, L13, Q50

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December 2020

Abstract

We study how the supply of environmentalism, which is defined by psychic benefits (costs) associated with the purchase of high-environmental (low-environmental) qualities, affects the way firms choose their products and the ensuing consequences for the global level of pollution. Contrary to general belief, a high supply of environmentalism does not give rise to a better environmental outcome because it endows firms with more market power which they use to maximize profits. By contrast, standard policy instruments such as a minimum quality standard or the use of greener technologies leads to a better ecological footprint.

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1 Introduction

Embedded in most debates about the environmental question is the view that changes in consumers’ behavior are a necessary condition for a transition to a cleaner society to happen. By inciting consumers to shift from polluting to less-polluting products, a more deeply rooted environmental consciousness would spark a major drop in the mass of pollutants through modified individual consumption choices. We refer to the various doctrines that compete on the market for ideas to shape the consumer side as environmentalism (also called “green consumerism”). This paper’s core goal is then to study how environmentalism affects the way firms choose their products and the ensuing consequences for the global level of pollution. Since the empirical literature on the consequences of green consumerism is meager, we find it meaningful to start with a theory-based investigation.

We show that environmentalism is not the silver bullet that will solve the environmental question because it bolsters a lower consumption of environmentally friendly products, which echoes the Jevons paradox (Alcott, 2005). The reason for that lies in firms’ response: they use their higher market power to raise their prices, which in turn leads consumers to buy more brown products at the expense of green ones. This result is in line with the empirical evidence gathered around the so-called rebound effect. This effect is observed whenever the expected gains generated by using more environmentally friendly products are reduced due to changes in consumption behavior as a whole. For example, hybrid vehicles with reduced per-unit emissions are marketed worldwide with the consequence of making cheaper the ordinary vehicles whose usage is thus increased. Using Australian data, Murray (2013) finds that rebound effects may offset the expected benefits of environmentalism.

The key-issue is that consumers endowed with greener preferences have a higher willingness-to-pay for clean products. Firms will, therefore, respond to that by changing prices and qualities. The following question then suggests itself: do these new qualities have the expected consequences for environmental sustainability? The conventional approach is to consider a market where firms produce a vertically differentiated good whose environmental qualities are chosen by their producers; this good is sold to consumers who have a higher willingness-to-pay for the green variants than for the brown ones. However, this modeling strategy fails to capture the various factors that affect consumers’ choices in a context where cultural, political and social values interact with standard preferences (see below for references). That said, as Stigler and Becker (1977) warned us, care is needed when considering deviations from standard preferences, for otherwise one runs the risk of providing “microeconomic foundations” to almost any prediction or recommendation policy. This is why we consider a minimal deviation from a well-established model where qualities are differentiated by their footprints by adding idiosyncratic psychic costs and benefits to the preferences of rational consumers.

As argued by Glaeser (2014), in the presence of environmentalism, a consumer who buys green
enjoys a *psychic benefit*, which has the nature of a nonpecuniary feeling of being a “good citizen”. By contrast, when the consumer buys brown, she bears a *psychic cost*, which corresponds to a nonpecuniary feeling of shame or guiltiness (Kahn, 2007; Carlsson *et al*., 2010; Allcott, 2011; Pinto *et al*., 2014). In this case, each product is characterized by *two* characteristics, namely an *intrinsic* attribute, which is given by the environmental and hedonic characteristics of the product, and an *extrinsic* one, which is related to the supply of environmentalism within the public sphere, the value of which is determined by the interactions among activists, lobbies, political parties, and the media. Central to our setting is the idea that the intrinsic attribute is *chosen* by firms whereas the extrinsic attribute is *given* to the firms. Equally important, we assume that different individuals subscribe more or less to a value system, here environmentalism. Therefore, the psychic benefit associated with the consumption of the green product—the consumer is a member of the reference group—whereas the psychic cost she bears for consuming brown—she does not belong to the reference group—vary across consumers. Using this setting, we then ask how the market responds to environmental ideology when consumers are endowed with such preferences.

Our main findings may be summarized as follows. Consider a market where two firms produce a good whose environmental qualities are chosen by their producers. One variant is *green* and the other is *brown*, meaning that the former has a higher environmental quality than the latter. Given the qualities chosen by firms, we first study the ensuing price-subgame. Consider two price-setting firms that sell the green and brown variants of a given product. When environmentalism is weak, price competition is tough enough for the entry of the brown firm to be deterred by the green firm. As environmentalism grows beyond some threshold, the green firm enjoys enough market power to set a price sufficiently high for the brown firm to produce and sell its product. This entry raises the level of pollution because some consumers buy brown. Once both firms are active, a higher environmental ideology relaxes price competition even further so that both firms end up charging higher prices. However, more consumers buy brown because the green firm charges a relatively higher price than its rival.

In the quality stage, firms anticipate accurately what the equilibrium prices will be while consumer choices are now driven by both firms’ quality and price decisions. The marginal production cost increases with quality because producing a higher quality good often requires more expensive inputs and better management practices. Furthermore, improving the environmental quality also implies additional overhead expenditures such as R&D and capital goods. We first show the existence and uniqueness (up to a permutation of firms’ names) of a quality equilibrium. The market equilibrium involves two firms that share the market (interior equilibrium) or a single supplier (corner equilibrium).

When the supply of environmentalism is low, only one firm invests in environmental quality while the other firm acts as a potential entrant. In this case, the active firm finds it profit-maximizing to set the limit price that prevents the entry of its competitor. As the supply of environmentalism rises
above some threshold, consumers become heterogeneous enough for the incumbent to rise its price, thereby allowing the second firm to enter the market by supplying a quality inferior to that provided by the incumbent. In other words, the market now involves a green product and a brown product which are, respectively, the expensive and cheap variants. Rising consumers’ psychic benefits and costs allow the green firm to alleviate its investment costs by supplying a lower quality variant, whereas the higher psychic costs incentivize the brown firm to improve its own quality. The environmental surplus decreases with environmentalism, whereas the social welfare increases. Consequently, environmentalism does not act as a pro-environmental force, the reason being that both the green and brown firms use their higher market power to choose prices and qualities that raise their profits, but not the environmental surplus.

Our results cast serious doubt on the ability of environmentalism to be the weapon that would drastically improve upon the prevailing level of pollution. They suggest instead that the responsibility to solve the environmental question should fall on governments and producers. What is more, when combined with specific policy instruments, environmentalism could deliver its expected positive effects. It is, therefore, crucial to identify the instruments whose effects are magnified by green consumerism. This conclusion agrees with the idea that “a consistent instrument approach incorporating technology, fiscal and behavioural aspects” (European Commission DG Environment, p.16, 2011) should be evaluated to curb emissions.

Although environmental taxes comply with the polluters pay principle, the risk of enforcing a regressive policy has led policy-makers to implement a wider portfolio of different measures to abate emissions and promote the growth of an eco-friendly economy. In the US, the Environmental Protection Agency defines standards to abate greenhouse gases generated by cars, light trucks, and heavy-duty trucks, whereas the Renewable Fuel Standard program is used to enlarge renewable fuels sector at the expense of imported oil. Since 2009, the EU legislation has introduced mandatory emission targets for new cars and, later, for vans. Along the same lines, the Fuel Quality Directive has set quality requirements for fuels used for road transport within the EU. Furthermore, both in the US and the EU a wide range of projects enhancing eco-innovations are made available to firms. The US Department of Energy provides many funding opportunities in the form of grants and loans to firms that are willing to adopt eco-friendly technologies, whereas a great number of investment plans are currently implemented by the European Green Deal whose aim is to reach climate neutrality by 2050.

In accordance with the above evidence, we use our baseline model to study the effects of the following instruments in the presence of environmentalism: (i) the development of green technologies and (ii) a minimum quality standard. We first study the impact of green technologies that allow producing more environmental-friendly products. As expected, the use of greener technologies leads to a higher environmental surplus through better qualities and a bigger market share for the eco-friendly variant. These findings point to the social desirability of policies that facilitate the emergence of green techno-
logical innovations. Greener technologies are the output of R&D activities undertaken by firms and/or external bodies such as research labs and universities. Ideally, we should combine production and R&D within a unified framework to study the full cost of green innovations (Lambertini, 2017). However, doing this would take us too far from the main purpose of this paper. Another fairly natural instrument is the minimum quality standard. For this policy to have an impact, the standard must be the brown quality. We then show that the environmental surplus rises with the quality standard. In other words, environmentalism and minimum quality standard act like complements that lead to a more ecological consumption pattern.

Since we work with a duopoly, one may wonder what our main findings become in an oligopolistic market. We show that they hold true when the market involves an arbitrary number of firms supplying different environmental qualities: a higher supply of environmentalism relaxes competition, which in turn allows for the entry of firms in the low end of the environmental quality range. Our choice to work with a duopoly is motivated by the desire not to distract our analysis from considerations foreign to our main purpose and to keep the analysis as simple as possible from the analytical viewpoint.

**Related literature.** When some consumers are willing to pay more than others to consume less-polluting goods, the analysis of environmental quality is amenable to settings with vertically differentiated products, such as those developed in industrial economics (Tirole, 1988; Belleflamme and Peitz, 2015). These models have been applied successfully to environmental quality competition. The entry point of this literature is that environmentally aware consumers perceive products as being vertically differentiated on the basis of their environmental impact. The main message is clear: when consumers care about the ecological footprint of their own consumption, firms segment the market by supplying green and brown variants of the same good, which are sold at high and low prices. This idea has been developed along several dimensions: (i) the emission of pollutants (Moraga Gonzales and Padron-Fumero, 2002), (ii) firms’ abatement effort (Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995; Rodriguez-Ibeas et al., 2003; Bansal, 2008; Karakosta, 2018), and (iii) the degree of corporate social responsibility adopted by firms (Garcia-Gallego and Georgantis, 2009; Doni and Ricciuti, 2013; Ambec and De Donder, 2020). Closer to us, Eriksson (2004) who uses a product differentiation setting to show that green consumerism cannot replace environmental regulation.

In a different strand of literature, consumers internalize partially the environmental damages generated by the consumption of polluting goods (Cremer and Thisse, 1999; Bansal and Gangopadhyay, 2003; Amacher et al., 2004; Lombardini 2005). Fuelled by empirical analysis that shows that consumers attribute a symbolic value to clean goods (Heffner et al., 2007; Sexton and Sexton, 2014), Ben-Elhadj and Tarola (2014) assume that consumers choose green products not only to satisfy material needs but also to obtain a socially worthy position along a social ladder. The merit of these contributions is to open the door to psychological and sociological considerations that are likely to affect the preferences.
of environment-friendly consumers.

The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium of any price subgame. In Section 4, we solve the quality game. Section 5 focusses on how the supply of environmentalism affect the environmental surplus and social welfare generated by the market equilibrium and discusses the properties of the second best social optimum in which a planner chooses qualities and compare these outcomes to the market solution. In Section 6, we discuss the combination of environmentalism with various standard policy instruments. Section 7 concludes.

2 The model

We consider a market for a vertically differentiated good produced by two firms $G$ and $B$ that supply each one product. A product embeds both environmental and hedonic attributes. The environmental attribute of a product is determined by the social cost of the greenhouse gas emissions generated by both its production and consumption. For simplicity, we assume that the two products share the same hedonic characteristics. Note, however, that our results remain valid if the environmental and hedonic attributes are aligned or if the former dominates the latter. Since the quality of the green product, denoted by $q_G$, is higher than the quality of the brown product, denoted by $q_B$, we have $q_G > q_B$. This quality ranking reflects consumers’ awareness of the environmental consequences of their consumption, which differs from what we call below environmentalism.

Preferences. There is a unit mass of heterogeneous consumers. In line with the literature, we assume that the product is indivisible (i.e., a durable) and that each consumer buys one unit of a single product (perhaps because this product is a necessity good), so that the whole market is covered. Each product is characterized by two attributes. The first one is intrinsic to the product and given by its environmental quality discussed in the above paragraph. The second attribute is extrinsic to the product and pertains to the reference group to which a consumer relates, or aspires to relate, herself through the product she consumes.

The reference group is formed here by those consumers who buy the green product. Belonging to this group confers a psychic benefit to its members that translates into a higher utility. This psychic benefit $\psi_G > 0$ which varies across consumers, is the concrete form taken by the impact environmentalism on individual preferences. By contrast, very much like Groucho Marx who did not want to belong to a club that will accept him as a member, a consumer who buys brown suffers a negative effect — under the form of shame or guiltiness — that reduces her welfare. This is because buying a polluting product is perceived as a negative action that excludes her from the reference group. Consequently, the psychic cost $\psi_B < 0$ the consumer bears makes her worse off. Like the psychic benefit, it is individual-specific.
Formally, consumers are endowed with pro-environmental preferences. We follow the literature and assume that a \((\theta_1, \theta_2)\)-consumer is endowed with a linear indirect utility (Neven and Thisse, 1990; Vandenbosch and Weinberg, 1995; Lauga and Ofek, 2011):

\[
V(\theta_1, \theta_2) = \begin{cases} 
\theta_1 q_G + \theta_2 \psi_G - p_G, & \text{if she consumes } G \\
\theta_1 q_B + \theta_2 \psi_B - p_B, & \text{if she consumes } B \\
-\infty, & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases} \tag{1}
\]

where \(\theta_1 \geq 0\) refers to the heterogeneity of consumers’ willingness-to-pay for the environmental quality \(q\), while \(\theta_2 \geq 0\) measures the idiosyncratic evaluation of the psychic benefit (resp., cost) that a consumer enjoys (resp., bears) when she is (resp., is not) a member of the reference group. This modeling approach may be viewed as a crude, but natural, way to capture the idea that the pursuit of socially positive values affects differently the well-being of different groups’ members. Since consumers are free to choose which product to buy, the group they belong to is the outcome of individual utility maximization. Note also that (1) implies that a consumer with a high (resp., low) psychic benefit for being green also faces a high (resp., low) psychic cost when she is brown, which seems reasonable.

Models of vertical differentiation typically assume that consumers are heterogeneous in a single attribute (Tirole, 1988; Belleflamme and Peitz, 2015; Gabszewicz and Tarola, 2018). Since products are here characterized by two attributes, it seems natural to consider a setting in which consumers are heterogeneous along the two characteristics. However, the few attempts made to develop two-dimensional models of product differentiation show that working with those settings become quickly very cumbersome from the analytical point of view. Since the focus of this paper is on the role of environmentalism, we assume with Garella and Lambertini (2014) that consumers are homogeneous in their attitude toward the environmental quality of products, that is, the distribution of \(\theta_1\) is atomic with a unit mass point at \(\theta = 1\). As a result, consumers have a higher willingness-to-pay for green than for brown. Using an atomic distribution is, therefore, unlikely to affect the nature of our findings since the green product is dominant in the two attributes. Note also that the first attribute of a product, which is given by its environmental quality, is a continuous variable.

In (1), the second attribute is given by a binary variable that refers to the group the consumer belongs to: \(\psi_G = \beta > 0\) and \(\psi_B = -\beta\) where \(\beta\) measures what we call the environmental ideology. That said, we may rewrite preferences (1) as follows:

\[
V(\theta) = \begin{cases} 
q_G + \beta \theta - p_G, & \text{for green product} \\
q_B - \beta \theta - p_B, & \text{for brown} 
\end{cases} \tag{2}
\]

Thus, things work as if a \(\theta\)-consumer were to pay the price \(p_G - \beta \theta\) for the green product and \(p_B + \beta \theta\) for the brown. These prices are consumer-specific but they also vary with the supply of environmentalism. By contrast, \(\beta\) is common to all. Since a higher supply of environmentalism makes the
greens better-off and the browns worse-off, the environmental ideology $\beta$ affects consumers’ willingness-to-pay, hence firms’ behavior on the market. Clearly, a consumer having a high value for $\theta$ is greener than a consumer having a low value.

Two remarks are in order. First, by assuming linear utilities, (1) and (2) remain in the tradition of standard models of product differentiation. It might seem more reasonable to consider a setting in which consumers’ welfare varies with the size of the group she belongs to. It is worth stressing that the findings obtained in the next sections hold true (up to some new numerical coefficients) if the psychic benefit of a $\theta$-consumer is given by $\theta n_G$ and her psychic cost by $\theta n_B$ where $n_i$ is the mass of consumers who purchase product $i$. In this context, consumers, and not only firms, are involved in a game-theoretic framework in which they must choose which firm to patronize. The elements of the resulting partition may then be viewed as the equilibrium networks or groups of consumers generated by a pair of qualities and a price system. Even in this case, our setting differs from the few models of vertical product differentiation with consumption externalities, such as Brécard (2013), because environmentalism implies that the group a consumer belongs to affects her welfare in opposite ways. Moreover, we assume that being a member of a group generates a (dis)satisfaction that is consumer-specific. Therefore, we may safely conclude that our setting is not another model of product differentiation with network externalities. Additional evidence can be found in the dissimilarities between several of our results with those obtained in the literature.

Second, in line with the literature we assume that the parameter $\theta$ is uniformly distributed over the interval $[0, 1]$. However, our analysis can readily be extended to any interval $[a, b]$ with $0 \leq a < b$ by rescaling the corresponding attribute. Furthermore, in (2) the qualities $q_G$ and $q_B$ can be weighted by a coefficient $\alpha > 0$ that reflects their relative value in consumer preferences. To ease the burden of notation, we set $\alpha = 1$. Hence, a lower $\beta$ also means that the environmental qualities per se matter more to consumers than the environmental ideology. Given these normalizations, a high or a low value of $\beta$ should not be interpreted in too a restrictive way.

**Demands and costs.** Substituting (2) into $V_G(\theta) = V_B(\theta)$ and solving for $\theta$ yields the consumer $\bar{\theta}$ indifferent between buying $G$ or $B$ at prices $p_G > 0$ and $p_B > 0$:

$$
\bar{\theta} = \frac{(p_G - p_B) - (q_G - q_B)}{2\beta}.
$$

(3)

Like in standard models of vertical differentiation, how consumers are allocated between green and brown depends on the price gap $p_G - p_B$ and the quality gap $q_G - q_B$: the larger the former (resp. the latter), the smaller (resp., the larger) the green product’s market share. The impact of $\beta$ on the marginal consumer $\bar{\theta}$ is a priori ambiguous since it has the sign of the numerator of (3). More specifically, if the
price gap dominates the quality gap, \textit{more consumers buy green when environmentalism gets stronger}, that is, \( \beta \) has the expected impact on the allocation of consumers between products \( G \) and \( B \). When the latter dominates the former, fewer consumers buy green.

In (3), we implicitly assume that the marginal consumer \( \bar{\theta} \) belongs to the open interval \((0,1)\). However, it should be clear that the right-and-side of (3) may be smaller than 0 or larger than 1. Consequently, the equilibrium value of \( \bar{\theta} \) that must be used to determine firms’ market demands \( D_G = 1 - \bar{\theta} \) and \( D_B = \bar{\theta} \) are given by the following expression:

\[
\bar{\theta}(p_G, p_B; q_G, q_B) = \max \left\{ 0, \min \left\{ \frac{(p_G - p_B) - (q_G - q_B)}{2\beta}, 1 \right\} \right\}.
\] (4)

Let us now come to firms’ cost. A firms’ choice of a better (environmental) quality gives rise to specific expenditures, such as R&D and capital goods, which typically have the nature of endogenous overhead expenditures. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that most of the burden of quality improvement falls on fixed costs \( F(q) \) (Ronnen, 1991; Motta, 1993). Nevertheless, marginal costs \( c(q) \), which are constant with respect to output, are likely to increase with quality because producing a better environmental quality typically requires more expensive inputs (Lauga and Ofek, 2011).

Since a steady improvement of the environmental quality is likely to require more and more investment in R&D and capital, the function \( F \) is also strictly convex in \( q \). In line with the literature, we assume that fixed costs are quadratic in \( q \), i.e., \( F(q) = q^2/2 \). We also assume that the quality marginal cost is proportional to the chosen quality, i.e., \( c(q) = cq \) where \( c \) is a positive constant. In what follows, we assume that \textit{both firms have access to the same technology described by the marginal cost \( cq \) and the fixed cost \( q^2/2 \), which both depend on the quality \( q \). In our setting, developing new technologies that allow producing greener products at lower costs does not generate additional pollutants because the possible damages caused by such technologies are taken into account in the environmental qualities supplied by firms.}

The profit function of firm \( i = G, B \) is then as follows:

\[
\pi_i(p_G, p_B; q_G, q_B) = (p_i - cq_i)D_i(p_G, p_B; q_G, q_B) - \frac{q_i^2}{2}, \quad i = G, B.
\]

Competition between firms is modeled as a two-stage game. Let \( \bar{q} \) be the highest environmental quality that can produced under the current technology, while the minimal quality is normalized to 0. At the first stage, firms choose the environmental quality of their product along the spectrum of technologically feasible qualities given by the interval \([0, \bar{q}]\) where the lowest quality is normalized to 0. At the second stage, firms compete in prices with \( p_G \geq cq_G \) and \( p_B \geq cq_B \). The fixed costs and are sunk at the price competition stage of the game. The market outcome is given by a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. For this equilibrium to be consistent with the above demand functions, it must be that
$q_G > q_B$. The market outcome is given by a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. As usual, the game is solved by backward induction.

Let us make a pause in order to discuss what makes vertical product differentiation different from horizontal product differentiation. The distinctive feature of the former is the “finiteness property,” which states that only a limited number of firms can survive in equilibrium. More specifically, the market equilibrium involves a maximal number of firms whose value depends on the degree of consumer heterogeneity even when fixed costs are arbitrarily small. Since $q - c(q)$ stands for the social value of quality $q$, this property holds if and only if consumers agree on the ranking of all products when each quality $q$ is priced at its marginal cost $c(q)$. Otherwise, a firm can always sell its output to the consumers who rank its product first because these consumers are willing to pay a price that slightly exceeds the product’s marginal cost (Shaked and Sutton, 1983; Anderson et al., 1992; Gabszewicz and Tarola, 2018). In this case, there is horizontal differentiation.

Under vertical differentiation, two cases may arise according to the value of $c$. In the former case, all consumers prefer green to brown when $p_i = cq_i$, that is,

$$q_G + \beta \theta - cq_G > q_B - \beta \theta - cq_B$$

must hold for all $\theta \in [0, 1]$. The most binding condition arises at $\theta = 0$, which means $(1-c)(q_G-q_B) > 0$. For this to hold, it must be that $c < 1$. In the latter, all consumers prefer brown to green, i.e.,

$$q_B - \beta \theta - cq_B > q_G + \beta \theta - cq_G$$

must hold for all $\theta \in [0, 1]$. The most binding condition arises at $\theta = 1$, which implies $(c-1)(q_G-q_B) > 2\beta$. Since this inequality must be satisfied for all $\beta > 0$, it amounts to $c > 1$. In this case, all consumers prefer $B$ and $G$, which is the reverse of the ranking obtained when $c < 1$. Since our focus is on consumers endowed with pro-environmental preferences when $q_G > q_B$, we assume $c < 1$. Note also that this assumption implies that the social surplus $q_i - cq_i$ associated with quality $q_i$ is strictly positive for $q_i > 0$.

3 How does price competition affect the consumption of the green and brown products?

In order to determine how environmentalism affect firms’ behavior and the level of pollution generated by the consumption of goods differentiated by their environmental qualities, we need a benchmark case that describes the market outcome when consumers’ choices are unaffected by social considerations, i.e., $\beta = 0$. 


3.1 Price competition in the absence of environmentalism

By setting \( \beta = 0 \) in (2), we obtain the benchmark case in which consumers care only about their own choices. We have a standard setting in which two firms selling a vertically differentiated product and producing at different marginal costs compete in prices. Studying the case where \( \beta = 0 \) is worth doing because it allows us to determine how the market outcome is affected by environmentalism.

Since consumers are homogeneous when \( \beta = 0 \), firms compete in prices under different marginal costs. Consequently, they undercut each other until one firm reaches its marginal cost. In the presence of a price tie, it is natural to assume that the price tie is broken in favor of the firm with the lower marginal cost since this firm is able to further lower its price. Since all consumers prefer to buy \( G \) when both products are priced at their marginal costs, firm \( G \) can undercut firm \( B \) until its price is equal to

\[
p^*_G(q_G, q_B) = q_G - (1 - c)q_B > cq_G,
\]

while \( p^*_G(q_G, q_B) = cq_B \), and thus the green firm supplies the entire market. The above pair of prices is a Nash equilibrium of the price subgame.

Thus, in the absence of environmentalism (\( \beta = 0 \)), all consumers buy from the green firm, which sets a price above its marginal cost. This firm sets a price such that consumers are indifferent between the two products, whereas the other firm prices at marginal cost. This shows the main implication of using an atomic distribution for quality: there is no equilibrium in which both firms share the market and earn positive profits. As shown below, this ceases to hold when \( \beta \) is positive.

3.2 Price competition in the presence of environmentalism

When \( \beta > 0 \), a \( \theta \)-consumer considers the following “quality indices” before making her purchasing decision:

\[
Q_G(\theta) \equiv q_G + \beta \theta > q_G \quad Q_B(\theta) \equiv q_B - \beta \theta < q_B.
\]

Observe that \( q_G \) and \( q_B \) are firm-specific, while \( Q_G(\theta) \) and \( Q_B(\theta) \) are consumer-specific. This difference is a distinctive feature of our model. In addition, raising \( \beta \) means that \( Q_G \) increases whereas \( Q_B \) decreases, even when \( q_G \) and \( q_B \) do not change. So, everything else, a higher environmental concern strengthens the market power of the green firm relative to the brown firm by magnifying the quality difference \( q_G - q_B \).

Since the profit function \( \pi_i \) is concave in \( p_i \), applying the first-order condition yields the following equilibrium prices when both firms share the market (\( 0 < \bar{\theta} < 1 \)):

\[
\begin{align*}
p^*_G(q_G, q_B) &= \frac{1}{3} (2cq_G + cq_B + (q_G - q_B) + 4\beta), \\
p^*_B(q_G, q_B) &= \frac{1}{3} (cq_G + 2cq_B - (q_G - q_B) + 2\beta).
\end{align*}
\]
Whereas $p_G^*(q_G, q_B) > cq_G$ always holds, $p_B^*(q_G, q_B) > cq_B$ if and only if $\beta > (1 - c)(q_G - q_B)/2$. Otherwise, firm $G$ charges the limit price and firm $B$ remains out of business, a result that typically arises in vertical differentiation models when consumer heterogeneity is low (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Wauthy, 1996). Assume now that $\beta$ satisfies the above condition, so that firms $G$ and $B$ share the market. In this case, both prices increase with the intensity of environmental ideology ($\beta \uparrow$) because psychic costs and benefits rise. Stated differently, environmentalism relieves competition at the price stage. However, the green firm’s price grows faster than the brown firm’s with $\beta$ because more environmental ideology renders the green product even more attractive as $Q_G - Q_B$ becomes wider. Furthermore, $p_G^*$ increases while $p_B^*$ decreases with the quality gap $q_G - q_B$. Indeed, when the quality gap widens, the environmental ideology strengthens the green product’s attractiveness, which incentivizes firm $B$ to lower its price to restore its market share. This differs from what we observe in standard models of vertical differentiation where both prices increase with the quality gap.

Furthermore, the price differential is given by

$$p^*_G(q_G, q_B) - p^*_B(q_G, q_B) = \frac{1}{3}((2 + c)(q_G - q_B) + 2\beta) > 0. \tag{7}$$

Hence, a wider quality gap leads to a wider price differential because $p^*_G$ increases while $p^*_B$ decreases with $q_G - q_B$. Plugging $p^*_G(q_G, q_B)$ and $p^*_B(q_G, q_B)$ into (4), we get the following expression for the marginal consumer at the equilibrium prices:

$$\bar{\theta}(q_G, q_B) = \frac{k^{1/2}(q_B - q_G)}{6\beta} + \frac{1}{3}, \tag{8}$$

where $k \equiv (1 - c)^2 > 0$. Hence, a higher environmental concern allows the brown firm to capture a bigger market share because its rival builds on the resulting higher psychic costs and benefits to charge a much higher price.

### 3.3 The impact of environmental ideology on market prices

However, the level of environmental ideology must exceed the cutoff $\beta_B$ to generate this positive effect. This may explain why the global ecological footprint is unaffected by a mild environmental concern.

When $\beta = 0$, we have seen that firm $G$ serves the whole market. When $\beta$ becomes positive, we still have $\bar{\theta}(q_G, q_B) = 0$ until the threshold $\beta_G \equiv k^{1/2}(q_G - q_B) > 0$ is reached where the consumers at $\theta = 0$ are indifferent between the two products. When $\beta$ rises above $\beta_G$, both the psychic benefits of the greens and the psychic costs of the browns rise. As shown by (8), $\bar{\theta}(q_G, q_B)$ becomes positive. Therefore, product $B$ is sold to the consumers belonging to $[0, \bar{\theta}(q_G, q_B)]$. Why do some consumers now choose to buy the brown product? As $\beta$ increases, both prices increase but $p_G^*$ increases faster than $p_B^*$. When the price gap is wide enough, this induces the low $\theta$-consumers to buy $B$. In other words, a sufficiently
strong environmental ideology allows the brown product to enter the market. By implication, *a more environment-friendly population ends up with a worse ecological footprint*, the reason being that this social motivation exacerbates the perceived quality difference $Q_G - Q_B$, which in turn leads firm $G$, hence firm $B$, to charge higher prices.\footnote{Note also that this price escalation tends to reduce consumers’ real income, which may incite them to buy cheap, but dirty, goods on other markets.}

Furthermore, $\beta_G$ increases with $q_G - q_B$. Therefore, a shock that improves the environmental quality of $B$ makes it easier for this product to enter the market. Clearly, the entry of $B$ raises the global level of pollution.

The next proposition provides a summary.

**Proposition 1.** *When the degree of environmental ideology is low, the brown firm cannot enter the market. However, a sufficiently high value of $\beta > \beta_G$ leads to a higher level of pollution through the entry of the brown firm. Once this firm is in business, increasing $\beta$ raises the level of pollution because fewer consumers buy green.*

This counterintuitive result shows that a social attitude that seems beneficial to the environment may generate perverse effects by raising disproportionately the market power of the green firm. More specifically, this firm takes advantage of the growing psychic benefits associated with the consumption of the green product to raise its price at a level sufficiently high for the brown firm to enter the market or for more consumers to buy brown, even though the psychic costs associated with this consumption also increase.

**The n-firms case.** Before studying quality competition, it is worth stressing that Proposition 1 is not an artefact of working with a duopoly. To illustrate, we consider $n \geq 2$ firms whose environmental qualities are given by $q_k = kq$ for $k = 1, \ldots, n$ and $q > 0$ (in the 2-firm case considered above, we have $q_G = q_2$ and $q_B = q_1$). For analytical simplicity, we also assume that $c = 0$. The following proposition is then proved in Appendix A.

**Proposition 1a.** *There exist $n - 1$ thresholds $\beta_1 > \ldots > \beta_k > \ldots > \beta_{n-1}$ such that firm $k$ is active if and only if $\beta > \beta_k$ for $k = 1, \ldots, n - 1$. Furthermore, when $\beta$ increases, the active firms charge higher prices.*

Thus, as the environmental ideology spreads, firms enter sequentially from high to low environmental qualities because the incumbents enjoy more market power.

It might be argued that these findings are caused by the assumption of fixed environmental qualities. In other words, quality competition could lead to a better environmental outcome? To answer this question, we must determine how firms choose their qualities in a strategic context. Since solving the
vertically differentiated oligopoly problem for \( n \) qualities is notoriously hard, we return to the case of two firms.

4 The environmental qualities supplied by the market

We now turn our attention to the first stage of the game in which firms choose their environmental qualities \( q_G \) and \( q_B \) in the interval \([0, \bar{q}]\).

4.1 The case of a high supply of environmentalism

Duopoly models of vertical differentiation are characterized by interior equilibria where the two firms share the market or by corner equilibria where the high-quality firm secures the entire market (Anderson et al., 1992; Gabszewicz and Tarola, 2018).

4.1.1 Interior equilibrium

A quality equilibrium \((q^*_G, q^*_B)\) is said to be interior when \( 0 < \bar{\theta}(q^*_G, q^*_B) < 1 \), so that two firms enter the market. Assume that such an quality equilibrium exists. Plugging the prices (6) into firms' profit functions yields the payoffs of the first-stage game:

\[
\pi^*_G(q_G, q_B) = \frac{4\beta + k^{1/2} (q_G - q_B)}{18\beta} - \frac{1}{2}q_G^2, \quad \pi^*_B(q_G, q_B) = \frac{2\beta - k^{1/2} (q_G - q_B)}{18\beta} - \frac{1}{2}q_B^2. \tag{9}
\]

Note here a first difference with standard models of vertical differentiation where a wider quality gap implies higher profits for both firms. While the green firm’s profits always rise as the quality gap widens, this holds true for the brown firm if and only if \( k^{1/2} (q_G - q_B) / 2 \) remains smaller than \( \beta \). The impact of environmental ideology on profits is similar: the green firm’s profits always increase with \( \beta \) whereas the brown firm’s first decrease and then decrease. This is because psychic benefits and costs both rise but also diverge more and more.

Since the function \( \pi_i \) is quadratic in \( q_i \), then \( \pi_i \) is strictly concave in \( q_i \) if and only if the coefficient of \( q_i^2 \) in the function (9) is negative, that is

\[
\beta > \frac{k}{9}. \tag{10}
\]

In this case, the function \( \pi_i \) is continuous and strictly concave on the compact interval \([0, \bar{q}]\), which implies that the quality game has a Nash equilibrium.

The first-order conditions with respect to qualities yield the following best-reply functions:
\[ q^*_G(q_B) = \min \left\{ \max \left\{ 0, \frac{k^{1/2}(4B - k^{1/2}q_B)}{9B - k} \right\}, \bar{q} \right\}, \quad q^*_B(q_G) = \min \left\{ \max \left\{ 0, \frac{k^{1/2}(2B - k^{1/2}q_G)}{9B - k} \right\}, \bar{q} \right\}. \tag{11a} \]

When (10) holds, qualities are strategic substitutes, that is, when a firm increases (resp., decreases) the environmental quality of its product, its rival finds it profit-maximizing to decrease (resp., increase) its own quality. This concurs with the wide-spread idea that quality differentiation relaxes price competition.

The candidate equilibrium qualities are obtained by solving the system of linear equations (11a) whose unique solution is:

\[ q^*_G = \frac{2k^{1/2}}{3} \frac{6B - k}{9B - 2k} > q^*_B = \frac{2k^{1/2}}{3} \frac{3B - k}{9B - 2k}. \tag{12} \]

Note that the average quality \((q^*_G + q^*_B)/2 = k^{1/2}/3\) is independent of \(B\).

For (12) to be an interior quality equilibrium, \(q^*_G\) and \(q^*_B\) must satisfy the following conditions: (i) \(\bar{q} > q^*_G > q^*_B > 0\), (ii) \(\bar{q}(q^*_G, q^*_B) \in (0, 1)\), and (iii) \(\pi^*_G(q^*_G, q^*_B) > \pi^*_B(q^*_G, q^*_B) > 0\).

First, it is readily verified that \(q^*_G > q^*_B\) if and only if

\[ \beta > \frac{2k}{9} \tag{13} \]

holds, while \(q^*_B > 0\) if and only if\(^2\)

\[ \beta > \frac{k}{3}. \tag{14} \]

Clearly, (14) is more stringent than (10) and (13). Unless explicitly mentioned, we assume that this condition holds. Moreover, we have \(q^*_G < \bar{q}\) because \(q^*_B > 0\).

Second, the marginal consumer (8) at (12) is such that

\[ \bar{q}(q^*_G, q^*_B) = \frac{3B - k}{9B - 2k}. \tag{15} \]

It is readily verified that \(0 < \bar{q} < 1\) always holds under (14).

Third, substituting (12) in (6), we obtain the equilibrium markups and profits:

\[ p^*_G(q^*_G, q^*_B) - cq^*_G = \frac{2B(6B - k)}{9B - 2k}, \quad p^*_B(q^*_G, q^*_B) - cq^*_B = \frac{2B(3B - k)}{9B - 2k}, \tag{16} \]

and

\[ \pi^*_G(q^*_G, q^*_B) = \frac{2(6B - k)^2(9B - k)}{9(9B - 2k)^2}, \quad \pi^*_B(q^*_G, q^*_B) = \frac{2(3B - k)^2(9B - k)}{9(9B - 2k)^2}. \tag{17} \]

\(^2\)Observe that \(q^*_B > 0\) also holds when both the numerator and denominator of \(q^*_B\) are negative. This case is considered in Section 6.
which are all positive by implication of (14). Observe also that both $\pi^*_G(q_G^*, q_B^*)$ and $\pi^*_B(q_G^*, q_B^*)$ raise with $\beta$, which confirms what we said in the foregoing, namely, *environmentalism endows firms with market power*. Since $\pi^*_G(q_G^*, q_B^*) - \pi^*_B(q_G^*, q_B^*) > 0$, each firm would like to be the quality leader at the equilibrium like in standard models of vertical differentiation.

Furthermore, since qualities are strategic substitutes, the quality space is endogenously bounded above by

$$q_G^*(0) = \frac{4k^{1/2}\beta}{9\beta - k} > 0.$$  

We will see below that $k^{1/2}$ is another upper bound on $q_G$. Therefore, we set

$$\bar{q} = \max \{q_G^*(0), k^{1/2}\}.$$  

(18)

Note that $\bar{q} = q_G^*(0)$ if and only if $\beta > k/5$.

To sum up, we have shown the following result: if $\beta > k/3$, there exists a unique (up to a permutation of firms’ names) subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and both firms share the market.

### 4.1.2 Corner equilibrium

What happens to the market outcome when (14) does not hold? Plugging $q_B^* = 0$ in (11a) yields the corresponding equilibrium quality of the green product when $\beta = k/3$:

$$q_G^*(0) = \frac{4\beta k^{1/2}}{9\beta - k},$$  

(19)

while $\tilde{\theta}(q_G^*(0), 0) = 0$. In this case, the green firm sets the highest price such that the consumers at $\theta = 0$ are indifferent between buying the green quality $q_G^*(0)$ or the brown quality $q_B^* = 0$ at price $p_B^* = cq_B^* = 0$. In other words, the green firm sets a price $p_G$ such that

$$q_G^*(0) + \beta\theta - p_G = 0 - \beta\theta - 0,$$

holds for the consumers at $\theta = 0$ who are indifferent between $G$ and $B$. Therefore, firm $G$ chooses the *limit price* $p_G^*(q_G) = q_G^*(0)$, which agrees with (5), and its profits are given by

$$\pi_G(q_G^*(0), 0) = \frac{4\beta k(7\beta - k)}{(9\beta - k)^2}.$$  

Since $\tilde{\theta}(q_G^*(0), 0)$ increases with $\beta$, the green firm accurately anticipates that $\tilde{\theta} = 0$ when $\beta < k/3$, while it will charge its limit price $p_G^* = q_G$. As a result, this firm’s profit function is no longer given by (9), but by the following expression where we have set $p_G^* = q_G$:

$$\pi_G(q_G, 0) = k^{1/2}q_G - \frac{q_G^2}{2}.$$  

(20)
It is then immediate that (20) is maximized at $q^*_G = k^{1/2}$ while the corresponding profits are equal to $\pi_G(k^{1/2}, 0) = k/2 > 0$.

It remains to check whether firm $G$ prefers $k^{1/2}$ or $q^*_G(0)$ when $q_B^* = 0$. It is readily verified that

$$\pi_G(k^{1/2}, 0) - \pi_G(q^*_G(0), 0) = \frac{k (5\beta - k)^2}{2 (9\beta - k)^2} > 0,$$

so that $q^*_G(0)$ is not firm $G$’s best reply against $q_B = 0$ for $\beta < k/3$. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium of the quality game is given by $(k^{1/2}, 0)$ for $\beta < k/3$. That the limit price $p_G = q^*_G$ is the green firm’s Nash strategy when consumers are not very heterogeneous is in accordance with the literature on vertical differentiation (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Anderson et al., 1992; Gabszewicz and Tarola, 2018). The limit price is larger than the marginal cost $c q^*_G$ because $c < 1$, but lower than the monopoly price because $G$ is constrained in its price choice by potential competition with $B$. The market now has the structure of a natural monopoly in the sense that it can sustain only one firm.

The expression (21) has another consequence: $(k^{1/2}, 0)$ is a Nash equilibrium over the interval $(k/3, \tilde{\beta})$ with $\tilde{\beta} = k/3$ (see Appendix B.1). Consequently, there exist two pure strategy equilibria given by the interior equilibrium $(q^*_G, q_B^*)$ and the corner equilibrium $(k^{1/2}, 0)$ over this interval. So, we need a selection device to pin down one equilibrium.

Consider the following $2 \times 2$ game where the players are firms $G$ and $B$ whose strategy spaces are, respectively, $\{k^{1/2}, q^*_A\}$ and $\{0, q^*_B\}$. The corresponding payoff matrix is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0</th>
<th>$q^*_B$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$k^{1/2}$</td>
<td>$\pi_G(k^{1/2}, 0), \pi_B(k^{1/2}, 0)$</td>
<td>$\pi_G(k^{1/2}, q^<em>_B), \pi_B(k^{1/2}, q^</em>_B)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$q^*_G$</td>
<td>$\pi_G(q^<em>_G, 0), \pi_B(q^</em>_G, 0)$</td>
<td>$\pi_G(q^<em>_G, q^</em>_B), \pi_B(q^<em>_G, q^</em>_B)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria given by $(k^{1/2}, 0)$ and $(q^*_A, q^*_B)$. No equilibrium Pareto-dominates the other because

$$\pi_G(k^{1/2}, 0) > \pi^*_G(q^*_G, q^*_B), \quad \pi^*_B(q^*_G, q^*_B) > \pi_B(k^{1/2}, 0).$$

Standard refinements must be ruled out because they do not select among strict Nash equilibria such as ours. One noticeable exception is the concept of risk-dominance introduced by Harsanyi and Selten (1988), which extends the concept of Pareto-dominance. The argument goes as follows. The corner outcome (say) is a risk-dominant equilibrium if

$$\left[\pi_G(k^{1/2}, 0) - \pi_G(q^*_G, 0)\right] \cdot \left[\pi_B(k^{1/2}, 0) - \pi_B(k^{1/2}, q_B^*)\right]$$

$$> \left[\pi_G(q^*_G, q^*_B) - \pi_G(k^{1/2}, q_B^*)\right] \cdot \left[\pi_B(q^*_G, q^*_B) - \pi_B(q^*_G, 0)\right]$$

holds. When the opposite inequality holds, the risk-dominant equilibrium is the interior outcome. In words, $\pi_G(k^{1/2}, 0) - \pi_G(q^*_G, 0)$ is the gain made by firm $G$ when firm $G$ predicts accurately that firm $B$
will play 0 and best responds to this prediction by playing $k^{1/2}$, instead of predicting wrongly that firm $B$ will play $q_B^*$. The same holds mutatis mutandis for firm $B$. By choosing a risk-dominant equilibrium, firms $G$ and $B$ maximize the product of their deviation losses.

The following lemma is proven in Appendix B.2.

**Lemma 1.** On the interval $(k/3, \bar{\beta})$, the corner equilibrium $(k^{1/2}, 0)$ risk-dominates the interior equilibrium $(q_G^*, q_B^*)$.

### 4.2 The case of a low supply of environmentalism

It remains to discuss the case where $\beta < k/9$. When this inequality holds, we know that $\pi_G$ (resp., $\pi_B$) is strictly convex in $q_G$ (resp., $q_B$). Thus, regardless of the value of $q_B$, $\pi_G$ is maximized at $q_G = 0$ or at $q_G = \bar{q}$ where (18) implies $\bar{q} = k^{1/2}$. The same holds for firm $B$. In other words, we have a $2 \times 2$ game where the two firms share the same strategy set $\{0, \bar{q}\}$.

Observe first that $(\bar{q}, \bar{q})$ cannot be an equilibrium because both firms make negative profits. Second, plugging $q_G = \bar{q}$ and $q_B = 0$ in (8) implies that $\partial(\bar{q}, 0) = 0$. In this case, firm $G$ chooses the limit price $p_G = \bar{q}$, so that its profits are given by

$$\pi_G(\bar{q}, 0) = k^{1/2}\bar{q} - \frac{1}{2}\bar{q}^2 = k/2 > 0.$$ 

Last, $(0, 0)$ is not a Nash equilibrium because firm $G$’s best reply against $q_B = 0$ is $k^{1/2}$. As a result, $(k^{1/2}, 0)$ is the only Nash equilibrium of the quality game for $\beta < k/9$.

The following proposition summarizes the above findings.

**Proposition 2.** (i) For $0 < \beta < k/3$, $(k^{1/2}, 0)$ is the only Nash equilibrium. (ii) For $k/3 < \beta < 0.410k$, $(k^{1/2}, 0)$ is the Nash equilibrium selected by the risk-dominance criterion. (iii) For $\beta > \bar{\beta}$, the two firms share the market at the qualities $(q_G^*, q_B^*)$ and prices $(p_G^*, p_B^*)$.

This proposition confirms the idea that motivates this paper, i.e., environmentalism affects the market outcome but in ways that are hard to predict. More specifically, the supply of environmentalism has no impact on the equilibrium outcome and its environmental performance when it does not exceed the threshold $\bar{\beta}$. Consequently, the environmental ideology must be strong enough to have an impact on the greenness of the economy. Furthermore, the equilibrium strategy $q_G^*$ at the interior equilibrium is such that

$$q_G^* = \frac{2k^{1/2}}{3} \frac{6\beta - k}{9\bar{\beta} - 2k} < k^{1/2}.$$ 

As a result, in societies where the protection of the environment is not a significant concern ($\beta < \bar{\beta}$), market competition leads the green firm to invest more in environmental quality because it has less market power.
5 Environmentalism and the market

The general belief holds that a higher concern about the ecological implications of consumerism fosters a better environment through more selective consumers’ choices. This argument is too simplistic. First, it disregards the fact that consumers’ choices are also influenced by the prices and qualities of the goods made available on the market. For example, when the brown product is cheaper than the green one, the consumers whose willingness-to-pay is low will purchase the brown one. More importantly, by changing consumers’ incentives, environmentalism leads firms to revise their price and quality strategies in a way that need not reduce the carbon footprint generated by the consumption of the goods. In other words, environmentalism may generate effects unexpected by activists who often overlook the way markets work.

5.1 How the environmental ideology affects firms’ qualities?

In what follows, we study the effect of a change in $\beta$, which captures the population’s environmental ideology, on the market outcome.

(i) Assume first that $\beta > \bar{\beta}$. Totally differentiating the first-order conditions for the equilibrium qualities with respect to $\beta$ yields the following expressions:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{sign} \frac{d q_G^*}{d \beta} &= \text{sign} \frac{\partial^2 \pi_G^*(q_G^*, q_B^*)}{\partial \beta \partial q_G} = \text{sign}(q_B^* - q_G^*), \\
\text{sign} \frac{d q_B^*}{d \beta} &= \text{sign} \frac{\partial^2 \pi_B^*(q_G^*, q_B^*)}{\partial \beta \partial q_B} = \text{sign}(q_G^* - q_B^*),
\end{align*}
\]

so that

\[
\frac{d q_G^*}{d \beta} < 0 \quad \frac{d q_B^*}{d \beta} > 0.
\]

In words, a hike in the degree of environmental ideology leads the brown firm to produce a better environmental quality whereas the green firm chooses to raise its emission of pollutants. Hence, a more environmental-friendly population does not leads both firms to choose better environmental qualities. On the contrary, the quality gap shrinks symmetrically about the average quality $k = \frac{1}{2}$ for $\frac{d q_G^*}{d \beta} < 0 \quad \frac{d q_B^*}{d \beta} > 0$. These findings are not straightforward because the literature suggests instead that firms have a taste for product differentiation that often leads them to move far apart (Tirole, 1988). However, we want to stress that firms’ desire to differentiate their products does not mean that they want to choose maximal differentiation. In the above, even though the quality gap shrinks, firms $G$ and $B$ keep selling different qualities.

Consider first the impact of a higher environmental ideology ($\beta \uparrow$) on the equilibrium prices when qualities are given. As the psychic benefits and costs increase with $\beta$, firm $G$ enjoys relatively more market power than firm $B$ because the perceived quality gap $Q_G - Q_B$ widens with $\beta$. Furthermore, since
c < 1, (7) implies that a change in the quality gap \( q_G - q_B \) is associated with a less than proportional change in the price gap. Moreover, (8) shows that more consumers buy green when the quality gap shrinks (\( \bar{\theta} \downarrow \)). Combining these various effects allows the green firm to save on its investment expenditures by reducing its quality without reducing much its market share. Since the brown firm loses some market power relative to the green firm, the former strives to regain consumers by improving its own quality. Eventually, both the quality and price gaps end up being narrower after the rise in the supply of environmentalism. Hence, more consumers buy brown. It should be clear that the environmental consequences of these changes in firms’ strategies are not easy to predict.

A standard argument of product differentiation theory would suggest that the impact of \( \beta \) on firms’ profits is negative because products are less differentiated. Let us show that things are more involved than that.

Using (17), It is straightforward to check that \( d\pi_B^*(q_G^*, q_B^*)/d\beta > 0 \) always holds. However, \( d\pi_G^*(q_G^*, q_B^*)/d\beta \) is positive if and only if \( \beta > \hat{\beta} \equiv (\sqrt{17}/9 + 1)k > \bar{\beta} \) because \( \pi_G^*(q_G^*, q_B^*) > k/2 \) at \( \hat{\beta} \). When \( \beta \in (\bar{\beta}, \hat{\beta}) \), firm G’s profits decrease with \( \beta \). Indeed, the higher psychic benefits associated with the consumption of the green variant do not endow firm G with enough market power to compensate this firm for the narrower quality gap that favors firm B.

In other words, environmentalism is beneficial to both firms when \( \beta > \hat{\beta} \), an effect that environmental activists do not probably suspect. This is so because, when \( \beta \) is sufficiently large, higher psychic benefits and costs make consumers sufficiently heterogeneous to permit firms to charge higher prices. However, a higher \( \beta \) may be detrimental to the green firm for intermediate value of \( \beta \) because the stronger heterogeneity of consumers does not compensate this firm for its shrinking market share.

(ii) We now come to the case where \( 0 < \beta < \bar{\beta} \). Proposition 2 implies that \( q_G^* = k^{1/2} \) and \( q_B^* = 0 \). Therefore, the green quality does not depend on the environmentalism.

Thus, firms operating in a more environmental-friendly society need not choose better environmental qualities. More importantly, since \( k^{1/2} > q_G^* > q_B^* \), the market delivers the best ecological outcome when environmentalism is weak.

### 5.2 Environmental surplus and social welfare

We now turn our attention to the impact of green consumerism on the environmental surplus and social welfare generated by the market equilibrium described in Proposition 2. More specifically, does a greener society incentivize firms to choose qualities and prices such that consumers’ choices lead to a better environment and/or a higher social welfare? To assess the overall impact of a quality pair \( (q_G, q_B) \), we use two different criteria, i.e., the environmental surplus and the social welfare.
5.2.1 Environmental surplus

The environmental surplus ($ES$) measures the environmental impact of the consumption of the green and brown variants at the market outcome. It is defined as the sum of the market shares of the two variants, weighted by the environmental quality of the corresponding product:

$$ES(q_G, q_B) \equiv EG(q_G, q_B) + EB(q_G, q_B) = [1 - \bar{\theta}(q_G, q_B)] \cdot q_G + \bar{\theta}(q_G, q_B) \cdot q_B.$$ 

Recall that we have normalized the best environmental quality to $\bar{q}$ and the worst to 0. As a result, the environmental surplus is minimized when all consumers purchase the quality $q = 0$, whereas $ES$ reaches its highest value when all consumers buy the quality $\bar{q}$. The value of $ES$ always increases when a growing number of consumers buy the green variant. By contrast, the opposite holds when more consumers purchase the brown variant. This highlights the role of the marginal consumer in evaluating the environmental surplus generated by a given quality pair $(q_G, q_B)$. Furthermore, when firms change the environmental quality of their products, this has a direct effect on the environmental surplus, but also an indirect impact through the new value of the marginal consumer $\bar{\theta}$ since this one varies with $q_G$ and $q_B$ according to (15). Consequently, the impact of $\beta$ on $ES$ must account for several distinct effects.\(^3\)

Assume a environmentalist society that evaluates the market outcome through the sole criterion $ES$. We only discuss the case where both firms share the market because the quality $k^{1/2}$ in independent of $\beta$ for $\beta < \bar{\beta}$. It then follows from (15) that more consumers buy brown when $\beta$ rises. Since $q_G^*$ decreases with $\beta$, $EG$ thus decreases. As for the brown variant, we have seen that its quality rises. Since the market share of firm $B$ increases, the net impact on $EB$ is positive. In sum, the impact of $\beta$ on $EG$ and $EB$ are opposite. Comparing the variations of $EG$ and $EB$ shows that $|dEG/d\beta| > |dEB/d\beta|$ holds, which means that $ES$ decreases when the environmental ideology is heightened (see Appendix C.1).

Since the green firm enjoys more significant psychic benefits, it is able to supply a lower quality sold at a higher price. These two effects incentivize more consumers to shift to brown. In addition, the brown firm supplies a better quality which should attract even more consumers away from firm $G$ despite the higher psychic costs. The combination of all these effects allows firm $B$ to raise its price, but not as much as its rival. The net negative effect on $EG$ dominates the net positive effect on $EB$, so that the environmental surplus associated with the market outcome decreases with $\beta$.

Disregarding the costs generated by the supply of environmental qualities seems too extreme for the following two reasons. First, besides consumption, production often generates pollution. Second, increasing the environmental surplus at a monetary cost that exceeds the opportunity cost of money is obviously not socially desirable. This is why we find it more reasonable to consider the net environmental

\(^3\)Note that maximizing the environmental surplus is equivalent to minimizing the environmental damage $ED \equiv \bar{q} - ES$, which is often used in the literature.
surplus defined as follows:
\[ NES(q_G, q_B) = ES(q_G, q_B) - C(q_G, q_B), \]
where the total cost
\[ C(q_G, q_B) = cq_G(1 - \tilde{\theta}) + cq_B\tilde{\theta} + \frac{1}{2}q_G^2 + \frac{1}{2}q_B^2, \]
is the social cost of producing the qualities \( q_G \) and \( q_B \) when the mass of green consumers is \( 1 - \tilde{\theta} \) while \( \tilde{\theta} \) is the mass of brown consumers.

Recall that the average quality \( (q_G^* + q_B^*)/2 \) is independent of \( \beta \). When \( q_G^* \) decreases by the amount \( \Delta > 0 \) while \( q_B^* \) increases by the same amount, the investment cost \( q_G^2/2 + q_B^2/2 \) decreases with \( \beta \). Since the environmental surplus and the investment costs vary in the same direction, while \( (1 - \tilde{\theta})cq_G^* \) and \( \tilde{\theta}q_B^* \) move in opposite directions, the impact of \( \beta \) on \( NES \) is a priori ambiguous. Nevertheless, Appendix C.1 shows that the net environmental surplus decreases with the supply of environmentalism, i.e., the drop in \( ES \) dominates the drop in costs.\(^4\)

Summing up the above results, we have the following proposition.

**Proposition 3.** Assume \( \beta > \tilde{\beta} \). Then, a higher supply of environmentalism makes firms better-off but worsens the (net) environmental surplus at the market outcome.

The result, which clashes with mainstream pro-environmental claims, tells us something important: a greener society does not trigger a better ecological footprint because firms adjust their qualities in a way that may incite more consumers to purchase the brown variant, while the green firms reduces its environmental quality. This highlights once more the need to study how the market selects prices and qualities before evaluating the social desirability of environmentalism.

### 5.2.2 Social welfare

Since all consumers buy a single unit of the differentiated product, there is no deadweight loss. Therefore, prices have the nature of transfers from consumers to firms and need not be taken into account. The social welfare must account for the psychic benefits and costs. As indirect utilities are linear, the social benefit associated with the consumption of the green variant may be obtained by summing the gross indirect utilities across greens:

\[ SG(q_G, q_B) \equiv \int_{\tilde{\theta}}^{1} (q_G + \beta \theta) d\theta = (1 - \tilde{\theta})q_G + \frac{\beta}{2}(1 - \tilde{\theta}^2), \]

\(^{4}\)In the foregoing, we assume that \( ES \) and \( C \) are directly comparable because consumers know the “true” social value of the environmental qualities. However, in a population formed by individuals having different attitudes toward the environment, finding a consensus on the value of environment might be problematic. One way out is consider \( \lambda ES - C \) as the environmental surplus where the parameter \( \lambda \) is treated as the “shadow price” of environmental qualities. When these ones are endowed with a higher weight than costs (\( \lambda > 1 \)), \( \lambda ES \) still decreases with \( \beta \) while the drop in \( \lambda ES \) still dominates the drop in \( C \). Hence, \( \lambda ES - C \) decreases with \( \beta \) even when \( \lambda \) takes on higher values.
while the social benefit generated across browns is similarly defined by

\[ SB(q_G, q_B) \equiv \int_0^\theta (q_B - \beta \theta) d\theta = \bar{q}_B - \frac{\beta}{2} \theta^2. \]

The social welfare (SW) is then given by

\[ SW(q_G, q_B) \equiv SG + SB - C(q_G, q_B). \] (23)

Hence, the social welfare encompasses the (net) environmental surplus.

Observe that \( SW = NES + \Psi(\beta) \) where the net psychic benefits is given by

\[ \Psi(\beta) \equiv \beta/2 - \beta \theta^2. \]

As shown in Appendix C.2, the function \( \Psi \) is convex in \( \beta \) and the derivative of \( \Psi \) at \( \beta = 2k/3 \) is positive. Therefore, in response to a higher supply of environmentalism, firms adjust their qualities to raise the net psychic benefits at an increasing rate. To put it differently, instead of reducing the ecological footprint, environmentalism incentivizes firms to choose qualities that make consumers psychologically better-off.

Since \( NES \) decreases while \( \Psi \) increases with \( \beta \), the impact of environmentalism on social welfare is a priori undetermined. We then proceed as follows.

Differentiating (23) twice shows that the social welfare function is convex in \( \beta \) (see Appendix C.3). Since \( SW \) has a positive intercept for all \( k \in [0,1] \) while the derivative of \( SW \) at \( k/3 \) is negative for all \( k \in [0,1] \), the function \( SW \) reaches its minimum at \( \tilde{\beta} > k/3 \). In other words, \( SW \) decreases over \( (k/3, \tilde{\beta}) \) and increases for \( \beta > \tilde{\beta} \).

Hence, we have shown the following proposition.

**Proposition 4.** As the level of environmentalism steadily rises, the social welfare at the market outcome first decreases and, then, increases.

In other words, environmentalism delivers its expected effects when it reaches a sufficiently high level. However, the so-obtained welfare gains are not generated by a less polluted environment since the (net) environmental surplus goes down. Rather, these welfare gains stem from the additional benefits consumers enjoy by purchasing green. Once more, this result shows that greener consumerism is not the solution to our environmental problems. Quite unexpectedly, it may even worsen the outgoing situation because a higher supply of environmentalism affects firms’ behavior in ways that are not necessarily easy to understand when strategic interactions between firms are ignored.

### 6 Environmental policies

In a way, the above findings are disappointing. This leads us to consider the following policy instruments: (i) the development of green technologies and (ii) a minimum quality standard. We discuss their
efficiency per se. Furthermore, when combined with these instruments, environmentalism might deliver its expected payoffs. Unless explicitly mentioned, we consider only the case of an interior equilibrium.

6.1 Green technologies

It is widely accepted among policy-makers that the use of more environmental-friendly technologies is one of the main tools that should permit the development of a green society. Reformulating this idea in our setting amounts to assuming that firms have access to a technology that allows them to produce \( q_G \) and \( q_B \) at lower costs. We are agnostic about the reasons that explain the emergence of this new technology. In this section, our aim is instead to investigate the market and environmental effects of such a technology. More specifically, we consider a cost function, which we view as a reduced form for an abatement or replacement technology designed through innovations or governments subsidizes.

So far, we have assumed that production costs are given by \( cq + q^2/2 \). We start by assuming that firms’ fixed costs decrease. Formally, the fixed production costs are now defined as follows:

\[
F(q) = \frac{q^2}{2\gamma},
\]

where \( \gamma > 0 \) measures the technological greenness of the production technique: the higher \( \gamma \), the lower the cost of designing the environmental quality \( q \). Since we have normalized \( \gamma = 1 \) in the previous sections, we study how increasing \( \gamma \) above 1 affects the market outcome.

**Fixed costs.** Assume for the moment that both firms adopt the new technology described by (24). Following Section 4, it can be shown that, for \( \beta > \tilde{\beta}_\gamma \equiv \gamma\beta = 0.410\gamma k/3 \), the equilibrium qualities are given by

\[
q_G = \frac{2\gamma k^{1/2}}{3} \frac{6\beta - \gamma k}{9\beta - 2\gamma k} > q_B = \frac{2\gamma k^{1/2}}{3} \frac{3\beta - \gamma k}{9\beta - 2\gamma k},
\]

which are both positive since \( \beta > \tilde{\beta}_\gamma \). When this inequality does not hold, we have a corner solution which involves only the green firm.

It is readily verified that the green quality increase with the degree of technological greenness. As for the brown one, the argument goes as follows. We have:

\[
\frac{dq_B}{d\gamma} = \frac{2k^{1/2}2k^2\gamma^2 + 9\beta (3\beta - 2k\gamma)}{(9\beta - 2k\gamma)^2}.
\]

As the numerator of this expression is a quadratic and convex function of \( \beta \) which is positive at \( \beta = 0 \), the brown quality also increases with \( \gamma \) when \( \beta > 0.526\gamma k \). Thus, both environmental qualities increase with technological greenness when the supply of environmentalism is sufficiently high. In this case, the
green quality rises faster than the brown one. This is because the strict convexity of the fixed cost
function implies that a higher technological greenness has a bigger impact on firm $G$ than on firm $B$.

Furthermore, the average quality

$$\frac{q^G + q^B}{2} = \frac{\gamma k^{1/2}}{3},$$

increases with $\gamma$ while the quality gap, hence the price differential, widens.

Moreover, it holds that

$$\bar{\theta}(q^G, q^B) = \frac{3\beta - \gamma k}{9\beta - 2\gamma k} > 0,$$

because $\beta > \gamma k/3$. Differentiating this expression with respect to $\gamma$ shows that the market share of the
green variant grows with $\gamma$.

Since the environmental surplus is given by

$$ES^\gamma = \frac{2k^{1/2}\gamma}{3} \frac{2k^2\gamma^2 - 18k\beta\gamma + 45\beta^2}{(9\beta - 2\gamma k)},$$

The derivative of $ES$ with respect to $\gamma$ is equal to

$$\frac{dES^\gamma}{d\gamma} = (15\beta - 2k\gamma) \frac{2k^2\gamma^2 - 12k\beta\gamma + 27\beta^2}{(9\beta - 2\gamma k)^3},$$

which is positive for all $\beta$ and $\gamma$.

Moreover, the effect on net environmental surplus is also positive. Indeed, we have:

$$NES^\gamma = \frac{2k\gamma (3 - k)}{9} \frac{(2k^2\gamma^2 + 9\beta (5\beta - 2k\gamma))}{(9\beta - 2k\gamma)^2},$$

so that

$$\frac{dNES^\gamma}{d\gamma} = \frac{2k(3-k)(15\beta - 2k\gamma)}{9} \frac{2k^2\gamma^2 + 27\beta^2 - 12k\beta\gamma}{(9\beta - 2k\gamma)^3} > 0.$$

For the above findings to be meaningful, it must that the two firms adopt the new technology. But
do they want to do so? Plugging (25) in (9) yields the following equilibrium profits:

$$\pi^G(q^G, q^B) = \frac{2}{9} \frac{(9\beta - k\gamma^2)(6\beta - k\gamma^2)}{(9\beta - 2k\gamma)^2}, \quad \pi^B(q^G, q^B) = \frac{2}{9} \frac{(9\beta - k\gamma^2)(3\beta - k\gamma^2)}{(9\beta - 2k\gamma)^2}. \quad (26)$$

Differentiating these expressions with respect to $\gamma$ shows that firm $G$’s profits increase with $\gamma$. By
contrast, firm $B$’s profits decrease because $\beta > \gamma k/3$. As a result, it is not clear that firm $B$ wants to
adopt the new technology.

Consider a game prior to the quality game, where each firm chooses either to adopt or not to adopt
the $\gamma$-technology. Lemma 2, proven in Appendix D, shows that both firms choose the $\gamma$-technology.

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**Lemma 2.** In the $2 \times 2$ game where firms chooses between the old and new technologies, adopting the new technology is a dominant strategy for each firm.

Like in Section 4, when $\beta < \bar{\beta}_1$, the market outcome is given by the corner equilibrium where firm $G$’s strategy is given by $q_G = \gamma k^{1/2}$, which increases with $\gamma$, while firm $B$’s strategy is still $q_B = 0$. Here too, technological greenness leads to a better environmental outcome.

We may thus conclude that $\beta$ and $\gamma$ affect the market outcome in opposite ways: whereas green consumerism has a negative direct impact on environmental qualities and surplus, technological greenness delivers positive effects.

Observe that

$$\frac{\partial^2 ES^\gamma}{\partial \beta \partial \gamma} = -36\beta\gamma k \frac{9\beta + k\gamma}{(9\beta - 2k\gamma)^4} < 0.$$  

Hence, environmentalism weakens the positive effects of green technologies.

**Marginal quality cost.** We now investigate to the impact of a lower marginal quality cost. Since $k$ decreases with $c$, a lower marginal quality cost amounts to a higher $k$.

Assume first that $\beta > \bar{\beta}$. Differentiating (12) with respect to $k$ yields:

$$\frac{dq_G^\gamma}{dk} = \frac{1}{3k^{1/2}} \frac{54\beta^2 - 15k\beta + 2k^2}{(9\beta - 2k)^2}, \quad \frac{dq_B^\gamma}{dk} = \frac{1}{3k^{1/2}} \frac{(3\beta - 2k)(9\beta - k)}{(9\beta - 2k)^2}.$$  

The sign of $dq_G^\gamma/dk$ is given by the sign of the numerator, which is a convex parabola of $k$. This parabola is positive at $k = 0$ and its minimum is reached at $k = 15/4\beta$. Plugging this value in the numerator shows that this one is always positive. Therefore, the green quality increases with $k$. As for the brown quality, it is immediate that $dq_B^\gamma/dk$ is positive since $\beta > k/9$. In other words, the brown quality also increases with $k$. Consequently, the average quality rises when the marginal quality cost decreases.

Differentiating (15) with respect to $k$ shows that more consumers buy the brown quality when $k$ increases ($\bar{\theta} \uparrow$). Nevertheless, it is easy to show that the impact of $k$ on the environmental surplus is positive. Furthermore, the net environmental surplus also increases with $k$.

Clearly, when $\beta < \bar{\beta}$, it is immediate that the equilibrium quality $k^{1/2}$ increases with $k$.

Summarizing yields the following proposition.

**Proposition 5.** For all levels of environmental ideology, a greener technology leads to a better environmental outcome.

Hence, unlike environmentalism, a higher technological greenness always leads the market to provide better environmental solutions.
6.2 Minimum quality standard

Assume that $\beta > 6k/9$, so that the quality equilibrium is interior and given by (12) at the unregulated market outcome. The minimum quality standard (MQS) $Q$ must be such that $Q > q_B^*$, for otherwise the MQS would not bind. Since profit functions are strictly concave, there exists a quality equilibrium $(q_G^*, q_B^*)$ of the game where the strategy space of the brown firm is given by $[Q, \bar{q}]$. If $q_B^* > Q$, $q_B^*$ maximizes $\pi_B(q_G^*, q_B)$ over $[Q, \bar{q}]$. Since $\pi_B(q_G^*, q_B)$ is strictly concave over $[0, \bar{q}]$, $q_B^* > Q$ implies that $q_B^*$ also maximizes $\pi_B(q_G^*, q_B)$ over $[0, \bar{q}]$. In this case, there would exist two interior quality equilibria, $(q_G^*, q_B^*)$ and $(q_G^*, q_B^*)$, which contradicts Proposition 2. Therefore, in equilibrium, it is profit-maximizing for the brown firm to supply the quality $Q$. It then follows from (11a) that the green firm chooses the quality

$$q_G^*(Q) = \frac{k^{1/2}(4\beta - k^{1/2}Q)}{9\beta - k}. \quad (27)$$

Hence, $(q_G^*(Q), Q)$ is the only candidate Nash equilibrium of the quality game where the strategy space of the brown firm is given by $[Q, \bar{q}]$. However, for $(q_G^*(Q), Q)$ to be a Nash equilibrium, the following conditions must be satisfied: (i) $q_G^*(Q) > Q$, (ii) $\pi_B(q_G^*(Q), Q) > 0$, and (iii) $0 < \bar{\theta}(q_G^*(Q), Q) < 1$.

First, $q_G^*(Q) > Q$ holds if and only if $Q < 4k^{1/2}/9 < \bar{q}$. In this case, the quality gap $q_G^*(Q) - Q$ shrinks as $Q$ rises. It then follows from (6) that the green firm sets a lower price whereas the brown firm is able to charge a higher price in the ensuing price subgame.

Since $q_G^*(Q)$ decreases with $Q$ and $Q > q_B^*$, we have $q_G^*(Q) < q_G^*$. Plugging $q_G^*(Q)$ and $Q$ in (8) yields the marginal consumer

$$\bar{\theta}(q_G^*(Q), Q) = \frac{16\beta - 2k + 3Qk^{1/2}}{2(9\beta - k)}, \quad (28)$$

which increases with $Q$. Indeed, as $Q$ rises, the quality of the green variant decreases, which makes $B$ more attractive to a wider range of consumers. By contrast, raising $Q$ renders the green variant relatively more attractive because its price decreases, so that more consumers buy green.

Second, differentiating twice the profit function $\pi_B(q_G^*(Q), Q)$ with respect to $Q$ shows that the equilibrium profits of the brown firm are strictly concave in $Q$. Applying the first-order condition to $\pi_B$ indicates that the maximizer $\bar{Q}$ of $\pi_B$ is positive while the equation $\pi_B = 0$ has a unique positive solution $Q_0$. Since $\pi_B(0) > 0$, the function $\pi_B$ increases over $(Q, \bar{Q})$ and decreases toward 0 over $(\bar{Q}, Q_0)$. Hence, the MQS $Q$ must be lower than the two upper bounds $4k^{1/2}/9$ and $Q_0$. It can be shown that the binding condition is given by $Q_{\text{max}} \equiv 4k^{1/2}/9 < Q_0$. Substituting $4k^{1/2}/9$ in (28) shows that $0 < \bar{\theta}(q_G^*(Q), Q) < 1$.

We now study the impact of the MQS $Q$ on the environmental surplus $ES(q_G^*(Q), Q)$. As in Section 4, we consider separately $EG$ and $EB$. Differentiating $EG(q_G^*(Q), Q)$ with respect to $Q$ shows that the
first-order condition has a single positive solution given by

$$Q_0 = \frac{4\beta}{k^{1/2}},$$

which is larger than $Q_{\text{max}}$. Inspecting (27) and (28) shows that $E\varphi$ is strictly convex in $Q$. As a result, $E\varphi$ decreases on $(q_B^*, Q_{\text{max}})$. Furthermore, since $\tilde{E}^*(q_G^*(Q), Q)$ increases with $Q$, $E\varphi = Q\tilde{E}^*(q_G^*(Q), Q)$ increases on $(q_B^*, Q_{\text{max}})$.

We now come to the total impact of the MQS on the environmental surplus:

$$ES(q_G^*(Q), Q) = \frac{1}{2} \frac{127\beta k^{1/2}Q^2 + (2k^2 + 54\beta^2 - 48\beta k)Q + 48\beta^2 k^{1/2}}{(9\beta - k)^2},$$

which is quadratic and convex in $Q$. Furthermore, solving the first-order condition yields the unique minimizer of $ES$:

$$\bar{Q} = \frac{-27\beta^2 + 24k\beta - k^2}{27k^{1/2}},$$

which is positive at $\beta = k/3$ and smaller than $Q_{\text{max}}$. Since

$$\bar{Q} > q_B^* \Leftrightarrow \beta < 2k/3,$$

we have the following proposition.

**Proposition 6.** If $k/3 < \beta < 2k/3$, then the environmental surplus first decreases with the MQS over $(q_B^*, \bar{Q})$, and then increases over $(\bar{Q}, Q_{\text{max}})$. If $\beta > 2k/3$, the environmental surplus increases with the MQS over $(q_B^*, Q_{\text{max}})$.

Hence, in a duopoly, implementing a MQS is a more effective strategy to reduce the volume of emissions than environmentalism.

Note that the average quality $(Q + q_G^*(Q))/2$ increases with $Q$ and with $\beta$, while the quality gap shrinks with $Q$ and $\beta$.

Furthermore, the cross-derivative of $ES$ is given by

$$\frac{\partial^2 ES}{\partial Q \partial \beta} = -3k^{1/2} \frac{81Q\beta - 54k^{1/2}\beta + 9Qk - 2k^{3/2}}{(9\beta - k)^3} > 0.$$

Indeed, the numerator is negative at $\beta = k/3$, which is the minimum value of $\beta$, and negative at $Q = 4k^{1/2}/9$, which is the maximum value of $Q$. Since it is increasing in $Q$ and decreasing in $\beta$, the numerator is always negative. That is, the MQS and environmentalism are complements: environmentalism reinforces the positive effect of the MQS on the environmental surplus associated with the market outcome.
7 Concluding remarks

Green consumerism is often presented as one of the main backbones of new environmental policies. However, very little is known about its impact on firms’ decisions. This paper aimed to reduce such a lacunae. To this end, we have developed a simple and intuitive model that takes into account the psychic costs and benefits associated with the consumption of goods that generate different amounts of emissions. Using this setting has allowed us to show that the environmental ideology is largely ineffective in curbing the damages generated by consumption in a market economy. Our findings suggest instead the need for policy initiatives that differ from those aimed at promoting environmentalism. In particular, we find that the two widespread instruments discussed in this paper do a much better job as they all reduce the ecological footprint of consumption. Interestingly, environmentalism may now have different effects because it either strengthens or weakens the positive environmental impact of the policy instruments considered.

References


Maxwell, D., P. Owen, L. McAndrew, K. Muehlmel, and A. Neubauer (2011) *Addressing the Rebound*


Appendix A

There are $n \geq 2$ firms while fixed production costs prevent $n$ from becoming arbitrarily large. We assume that firms’ qualities are given by $q_k = kq$ for $k = 1, \ldots, n$ and $q > 0$. In other words, environmental qualities are ranked by increasing order ($q_1 < q_2 < \ldots < q_n$) and the difference between any two neighboring qualities is the same and equal to $q$. Hence, the top environmental quality is $q_n = nq$ while the bottom one is $q$. For simplicity, we also assume that $c = 0$.

A consumer of type $\theta$ who buys the $k$th quality has an indirect utility given by

$$V_k(\theta) = q_k - \beta \theta(n - k) - p_k,$$

for $k = 1, \ldots, n$

where $\beta \theta(n - k)$ stands for the psychological cost the consumer bears for not consuming the best environmental quality $q_n$, while $p_k$ is the price of quality $q_k$. In this case, firm $k$ competes directly with firm $k - 1$ and firm $k + 1$, while firm 1 ($n$) compete with firm 2 ($n - 1$) only. Hence, the consumer $\theta_k$ indifferent between buying qualities $q_{k+1}$ or $q_k$ is given by the solution to the equation:

$$q_{k+1} - p_{k+1} - \beta \theta(n - (k + 1)) = q_k - p_k - \beta \theta(n - k),$$

that is,

$$\theta_k = \frac{p_{k+1} - p_{k} - q}{\beta}, \quad \text{for } k = 1, \ldots, n - 1. \quad \text{(A.1)}$$

Assuming that types are uniformly distributed over $[0, 1]$ with a unit density, firm $k$’s demand is given by

$$D_k \equiv \theta_k - \theta_{k-1} = \frac{p_{k+1} - 2p_k + p_{k-1}}{\beta}, \quad \text{for } k = 2, \ldots, n - 1.$$ 

As for firms 1 and $n$, their demands are, respectively, given by

$$D_1 = \theta_1 = \frac{p_2 - p_1 - q}{\beta}, \quad D_n = 1 - \theta_{n-1} = 1 - \frac{p_n - p_{n-1} - q}{\beta}.$$ 

In the case of a duopoly ($n = 2$), $\theta_1$ is identical to (3) where $G = 2$, $B = 1$ and $q = q_G - q_B$, apart from the denominator of (A.1) where $\beta$ is replaced by $2\beta$ because the difference between the psychic benefit and the psychic cost is $2\beta$ whereas the difference in psychic costs between $q_{k+1}$ and $q_k$ is $\beta$. Hence, the duopoly studied in Section 3 is a special case of our $n$-firm setting. In what follows, we show that the main properties of the price equilibrium obtained in Proposition 1 hold true for $n \geq 2$ firms. Since qualities are given, we may disregard the fixed production costs in the price game.
Profit functions are such that
\[
\pi_1 = \theta_1 = p_1 \frac{p_2 - p_1 - q}{\beta}, \\
\pi_k = p_k(\theta_k - \theta_{k-1}) = p_k \frac{p_{k+1} - 2p_k + p_k - 1}{\beta}, \quad k = 2, \ldots, n-1 \\\n\pi_n = p_n(1 - \theta_{n-1}) = p_n \left(1 - \frac{p_n - p_{n-1} - q}{\beta}\right),
\]
where \(\pi_k\) is continuous and quasi-concave in \(p_k\) for \(k = 1, \ldots, n\).

**The 3-firm case.** Assume \(n = 3\). If the price equilibrium is interior, the first-order conditions are as follows:

\[
p_2 - 2p_1 = q, \quad (A.2) \\
4p_2 - p_1 - p_3 = 0, \quad (A.3) \\
2p_3 - p_2 = q + \beta, \quad (A.4)
\]
whose solution is
\[
p_1^* = \frac{1}{12} \beta - \frac{1}{2} q, \quad p_2^* = \frac{\beta}{6}, \quad p_3^* = \frac{1}{2} q + \frac{7}{12} \beta, \quad (A.5)
\]
which all increases with \(\beta\). Note that
\[
D_1(p_1^*, p_2^*) = \frac{1}{12} (\beta - 18q),
\]
which increases with \(\beta\). Moreover,
\[
D_3(p_2^*, p_3^*) = \frac{q}{2\beta} + 7
\]
decreases with \(\beta\). Hence, *the spreading of environmental ideology widens the market share of the bottom quality and narrows down that of the top quality*. In other words, when the three firms operate, raising \(\beta\) leads to a market outcome that generates a higher level of pollution.

Since \(p_1^* < p_2^* < p_3^*\), the equilibrium is interior if and only if \(p_1^* > 0\), that is, \(\beta > \beta_1 \equiv 6q\), where \(\beta_1\) is the unique solution to \(p_1^*(\beta) = 0\). In this case, it follows from \((A.2)\) that firm 2 charges the limit price \(p_2^* = p_{\text{lim}} = q\) while firm 3’s best reply implies that \(p_3^* = q + \beta/2\). Note also that \((A.1)\) implies \(\theta_1(p_1^*, p_2^*) = 0\) at these two prices.

Assume now that \(\beta\) crosses from \(\beta_1\) above, so that \(p_3^*\) also decreases. Below some threshold, \(p_3^*\) becomes small enough for firm 2 to find it profitable to set a price smaller than \(q\). In this case, the equilibrium prices of firms 2 and 3, denoted \(p_2^{**}\) and \(p_3^{**}\), are given by the solution to the system of first-order conditions for these two firms:
\[ p_3 - 2p_2 = q, \quad 2p_3 - p_2 = q + \beta. \]

Solving yields
\[ p_2^{**} = \frac{\beta - q}{3}, \quad p_3^{**} = \frac{q + 2\beta}{3}, \quad (A.6) \]
which both decrease with \( \beta \). Let \( \beta_{\text{lim}} = 4q \) be the solution to the equation \( p_2^{**}(\beta) = q \). Clearly, \( \beta_{\text{lim}} \equiv 4q < \beta_1 \), and thus firms 2 and 3 choose \( p_2^* = q \) and \( p_3^* = q + \beta/2 \) for \( \beta_{\text{lim}} < \beta < \beta_1 \).

When \( \beta < \beta_{\text{lim}} \), firms 2 and 3 charge the prices (A.6) that both decrease with \( \beta \). Since
\[ \theta_2(p_2^{**}, p_3^{**}) = \frac{p_3^{**} - p_2^{**} - q}{\beta} = 1 - \frac{q}{\beta}, \]
\[ \theta_2(p_2^{**}, p_3^{**}) = 0 \text{ when } \beta = q. \] In this case, we have \( p_2^{**} = 0 \) and \( p_3^{**} = p_{\text{lim}} \equiv q \). Set \( \beta_2 \equiv q < \beta_{\text{lim}} < \beta_1 \). Hence, when \( \beta \) crosses \( \beta_2 \) from above, firms 1 and 2 are out of business while firm 3 supplies the whole market at the price \( p_3^{**} = q \).

In sum, we have: assume that \( \beta \) decreases from a value larger than \( \beta_3 \). First, firm 1 exits the market when \( \beta = \beta_3 \) while firm 2 charges the limit price \( p_{\text{lim}} = q \). Firms 2 and 3 remain in business for \( \beta_2 < \beta < \beta_3 \). Then, firm 2 exits the market when \( \beta = \beta_2 \) while firm 3 remains in business charges the limit price \( p_{\text{lim}} = q \). Finally, firm 1 remains in business for all \( \beta \geq 0 \). In other words, we have: (i) when \( \beta < q \), only the high-quality firm is in business; (ii) when \( \beta < q < 6q \), both firms 2 and 3 are on the market; and (iii) when \( \beta > 6q \), the 3 firms supply the market. To put it differently, a steadily growing environmental ideology allows firms with a decreasing environmental quality to enter sequentially the market.

Putting all the above results together, we have shown that an economy characterized by a rising environmental ideology generates a market outcome whose environmental standard goes down.

**The n-firm case.** Differentiating \( \pi_k \) with respect to \( p_k \) yields the following second-order difference equations for an interior equilibrium:
\[
\begin{align*}
p_2 - 2p_1 &= q, \\
4p_k - p_{k-1} - p_{k+1} &= 0, & k = 2, \ldots, n - 1 \\
2p_n - p_{n-1} &= q + \beta
\end{align*}
\quad (A.7)
\]
The first and last equations are the same as (A.2) and (A.4) while (A.3) is a straightforward extension of (A.3).

The characteristic equation associated with (A.7) is
\[-A^2 + 4Ab - Ab^{k-1} = 0,\]
After simplification, we have the following quadratic equation:

\[-b^2 + 4b - 1 = 0\]

whose solutions are given by

\[b_1 = 2 + \sqrt{3} > 1 > b_2 = 2 - \sqrt{3} > 0.\]

Consequently, the solution to (A.7) is

\[p_k^* = A_1 b_1^k + A_2 b_2^k\]

where \(A_1\) and \(A_2\) are two unknown constants.

To find \(A_1\) and \(A_2\), we proceed as follows. Note, first, that the equilibrium condition for firm 1 is

\[p_2 = q + 2p_1.\]

Applying (A.7) to firm 1 yields:

\[4p_1 - p_0 - p_2 = 0,\]

where \(p_0\) is the price set by a hypothetical firm selling a variant of quality 0. It then follows from the above two equations that

\[4p_1 - p_0 - q - 2p_1 = 0\]

whose solution in \(p_0\) is given by

\[p_0 = 2p_1 - q.\]

Using (A.8), we obtain

\[p_0 = A_1 b_1^0 + A_2 b_2^0 = A_1 + A_2 = 2p_1 - q = 2A_1 b_1 + 2A_2 b_2 - q,\]

which implies

\[A_2 = \frac{q + A_1 (1 - 2b_1)}{2b_2 - 1}.\]  \hspace{1cm} (A.9)

Equation (A.4) may be rewritten as follows:

\[A_1 b_1^{n-1} + A_2 b_2^{n-1} = 2A_1 b_1^n + 2A_2 b_2^n = q + \beta.\]

Plugging (A.9), this expression becomes:

\[A_1 b_1^{n-1} + \frac{(q + A_1 (1 - 2b_1)) b_2^{n-1}}{2b_2 - 1} - 2A_1 b_1^n - 2 \frac{(q + A_1 (1 - 2b_1)) b_2^n}{2b_2 - 1} + q + \beta = 0\]

whose solution in \(A_1\) is equal to

\[A_1 = \frac{\beta + q}{(2b_1 - 1)(b_1^{n-1} - b_2^{n-1})} > 0\]
because $2b_1 - 1 > 0$. By implication of (A.9),

$$A_2 = \frac{\beta + q(1 - b_1^{n-1})}{(2b_2 - 1)\left( b_1^{n-1} - b_2^{n-1} \right)}.$$  

the sign of which depends on $\beta$.

If the equilibrium is interior, the equilibrium prices are then given by

$$p_k^*(\beta; n) = \frac{1}{b_1^{n-1} - b_2^{n-1}} \left[ \frac{\beta + q \left( 1 - b_2^{n-1} \right)}{2b_1 - 1} b_1^k + \frac{\beta + q(b_1^{n-1} - 1)}{1 - 2b_2} b_2^k \right] \quad \text{for } k = 1, \ldots, n. \quad (A.10)$$

Note that (A.10) is equal to (A.5) (resp., (A.6)) when $n = 3$ and $k = 1$ (resp., $n = 2$ and $k = 1, 2$).

The equilibrium prices increase with $\beta$ or $q$ because a higher supply of environmentalism or a wider quality gap endows firms more market power. Since $b_1 > b_2$, we have $p_{k+1}^* > p_k^*$ for $k = 1, \ldots, n - 1$. Furthermore, $p_k^*$ increases faster than $p_{k-1}^*$ with $\beta$, so that $\theta_1(p_1^*, p_2^*)$ and $\theta_{n-1}(p_{n-1}^*, p_n^*)$ increases with $\beta$.

As a result, when $\beta$ rises, more consumers buy the bottom environmental quality while fewer consumers buy the top quality.

The equilibrium with $n$ firms is interior if $p_1^*(\beta) > 0$. For this to hold, $\beta$ must be larger than the solution to the equation $p_1^*(\beta) = 0$, which is given by

$$\beta_1 = q \frac{b_1 b_2^{n-1} - 2b_2^{n-1} + b_2 b_1^{n-1} - b_1 b_2^{n-1} - b_1 b_2^{n-1}}{b_1^{n-1} - b_2^{n-1}}.$$  

By contrast, when $\beta < \beta_1$, $p_1^*(\beta) = 0$ and firm 1 is out of business.

Assume now that $k - 1 > 0$ firms are out of business. Since $p_k > p_{k-1} > \ldots > p_1$, these firms are $1, \ldots, k - 1$, which means the first active firm is firm $k$. Let $\beta_k \equiv \beta_1(n - k)$ be the solution to

$$p_1^*(\beta; n - k) = \frac{1}{b_1^{n-k-1} - b_2^{n-k-1}} \left[ \frac{\beta + q \left( 1 - b_2^{n-k-1} \right)}{2b_1 - 1} b_1^1 + \frac{\beta + q(b_1^{n-k-1} - 1)}{1 - 2b_2} b_2^1 \right] = 0,$$

that is,

$$\beta_k = \beta_1(n - k) = q \frac{b_1^{n-k-1} - 2b_2^{n-k-1} + b_2^{n-k-1} - b_1^{n-k-1} - b_1^{n-k-1} + b_2^{n-k-1}}{b_1^{n-k-1} - b_2^{n-k-1}}.$$  

Differentiating this expression with respect to $n$ yields

$$\frac{d\beta_k}{dn} = q \frac{(2b_1 - 1)b_1^{n-k-1}b_2 \ln b_1 + (1 - 2b_2)b_1b_2^{n-k-1} \ln b_2}{b_1 - b_2} > 0$$

because $b_1 > b_2$. Thus, the value of $\beta$ that solves $p_1^*(\beta; n - k) = 0$ decreases as the number of active firms decreases. Therefore, we may rank the thresholds associated with the exit of firms $n - 1, n - 2, \ldots, 2$ as follows: $\beta_1 > \beta_2 \equiv \beta_1(n - 1) > \ldots > \beta_{n-1} \equiv \beta_1(2)$. Firm $n - k$ remains active provided that $\beta > \beta_k$.  

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When $\beta$ crosses $\beta_k$, firm $n-k$ is out of business at price $p^*_n = 0$. To put the other way round, as $\beta$ steadily increases from 0 firms $i = n-1, n-2, ..., 1$ enter the market sequentially each time that $\beta$ crosses $\beta_{n-i+1}$ from below.

For the proof to be complete, it remains to show that $\beta_k > 0$ for $k = 1, ..., n-1$. First, $\beta_k$ decreases with $k$. Indeed, we have

$$\frac{d\beta_k}{dk} = q \left( 1 - 2b_1 \right) b_1^{-k+n-1} b_2 \ln b_1 + (2b_2 - 1) b_1 b_2^{-k+n-1} \ln b_2 < 0$$

for $k < n-1$ because $b_2 < 1$. Therefore, $\beta_k$ takes on its minimum value at $k = 1$. Since $\beta_1(2) = q > 0$, it must be that $\beta_k = \beta_1(n-k)$ is positive.

We may summarize our main results as follows. When $\beta$ is small enough ($\beta < \beta_1$), only the best environmental quality firm is active. When $\beta$ becomes larger than $\beta_1$, then firm 2 enters the market with a lower environmental quality, which leads to a worse ecological footprint. As $\beta$ keeps rising above $\beta_2, \beta_3, ..., \beta_k$, more and more firms that produce lower and lower environmental qualities get into business. This gradually downgrades the environmental performance of the market outcome because a growing number of consumers buy the worst environmental qualities. Note also that a wider quality gap ($q \uparrow$) raise the value of the thresholds $\beta_k$ and thus slows down the entry of lower environmental qualities.

This completes the proof of Proposition 1a, that is, a stronger environmental ideology leads to a worse ecological footprint through the gradual entry of firms selling more polluting products.

Appendix B

1. $(k^{1/2}, 0)$ is a Nash equilibrium over $(k/3, \beta)$

   The argument involves two steps.

   **Step 1.** What is firm $G$’s best reply against $q_B = 0$ when $\beta > k/3$? By construction, $k^{1/2}$ is the best reply when $\bar{\theta} = 0$. When $0 < \bar{\theta} < 1$, it follows from (9) that firm $G$’s profits are given by

   $$\pi^*_G(q_G, 0) = \frac{(4\beta + k^{1/2}q_G)^2}{18\beta} - \frac{1}{2}q^2_G.$$

   Differentiating with respect to $q_G$ yields the solution

   $$\bar{q}_G = \frac{4k^{1/2}\beta}{9\beta - k} = q^*_G(0).$$

   Since the second derivative of $\pi^*_G(q_G, 0)$ is always negative, $\pi^*_G(q_G, 0)$ is concave and maximized at $\bar{q}_G$. Hence, $\bar{q}_G$ is the best reply against $q_B = 0$ for $0 < \bar{\theta} < 1$ because

   $$\bar{\theta}(\bar{q}_G, 0) = -\frac{k}{6\beta} \frac{4\beta}{9\beta - k} + \frac{1}{3} = \frac{3\beta - k}{9\beta - k}.$$
is positive for $\beta > k/3$. Evaluating $\pi_G^*(q_G, 0)$ at $q_G$ yields

$$\pi_G^*(q_G, 0) = \frac{8\beta^2}{9\beta - k} > 0.$$  

Since the other candidate best reply is $q_G = k^{1/2}$ with $\tilde{\theta}(k^{1/2}, 0)$, it remains to compare $\pi_G^*(q_G, 0)$ and $\pi_G(k^{1/2}, 0)$. Observe that

$$\frac{k}{2} - \frac{8\beta^2}{9\beta - k} = \frac{1 - 16\beta^2 + 9k\beta - k^2}{2(9\beta - k)}$$

is a concave parabola in $\beta$, which is negative at $\beta = 0$. Therefore, the numerator $-16\beta^2 + 9k\beta - k^2 = 0$ of the above expression has two positive roots given by

$$\frac{k}{9} < \frac{9 - \sqrt{17}}{32}k \simeq 0.152k < \frac{k}{3} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{k}{3} < \frac{\sqrt{17} + 9}{32}k \simeq 0.410k < \frac{4k}{9}$$

Only the larger root is relevant because the smaller one is smaller than $k/3$. Setting

$$\bar{\beta} \equiv \frac{k\sqrt{17} + 9}{32} \simeq 0.410k < 4k/9,$$

we have

$$\frac{k}{2} - \frac{8\beta^2}{9\beta - k} > 0 \iff k/3 < \beta < \bar{\beta}.$$  

In other words, when $\beta > \bar{\beta}$, we have $k/2 > \pi_G^*(\tilde{q}_G, 0)$ over $(k/3, \bar{\beta})$, which means that $q_G = k^{1/2}$ is firm $G$’s best reply against $q_B = 0$ over $(k/3, \bar{\beta})$.

**Step 2.** What is firm $B$’s best reply against $q_G = k^{1/2}$ when $\beta > k/3$? It follows from (11a) that firm $B$’s best reply is

$$q_B^*(k^{1/2}) = k^{1/2} \frac{2\beta - k}{9\beta - k} > 0.$$  

At the strategy pair $(k^{1/2}, q_B^*(k^{1/2}))$, we have

$$\tilde{\theta}(k^{1/2}, q_B^*(k^{1/2})) = \frac{32\beta - k}{29\beta - k} > 0$$

if and only if $\beta > k/2$. Otherwise, $q_B = 0$ is $B$’s best reply against $k^{1/2}$. Therefore, $q_B = 0$ is $B$’s best reply against $k^{1/2}$ over $(k/9, k/5)$.

Putting Steps 1 and 2 together implies that $(k^{1/2}, 0)$ is a Nash equilibrium over $(k/3, \bar{\beta})$.

**2. Proof of Lemma 1.** Set $b \equiv \beta/k$ and assume $b > 1/3$. It is readily verified that $\tilde{\theta}(k^{1/2}, q_B^*) > 0$ iff $b > 4/9$ while $\tilde{\theta}(q_G^*, 0) > 0$ always holds. Furthermore, we also have $\tilde{\theta}(q_G^*, 0) < 1$ and $\tilde{\theta}(k^{1/2}, q_B^*) < 1$ because $b > 1/3$. Since $\bar{\beta} < 4k/9$, the only relevant case is $\tilde{\theta}(k^{1/2}, q_B^*) = 0$.  

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The corner equilibrium risk-dominates the interior equilibrium if and if:

\[
\left[ \pi_G(k^{1/2}, 0) - \pi_G(q_G^*, 0) \right] \cdot \left[ \pi_B(k^{1/2}, 0) - \pi_B(k^{1/2}, q_B^*) \right] > \left[ \pi_G(q_G^*, q_B^*) - \pi_G(k^{1/2}, q_B^*) \right] \cdot \left[ \pi_B(q_G^*, q_B^*) - \pi_B(q_G^*, 0) \right].
\]

The payoff matrix is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(\pi_G(k^{1/2}, 0) = \frac{k}{2})</th>
<th>(\pi_G(q_G^*, 0) = \frac{2k}{81} \cdot \frac{2916b^4 - 972b^3 + 36b^2 + 3b + 1}{b(9b - 2)^2})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(\pi_B(k^{1/2}, 0) = 0)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(\pi_B(k^{1/2}, q_B^*) = -\frac{2k}{9} (9b - 2)^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\pi_G(q_G^<em>, q_B^</em>) = \frac{2k}{9} (6b - 1)^2(9b - 1)(9b - 2)^2)</td>
<td>(\pi_G(k^{1/2}, q_B^*) = \frac{k}{2})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\pi_B(q_G^<em>, q_B^</em>) = \frac{2k}{9} (3b - 1)^2(9b - 1)(9b - 2)^2)</td>
<td>(\pi_B(q_G^*, 0) = \frac{2k}{81} \cdot \frac{(3b - 1)^2(9b - 1)^2}{b(9b - 2)^2})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The corner equilibrium risk-dominates the interior equilibrium if and if:

\[
\left[ \pi_G(k^{1/2}, 0) - \pi_G(q_G^*, 0) \right] \cdot \left[ \pi_B(k^{1/2}, 0) - \pi_B(k^{1/2}, q_B^*) \right] > \left[ \pi_G(q_G^*, q_B^*) - \pi_G(k^{1/2}, q_B^*) \right] \cdot \left[ \pi_B(q_G^*, q_B^*) - \pi_B(q_G^*, 0) \right].
\]

(B.1)

Using the above payoffs yields:

\[
\begin{align*}
\left[ \pi_G(k^{1/2}, 0) - \pi_G(q_G^*, 0) \right] & \cdot \left[ \pi_B(k^{1/2}, 0) - \pi_B(k^{1/2}, q_B^*) \right] \\
&= \left( \frac{k}{2} - \frac{2}{81} \cdot \frac{2916b^4 - 972b^3 + 36b^2 + 3b + 1}{b(9b - 2)^2} \right) \cdot \left( 0 + \frac{2}{9} \frac{(3b - 1)^2}{(9b - 2)^2} \right) \\
&= \frac{k^2}{729} \frac{(-11664b^4 + 10449b^3 - 3060b^2 + 312b - 4)(3b - 1)^2}{b(9b - 2)^4}.
\end{align*}
\]

Similarly,

\[
\begin{align*}
\left[ \pi_G(q_G^*, q_B^*) - \pi_G(k^{1/2}, q_B^*) \right] & \cdot \left[ \pi_B(q_G^*, q_B^*) - \pi_B(q_G^*, 0) \right] \\
&= \frac{k^2}{729} \frac{(3b - 1)^2(9b - 1)(1296b^3 - 1305b^2 + 408b - 40)}{b(9b - 2)^4}.
\end{align*}
\]

The inequality (B.1) holds if and only if

\[
\frac{k}{729} \frac{(-11664b^4 + 10449b^3 - 3060b^2 + 312b - 4)(3b - 1)^2}{b(9b - 2)^4} > \frac{k}{729} \frac{(3b - 1)^2(9b - 1)(1296b^3 - 1305b^2 + 408b - 40)}{b(9b - 2)^4},
\]

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which is equivalent to

\[
\frac{1}{729} \frac{(3b - 1)^2 (-2592b^3 + 2034b^2 - 441b + 22)}{b(9b - 2)^3} > 0.
\]

The above expression is positive because its numerator

\[-2592b^3 + 2034b^2 - 441b + 22,
\]

is positive over the interval \((1/3, 3)\). This completes the proof of Lemma 1.

**Appendix C**

In this appendix, we provide the main expressions used to prove the results of Section 5.

1. (Net) Environmental surplus. Consider an interior equilibrium so that \(\beta > 6k/9\). The value of the environmental surplus at the equilibrium outcome is given by the following expression:

\[
ES(q^*_G, q^*_B) = \frac{2k^{1/2}}{3} \frac{45\beta^2 - 37k\beta + 8k^2}{(9\beta - 4k)^2}.
\]

Differentiating w.r.t. \(\beta\) yields:

\[
\frac{dES}{d\beta} = \frac{-2k^{3/2}}{3} \frac{27\beta - 4k}{(9\beta - 4k)^3} < 0.
\]

As for the net surplus, it is given by

\[
NES(q^*_G, q^*_B) = \frac{2k}{9} \frac{90\beta^2 - 75\beta k + 16k^2}{(9\beta - 4k)^2}.
\]

Differentiating \(NES\) w.r.t. \(\beta\) yields:

\[
\frac{dNES}{d\beta} = \frac{-2k^2}{3} \frac{(15\beta - 4k)k^2}{(9\beta - 4k)^3} < 0.
\]

Likewise, differentiating \(NES\) w.r.t. \(k\) yields:

\[
\frac{dNES}{dk} = \frac{4}{9} \frac{(3\beta - k)(-120k\beta + 135\beta^2 + 32k^2)}{(9\beta - 4k)^3},
\]

which is positive for all \(\beta > 0\).
2. Net psychic benefits. (i) Interior equilibrium: \( \beta > k/3 \).

\[
\Psi(\beta) = \frac{\beta}{2} - \frac{\beta}{2} \left( \frac{3\beta - k}{9\beta - 2k} \right)^2,
\]

so that

\[
\frac{d^2 \Psi}{d\beta^2} = \frac{3(9\beta - 4k)k^2}{(9\beta - 2k)^4} > 0.
\]

Hence, \( \Psi \) is strictly convex.

Since the derivative

\[
\frac{d\Psi}{d\beta} = \frac{3216\beta^3 - 2k^3 - 144k\beta^2 + 31k^2\beta}{(9\beta - 2k)^3}
\]
evaluated at \( \beta = 0 \) is positive, \( \Psi \) is increasing in \( \beta \) for \( \beta > 0 \).

(ii) Corner solution: \( 2k/9 < \beta \leq k/3 \). Since \( \bar{\theta}(q_G^*, 0) = 0 \), we have

\[
\Psi(\beta) = \frac{\beta}{2},
\]

which also increases with \( \beta \).

3. Social welfare at the market outcome. Assume \( \beta > \bar{\beta} \). Social benefit across greens is equal to

\[
SG(q_G, q_B) \equiv \int_0^1 (q_G + \beta \theta)d\theta = (1 - \bar{\theta})q_G + \frac{\beta}{2}(1 - \bar{\theta}^2),
\]

while social benefit across browns is similarly defined by

\[
SB(q_G, q_B) \equiv \int_0^\theta (q_B - \beta \theta)d\theta = \bar{\theta}q_B - \frac{\beta}{2}\bar{\theta}^2.
\]

Evaluating the total social welfare at the market equilibrium yields:

\[
SW(q_G^*, q_B^*) \equiv (1 - \bar{\theta})q_G^*k^{1/2} + \frac{\beta}{2}(1 - \bar{\theta}^2) + \bar{\theta}q_B^*k^{1/2} - \frac{\beta}{2}\bar{\theta}^2 - \frac{1}{2}(q_G^*)^2 - \frac{1}{2}(q_B^*)^2 = \frac{567k^3 + 144k^2 - 126\beta k^2 + 16k^3}{18(9\beta - 2k)^2},
\]

so that

\[
\frac{dSW(q_G^*, q_B^*)}{d\beta} = \frac{1567\beta^3 - 378\beta^2k + 62\beta k^2 - 4k^3}{(9\beta - 2k)^3} > 0,
\]

and

\[
\frac{d^2SW(q_G^*, q_B^*)}{d\beta^2} = \frac{2(99\beta - 4k)k^2}{(9\beta - 2k)^4} > 0.
\]
Appendix D

We know from (17) and (26) that
\[ \pi_G^*(q_G^*, q_B^*) = \frac{2}{9} \frac{(9\beta - k)(6\beta - k)^2}{(9\beta - 2k)^2}, \quad \pi_B^*(q_G^*, q_B^*) = \frac{2}{9} \frac{(9\beta - k)(3\beta - k)^2}{(9\beta - 2k)^2}. \]

\[ \pi_G^*(q_G^*, q_B^*) = \frac{2}{9} \frac{(9\beta - k)(6\beta - k)^2}{(9\beta - 2k)^2}, \quad \pi_B^*(q_G^*, q_B^*) = \frac{2}{9} \frac{(9\beta - k)(3\beta - k)^2}{(9\beta - 2k)^2}. \]

Assume that firm G adopts the new technology whereas firm B does not. Then, profits are defined by
\[ \pi_G^*(q_G^*, q_B^*) = \left( 4\beta + k^{1/2} (q_G - q_B) \right)^2 \frac{3}{18\beta} - \frac{1}{2} q_G^2, \quad \pi_B^*(q_G^*, q_B^*) = \left( 2\beta - k^{1/2} (q_G - q_B) \right)^2 \frac{3}{18\beta} - \frac{1}{2} q_B^2. \] (D.1)

Applying the FOCs yields the following equilibrium qualities:
\[ q_G^* = \frac{2k^{1/2}}{3} \frac{6\beta - k}{9\beta - k (\gamma + 1)}, \quad q_B^* = \frac{2k^{1/2}}{3} \frac{3\beta - k\gamma}{9\beta - k (\gamma + 1)}. \]

Plugging \( q_G^* \) and \( q_B^* \) into (D.1), we obtain
\[ \pi_G^*(q_G^*, q_B^*) = \frac{2}{9} \frac{(6\beta - k)^2 (9\beta - k\gamma)}{(9\beta - k (\gamma + 1))^2}, \quad \pi_B^*(q_G^*, q_B^*) = \frac{2}{9} \frac{(9\beta - k)(3\beta - k\gamma)^2}{(9\beta - k (\gamma + 1))^2}. \] (D.2)

Firm \( B \) prefers to select the new technology (\( \gamma > 1 \)) rather than sticking to the old technology (\( \gamma = 1 \)) as
\[ \pi_B^*(q_G^*, q_B^*) - \pi_B^*(q_G^*, q_B^*) = \frac{(9\beta - k\gamma)(9\beta - k (\gamma + 1))^2 - (9\beta - k)(9\beta - 2k\gamma)^2}{(9\beta - k (\gamma + 1))^2} > 0. \] (D.3)

Indeed, the denominator of this expression is always positive and strictly decreasing in \( \gamma \), while the numerator is equal to 0 for \( \gamma = 1 \) and increasing in \( \gamma \) for \( \gamma > 1 \). This implies that \( \pi_B^*(q_G, q_B) - \pi_B^*(q_G^*, q_B^*) = 0 \) at \( \gamma = 0 \) and increases in \( \gamma \). Consequently, (D.3) is positive and increasing for all \( \gamma > 1 \).

In other words, when firm G adopts the new technology, firm B finds it profitable to do the same.

Similarly, the equilibrium profits when firm B adopts the new technology and firm G does not are given by
\[ \pi_G^*(q_G^*, q_B^*) = \frac{2}{9} \frac{(9\beta - k)(6\beta - k\gamma)^2}{(9\beta - k (\gamma + 1))^2}, \quad \pi_B^*(q_G^*, q_B^*) = \frac{2}{9} \frac{(3\beta - k)^2 (9\beta - k\gamma)^2}{(9\beta - k (\gamma + 1))^2}. \] (D.4)

Firm G’s profit difference between adopting and not adopting the new technology when firm B adopts the new technology is given by
\[ \pi_G^*(q_G^*, q_B^*) - \pi_G^*(q_G^*, q_B^*) = \frac{(9\beta - k\gamma)(9\beta - k (\gamma + 1))^2 - (9\beta - k)(9\beta - 2k\gamma)^2}{(9\beta - 2k\gamma)^2 (9\beta - k (\gamma + 1))^2} > 0. \] (D.5)
Repeating the above argument shows that \( \pi_G^\gamma(q_G^*, q_B^*) - \pi_G^*(q_G^*, q_B^*) > 0 \) for all \( \gamma > 1 \). In other words, it is not optimal for firm \( G \) to stick to the old technology when firm \( B \) adopts this technology.

Consider now the 2 \( \times \) 2 game where the two firms possess two strategies, either to adopt \( (A) \) or not to adopt \( (NA) \).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( G ) ( \setminus ) ( B )</th>
<th>( A ) ( \pi^\gamma_G(q_G^<em>, q_B^</em>), \pi_B^\gamma(q_G^<em>, q_B^</em>) )</th>
<th>( NA ) ( \pi^<em>_G(q_G^</em>, q_B^<em>), \pi_B^</em>(q_G^<em>, q_B^</em>) )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( A ) ( A )</td>
<td>( \pi^\gamma_G(q_G^<em>, q_B^</em>), \pi_B^\gamma(q_G^<em>, q_B^</em>) )</td>
<td>( \pi^<em>_G(q_G^</em>, q_B^<em>), \pi_B^</em>(q_G^<em>, q_B^</em>) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( NA )</td>
<td>( \pi^<em>_G(q_G^</em>, q_B^<em>), \pi_B^</em>(q_G^<em>, q_B^</em>) )</td>
<td>( \pi^<em>_G(q_G^</em>, q_B^<em>), \pi_B^</em>(q_G^<em>, q_B^</em>) )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using (D.2) and (17) imply

\[
\pi_B^\gamma(q_G^*, q_B^*) > \pi_B^*(q_G^*, q_B^*) \quad (D.6) \\
\iff \frac{2 (3\beta - k)^2 (9\beta - k\gamma)}{9 (9\beta - k (\gamma + 1))^2} > \frac{2 (9\beta - k) (3\beta - k)^2}{9 (9\beta - 2k)^2} \\
\iff \frac{k (\gamma - 1) 9\beta (9\beta - k (\gamma + 1)) + k^2 (\gamma - 1)}{(2k - 9\beta)^2 (k - 9\beta + k\gamma)^2} > 0.
\]

Similarly, (D.4) and (17) imply

\[
\pi_G^\gamma(q_G^*, q_B^*) > \pi_G^*(q_G^*, q_B^*) \quad (D.7) \\
\iff \frac{2 (6\beta - k)^2 (9\beta - k\gamma)}{9 (9\beta - k (\gamma + 1))^2} > \frac{2 (9\beta - k) (6\beta - k)^2}{9 (9\beta - 2k)^2} \\
\iff \frac{2 k (k - 6\beta)^2 (\gamma - 1) 9\beta (9\beta - k (\gamma + 1)) + k^2 (\gamma - 1)}{(9\beta - 2k)^2 (9\beta - k (\gamma + 1))^2} > 0.
\]

It then follows from (D.3), (D.5), (D.6), and (D.7) that \( A \) is a dominant strategy for each player. This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
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