Seeking an understanding of globalizing processes and their relationships with living beings pushes researchers to collaborate with one another. These collaborations will often involve working across disciplines (Tomlinson, 1999, p.13). More importantly, perhaps, collaborations will often be transworld: researchers often will work to build transworld collaborations: investigators from different parts of the world, who are examining globalizing processes in different settings will be brought together to deepen understanding of such processes. In this article, we explore some of the obstacles to building the dialogue needed for transworld collaboration and suggest some starting points for addressing these obstacles.

To begin, the categorizations of phenomena along disciplinary lines are themselves culturally situated: the disciplines to which they refer emerged from European and Anglo-American countries -- the West -- and developed over the past several centuries, often to support the pursuits of imperial powers and their global ambitions. Ironically, some decentering effects of contemporary globalizing processes are leading us to question the long-assumed universality of these disciplinary definitions of the social and cultural sciences, if not science itself (Dirlik, 2007, p. 48). These disciplines too need to be decolonized. Accordingly, to be effective, collaborations must open up the possibilities not only of working across disciplines but also across different epistemologies and bodies of knowledge situated in different places outside the West. Once we see Western forms of knowledge in relative rather than universal terms as projections of economic, political, military and cultural power with erasures of other knowledges being consequences of such projections, collaborations must take cognitive injustice into consideration. Deeper forms of dialogue are needed if collaborative research on globalization is to be epistemologically fair.

In this article, we investigate the challenges of carrying out collaborative research on globalization processes if researchers are to engage with, and respect, different bodies of knowledge and distinctive, if not incompatible cosmologies. We begin with a critical review of the Globalization and Autonomy project and its limited, and in retrospect, inadequate attempts to be epistemologically inclusive. In the second part of the article, we reflect more deeply on epistemological exclusion and knowledge erasure as
challenges for globalization research. Drawing from the critical thinking in the second section, we then look at steps that might be taken to build collaborations that meet the condition of cognitive justice. The fourth part of the article returns to the Globalization and Autonomy project as an example to illustrate the structural challenges faced by researchers in search of epistemological inclusion. The final section offers some concluding thoughts on how to move forward and to improve collaborative research efforts.

The Research Project and the Double Apartheid

As noted in Coleman and Brydon in this issue, the Globalization and Autonomy project was conceived and a final proposal developed between 1998 and 2001. In this same period, Arjun Appadurai published his seminal article “Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination”. In that article, he discusses a developing “double apartheid” where globalization research is seen to be inaccessible to those who need knowledge of globalization the most. On the one side, globalization researchers in the academy had fallen into the usual set of parochial debates over definitions, key factors, and other issues such as the “end” of history. These debates seemed hardly relevant to the vernacular discourses taking place on the ground employed by social movements and other organizations seeking to understand and mobilize against some of the nefarious effects of neoliberal globalization. On the other side, these social forms, which he termed “grassroots globalization” or “globalization from below” found themselves a considerable distance away from the policy discourses on globalization taking place in their respective polities on such issues as trade, the environment, health and wellness, labour rights and so on.

In articulating, therefore, a concern about the conditions of possibility for the democratization of globalization, Appadurai noted that certain dominant forms of critical knowledge, especially those that have come to be organized by the social sciences in the West, might be inhibiting such democratization. He suggested that a disjuncture was growing between the globalization of knowledge and knowledge of globalization. Moreover, there was a temporal lag between how globalizing processes were developing and efforts to understand them conceptually. Compounding these problems, he added,
was that the unevenness of economic globalization itself contributed to the fragmented and uneven distribution of resources needed by “democratic research communities” seeking to understand globalization. Accordingly, he wrote, “social exclusion is ever more tied to epistemological exclusion” (2000:2).

Reading and reflecting upon the implications of Appadurai’s argument for a collaborative, interdisciplinary research project on globalization and autonomy took place between the events surrounding the WTO meeting in Seattle in 1999 and the attack on the World Trade Center in New York in September 2001. When the full team met in October 2002 for the first time, the project’s leadership group offered two proposals as particular initiatives inspired by Appadurai’s work: an affiliation with a group of scholars based in the Global South and an online publication that would make the findings of the project available to a global audience in accessible language and formats. Both proposals were subsequently acted upon.

The first proposal involved negotiating the participation in the project of an interdisciplinary research group based in Tunisia, but also including members from Lebanon, Jordan, Spain and France: the Groupe d’études et de recherche interdisciplinaire sur la Méditerannée (GERIM). Some serendipity was involved in this step. After the final application for the project was submitted to the program for Major Collaborative Research Initiatives (MCRI) of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), the Council announced a trial change in policy for this program. Until this point, field research funds could not be allocated to scholars who were based at postsecondary institutions outside Canada. Such scholars could be incorporated into projects as “Research Collaborators”, where expenses to attend meetings could be paid, but they could not be given research funds per se. The Council announced that it would permit non-Canadians based outside the country to receive sub-grants as “co-investigators” of a MCRI on an “experimental” basis.

The timing was unfortunate because all of the preparatory work and scholarly discussions for the project had already taken place by the time of the announcement. Moreover, the budget submitted to the Council had been worked out in some detail, with particular commitments made to participating “co-investigators”, all within Canada. In the summer of 2002, the project director received an email from the director of GERIM,
Professor Yassine Essid, expressing interest in learning more about the project. After the director had shared the project application with him, Professor Essid indicated an interest in having GERIM join the project. He argued that the issues related to globalization and autonomy at the heart of the project, particularly as they pertained to less wealthy countries, could be studied in microcosm in the Mediterranean region. After complex negotiations between the project director, IDRC, the SSHRCC and the Office of Research Services at McMaster University, Professor Essid formally became a co-investigator with the project, with a three year grant jointly funded by the project and IDRC. We return to these negotiations below.

The project leadership hoped that by involving GERIM in the project and entering into a dialogue about globalization and autonomy with this team, they could develop strategies for carrying out research and disseminating findings that would address some of Appadurai’s concerns. In particular, they thought that the dialogue might permit team members to understand differences in research ethics on the one side while introducing new standpoints for experiencing and studying globalization on the other.

The second proposal to the team was presented as a way to close the gap between the vernaculars of grassroots globalization activists on the ground and academic discussions of globalization by attempting to disseminate knowledge of globalization outside the academy through creation of an on-line compendium. Its structure is described in Coleman and Brydon this issue. To make the compendium as accessible to as large an audience as possible, the website was designed to permit the delivery of the publication to those with only low band width internet access. The final publication, entitled the Globalization and Autonomy Compendium, was peer reviewed in combination with the first two academic books published in the project. Peer reviewers, experts in the academic use of digital technologies, were asked to compare the academic research in a given chapter with the presentation of that same research in the Compendium, taking account of the website’s goals. The reviewers judged the publication very favourably in this peer review.

**Epistemological exclusion and knowledge erasure**
These two steps taken by the project – building an alliance with GERIM and creating the Compendium – were limited ones and did not address in the end the depth of the problem of epistemological exclusion and cognitive injustice. In defining the problematic of the project, globalization and autonomy, the research team made assumptions about the universality of the value of autonomy in particular. This kind of assumption may also be inherent in the field of globalization studies where the project located itself, a point to which we return later. Challenging such an assumption would have led to a project dynamic that would have departed perhaps even from what Appadurai had envisaged. In order to understand why the project would have differed, we turn our attention to cognitive justice, epistemological exclusion and knowledge erasure.

We begin with the simple observation that the epistemological diversity of the world has been immense, commensurate with its degree of cultural diversity. This diversity of cultures and knowledges, however, has come under severe attack since the onset of European and later U.S. imperialism. Mignolo (2006: xx) observes that the division of the continents and the geopolitical structures imposed upon them are all imperial constructions of the past five hundred years. Consequently, the geo-political location of knowledge and the fate of this knowledge are tied to the economic, political, cultural and epistemological dimensions between what he calls coloniality and modernity. The West as the centre point for the pursuit of modernity assumed in the process the right to name and to control other parts of the world. “The West was, and still is, the only geo-historical location that is both part of the classification of the world and the only perspective that has the privilege of possessing dominant categories of thoughts from which and where the rest of the world can be described, classified, understood, and ‘improved.’” (Mignolo 2006:36).

In the nineteenth century, utilizing modern science, European powers developed the technological capacity to dominate many parts of the world; in the process, they elevated modern science to the status of a universal and to a place superior to other knowledges. In the name of modern science, other “non-scientific” forms of knowledges and, at the same time, the subaltern social groups whose social practices were informed by such knowledges, were denigrated, suppressed, and in some cases erased. In this respect, there is an epistemological foundation to the capitalist imperial order imposed on
the Global South by the Global North (Santos, Nunes and Meneses 2007:xix). “In short, in the name of modern science, epistemicide has been committed, and the imperial powers have resorted to it to disarm any resistance of the conquered peoples and social groups” (Santos 2005:xviii).

Apparent increases in economic and political autonomy for societies outside the West as a result of decolonization have not reversed the effects of this epistemicide. Speaking from an Asian perspective, Alatas (2006) reflects on what he terms “academic imperialism”. Historically, to the extent that the control and management of the colonized required the cultivation of such disciplines as history, linguistics, geography, economics, anthropology, international relations and sociology in the colonies, academe becomes part of the technologies of imperialism (2006:58). Academic imperialism, then, is the domination of one people by another when it comes to thinking, particularly as alternative knowledges become erased. Moreover, this erasure is likely to be gendered: since the researchers populating these disciplines in the 19th century were almost universally men, perspectives of women in the metropolitan centers were absent and the bodies of knowledge particularly developed by women in the South were even more exposed to erasure. Alatas suggests that academic neo-colonialism continues to exist through a condition he refers to as academic dependency: academic disciplines of some countries are dependent on the development and growth of those disciplines in other countries, particularly ones to which the former were previously subjected (2006:63). Similarly, we might expect that the gendered character of the disciplines in the imperial powers as well as the social class locations of the scholars involved would be replicated in the colonial and post-colonial settings.

Alatas adds, some disciplinary communities (located in the dominant epistemological powers) can expand according to certain criteria of development and progress. Other disciplinary communities such as those located in the Global South can only do so as a reflection of that expansion, which can have mixed effects on their own development (2006:63). This academic dependency is reflected in ideas (metatheory, theory, research methods), men being more present than women, media of ideas (books, leading journals, conferences), aid for research and training, investment in education (particularly by Western educational institutions in the Global South), and movement of
“top” scholars, usually men, from the Global South to universities in the wealthy countries (64-70).

Mbembe (2001) has commented on the effects of such academic imperialism and dependency on research related to Africa. Social theory defines itself both as an accurate portrayal of Western modernity – that is, by starting from conventions that are purely local – and as a universal grammar. It “has condemned itself always to make generalizations from idioms of a provincialism that no longer requires demonstration since it proves extremely difficult to understand non-Western objects within its dominant paradigms” (2001:11). He continues: “There thus arises the methodological question of knowing whether it is possible to offer an intelligible reading of the forms of social and political imagination in contemporary Africa solely through conceptual structures and fictional representations used precisely to deny African societies any historical depth and to define them as radically other, as all that the West is not (2001:11).” As Mignolo (2005:85) avers, the theological and secular frames of mind, including their gendered character, in which political theory and political economy have been historically grounded are not ever questioned.

Many of the concepts being promoted by scholars of the hegemonic epistemological powers are “tossed off as universals” according to Alatas even though they emerge from particular cultural and gendered traditions (2006:15). Consequently, the building of theories and research programs founded on the discovery and development of non-Western categories and concepts is highly unlikely to take place under academic dependency. Nor do attempts take place to reconcile the cultural specificity of concepts with the self-understandings of the men and women being studied in the non-West. In the absence of such attempts, Mbembe (2001:7) observes that the research of Western scholars is primarily concerned, not with comprehending the economic or the political or the cultural in Africa or in producing knowledge in general. Their concern is with social engineering, whether it be called “development,” “modernization,” “poverty alleviation,” or the like.

Research and Cognitive Justice
To begin thinking about some of these issues and how they might relate to collaborative research on globalization, we begin with some reflections on research itself. Once again, Appadurai provides some useful observations. Consistent with what we have argued above, he suggests that research too is culturally situated and a cultural practice. The key to the “modern” research ethic dominant in the “West” is replicability. Research protocols are built around verifiability, falsifiability, and transparency. The idea is to eliminate “the virtuoso technique, the random flash, the generalist’s epiphany, and other private sources of confidence” (2000:12). Cross-checking and replication of results are crucial to reliable knowledge. These norms, in turn, give moral force to the idea of “value-free” sciences, which reinforces a growing divide between contemporary researchers and “the ancients” like Aristotle and Plato as well as modern thinkers like Kant, Locke and Goethe who all articulate a moral voice or vision.

Appadurai outlines several cultural distinguishing points or “diacritics” of the Western research ethic (2000:15):
- a commitment to routinized production of certain types of new knowledge
- an understanding of the systematic procedures for producing that knowledge
- a particular sense of the shelf-life for good research results
- a definite sense of belonging to and working with a specialized community of experts who precede and follow any specific piece of research
- a belief in the necessity of divorcing morality and political interest from proper research

We would add that this culturally situated research ethic emerges from a gendered, class-based, and racialized situation, where white, higher class, men have been leaders in developing these procedures.

Appadurai then poses a series of questions (2000:15) that allude to possible differences between this modern research ethic and other approaches outside the West. These differences would include a reluctance to conduct research where moral and political concerns were not central; support for public intellectuals and grassroots organizations working more independently of specialized communities of experts; and a resistance to a growing divide between the humanities and social sciences along methodological grounds.
In a subsequent article, he builds on this analysis by offering a broader definition of research activity. He writes that research is “not only the production of original ideas and new knowledge (as it is normally defined in academia and other knowledge-based institutions). It is also something simpler and deeper. It is the capacity to systematically increase the horizons of one’s current knowledge, in relation to some task, goal or aspiration” (2006:176). Such research capacity is most crucial for a specific part of the world’s population: “the bottom portion of the upper half of the typical population in poorer countries, the 30% or so of the total population who have a shot at getting past elementary education to the bottom rungs of secondary and post-secondary education. This group (which consists of perhaps 1.5 billion people in the world today) is within the framework of global knowledge societies. But their existence in this category is insecure, for many reasons, including partial education, inadequate social capital, poor connectivity, political weakness and economic insecurity and the gendered character of each of these factors (2006:168).”

Although apparently moving away from the Western-centric notion of research, Appadurai leaves several questions unaddressed if we are to find cognitive justice. First, how do researchers construct a dialogue between different knowledges and epistemologies given the academic hierarchy still present from imperialism and colonialism on the one side and the distinctive and highly different cultural contexts in which those knowledges are embedded on the other? Second, building upon that dialogue, how might collaborative research be organized so as to respect and reinforce cognitive justice? How might non-academic researchers be included? How might research be “representative” of different parts of the world?

Mignolo (2005:118-120) offers a way forward borrowing from the thinking of indigenous peoples as they have sought ways to engage with colonizers. He summarizes their contributions with the concept of “Interculturalidad”: putting into collaborative conversation two logics (accompanied by two distinct cosmologies) for the good of all. Mignolo adds that the “long process of subalternization of knowledge is being radically transformed by new forms of knowledge in which what has been subalternized and considered interesting only as object of study becomes articulated as new loci of enunciation (2000:13). He describes this process as “border gnosis” or “border thinking”
where attempts are being made by subalterns to bring to the foreground the force and creativity of knowledges repressed during the long process of colonization.

Drawing from Mignolo, Santos and his colleagues define an approach to dialogue that they term “emancipatory multiculturalism” (Sousa et al 2007:xxv). “Emancipatory versions of multiculturalism are based on the recognition of difference, and of the right to difference and the coexistence or construction of a common way of life that extends beyond the various types of differences” (xxv). They see this concept of multiculturalism to be linked to what Said has referred to as “overlapping territories” and “intertwined histories” (Said 1994). These products of imperialism and relations between post colonies and their metropoles link dominant societies with dominated territories and have created the historical conditions of diaspora and other forms of migration.

For emancipatory multiculturalism to work, drawing from a more specific discussion of human rights (Santos 2007:14-15), certain key assumptions need to be shared.

1. All cultures have conceptions of knowledge but these conceptions will differ significantly. Thus, one has to focus upon isomorphic concerns among different knowledges.

2. All cultures are incomplete and problematic in their conceptions of knowledge. This incompleteness is best perceived from the outside, from the perspective of a different culture.

3. No major culture is monolithic. Cultures will have different conceptions of knowledge, some more open to other cultures, some less so.

4. All cultures tend to distribute people and social groups among two competing principles of hierarchical belongingness: hierarchies among homogeneous units and separation among unique identities and differences. “The two principles do not necessarily overlap and for that reason not all equalities are identical and not all differences are unequal (Santos 2007:15).

Santos does not comment specifically on how these principles of hierarchical belongingness may also be gendered or differentiated by class. For this reason, we add one more assumption.
5. Within cultures, conceptions and bodies of knowledge may be gendered or dominated by particular social classes, thereby limiting access to knowledge.

It follows that emancipatory multiculturalism only becomes possible if there is a process of reciprocal and horizontal “translation”, that is sensitive to gender and class differences. Translation would allow common ground to be identified without erasing autonomy and difference. It would also permit different knowledges to articulate with one another and to support the construction of new configurations of knowledge anchored in local experiences. If translation works well, then these new configurations of knowledge are less likely to reproduce simply the concepts and concerns of modern science. Alatas (2006:82) sees this kind of process as one involving “alternative discourses”. These would lead to the reconstruction of social discourses that involve the development of concepts, categories and research agendas relevant to local conditions.

In his investigation of different cultural conceptions of law, Geertz (1983:184-195) suggests a hermeneutic way forward for beginning this process of dialogue among alternative discourses. He investigates how legal systems from one part of the world might relate to those in other parts by examining Islamic and Indic law and their differences from Western law. He does so by putting the Western notion of right (Recht, droit) into dialogue with parallel notions of haqq (reality, truth, validity) in Arabic and dharma, a Sanskritic word often deemed untranslatable but including notions of “duty”, “obligation”, “merit” and so on. Following Geertz’s lead, Santos carries out a similar exercise by taking the Western concept of human rights and comparing it with the Islamic concept of umma and the Indic dharma. He suggests how such dialogue and the accompanying translation process can build understanding by showing the respective incomplete character of each of the concepts.

In his writing, Santos discusses a particular methodology for engaging in this kind of translation process, one that he calls diatopical hermeneutics. In reading through this discussion, and then looking at how he and his colleagues set up a research project on “reinventing social emancipation”, we can garner some advice about how to think about organizing collaborative research projects that address issues of cognitive justice. In order to avoid what he called hegemonic co-optation in a collaborative research endeavour, he suggested the following principles (2005:xxiv-xxv):
1. The project did not have a structured theoretical framework
2. The project did not impose a single method or a single set of research methods.
3. The project did not make use of a series of working hypotheses or even less of terms of reference.
4. The theory of the project was to be collectively constructed, from the bottom up, and the basic concepts to be worked out together.
5. The project also assumed the plurality of rival and alternative knowledges and sought to give voice to them.
6. The project privileged the definition of a wide analytical field: those social situations where the conflict between hegemonic globalization and counter-hegemonic globalization was expected to be or to become more intense, and which were also fields of conflict between rival knowledges. These principles share some similarities to those that guided the carrying out of interdisciplinary research in the Globalization and Autonomy project (see Coleman and Brydon, this issue).

Presumably, then, if research collaboration were constructed along the lines suggested by Santos and, to some extent, those followed in the Globalization and Autonomy project, and if the approach defined as emancipatory multiculturalism were adopted and if the individuals concerned engaged in the hermeneutical exercises suggested by Geertz and Santos, a global dialogue on defining programs of globalization research has more chance to succeed. These principles for avoiding “hegemonic cooptation” do not address, however, two other obstacles to successful collaborative research: global “representation” and inclusion of researchers studying and engaging with globalization outside the academy (“grassroots globalization” to use Appadurai’s term”. Santos worried about the first of these obstacles and addressed it by seeking scholars from particular places, situated on the semi-periphery of the world. These scholars were capable of “border thinking”, who would permit a global attempt to address the particular problematic of his research project (see the discussion in Santos 2005). The second of these obstacles is even more difficult, given the diversity and particular foci of researchers outside the academy.

In summary, this analysis stresses the culturally embedded character of knowledge and presumably, then, of producing knowledge. And we add that part of this
cultural embedding will include a gendering of knowledge production and enunciation. In order to work with these deeply culturally entrenched knowledges and their gendered character, a process of dialogue is necessary, which recognizes difference and the right to difference. In this dialogue, it may be necessary to privilege in the first instance those capable of border thinking: replacing the knower and the known by those who can speak as two knowers in dialogue. Such a dialogue is only possible when a number of conditions are met by those participating in it, and which permit researchers to reflect upon and move past the power and gendered hierarchies in the construction of knowledges. In all likelihood, therefore, the principal difficulties researchers would face would be first identifying the ‘border-crossers’, or the participants, both academic and non-academic, to be included in the dialogical research process. Second, how does one determine what the most important research topics might be in the kind of collaborative, cross-cultural, interdisciplinary research often required for globalization studies.

**Research Projects and Cognitive Justice**

We now return to the Globalization and Autonomy project to examine the steps taken by that project in response to Appadurai’s problematic of a double apartheid: incorporation of a research group based in Tunisia and the development of the Globalization and Autonomy Compendium. These examples are useful because they point to probably typical efforts to “internationalize” humanities and social science research and the structural procedures of granting agencies for supporting such efforts. In critically reviewing the research team’s steps, we hope to make more clear how collaborative research projects addressing globalization topics might better address epistemological exclusion.

As noted above, the involvement of the Tunisian group came after the project had received funding and the research team had committed to a program of work to the research council. Accordingly, the Tunisian-based scholars were not involved in the definition of the problematic of the project, which focused on the relationships between globalization and autonomy. This lack of involvement hindered achievement of cognitive justice, therefore, because the formulation of the problematic had not been shared across
cultures and different ways of knowing. Such a process of sharing might have led to a rather different framing of the project’s goals.

Let us take, for example, one of the core concepts of the project, autonomy. In the earliest stage of development of the project, a small working group of eventual team members participated in a series of informal discussions of globalization. In reading the extant literature and then contemplating what became a pivotal event in challenging neoliberal globalization, the meeting and surrounding protests of the WTO ministerial in Seattle in 1999, the scholars involved concluded that the protests were about globalization and autonomy. If one listened to the various groups involved, they were concerned that nation-states on the one side and individual persons on the other were losing capacity to shape their respective collective and individual destinies. This conclusion led eventually to the formulation of the objectives of the project in terms of collective autonomy, individual autonomy and globalization.

We might now engage in a small thought experiment and ask what might have happened if researchers from outside the wealthier countries, and Canada in particular, had been engaged in this thinking. Mbembe (2001:10-11) has observed:

On key matters, the Hegelian, post-Hegelian, and Weberian traditions, philosophies of action and philosophies of deconstruction derived from Nietzsche or Heidegger, share the representation of the distinction between the West and other historical human forms as, largely, the way the individual in the West has gradually freed her/himself from the sway of traditions and attained an autonomous capacity to conceive, in the here and now, the definition of norms and their free formulation by individual, rational wills. The traditions also share, to varying degrees, the assumption that, compared to the West, other societies are primitive, simple, or traditional in that, in them, the weight of the past predetermines individual behavior and limits the areas of choice – as it were, a priori. The formulation of norms in these latter societies has nothing to do with reasoned public deliberation, since the setting of norms by a process of argument is a specific invention of modern Europe. This statement thus suggests that the project’s notions of individual autonomy and collective autonomy, as it involves public deliberation, have decidedly Western roots. These roots become problematic because the researchers were committed to investigating
the relationship between globalization and autonomy on a world scale, not just in the West.

In any process fitting the kinds of criteria for cognitive justice outlined in the previous section of the article, the concept of autonomy would need to have been interrogated deeply. And if it were put into dialogue with the same two concepts identified by Santos in his example related to human rights, *umma* and *dharma*, some of the silences and incompleteness of autonomy would have explicitly emerged. For example, when *umma* is put into dialogue with human rights, the latter are shown to be incomplete. On the basis of rights alone, “it is impossible to ground the collective linkages and solidarities without which no society can survive, let alone flourish” (Santos 2007:17). Similar limitations to the concept of autonomy did gradually become visible in the project, particularly in the volumes dealing with “renegotiating community” (Brydon and Coleman 2008) and indigenous peoples (Blaser et al. under review). Still, if a process of what Mignolo called “Interculturalidad” had been followed from the very beginning, these limitations would have come to the fore and the overall problematic of the project might have taken a different form altogether. Nonetheless, the inclusion of an academic research team from the South is still limited in this case. Their inclusion does not necessarily automatically improve the cultural heterogeneity of the entire research group, which remains basically comprised of academic researchers. Still, the difficulties encountered by the research project leadership in this attempt highlight existing structural obstacles toward a more inclusive and dialogical research process.

Obstacles to full cognitive dialogue are also erected by research granting institutions and thus the material structures and analytical conceptions underpinning academic collaborative research. When the Canadian research council allocates research grants to scholars, a number of conditions must be met. Three of these are important to our argument: the scholars must have an academic appointment at a postsecondary institution; the scholar receiving the funds must have approval for the research from a university research ethics committee, which follows a nation-wide ethics protocol; the postsecondary institution involved must have a research office, which can receive and manage the funds. These conditions are not at all unusual among granting agencies in OECD countries.
They did create significant difficulties, however, for involving the Tunisian research group in the project on the one side and in engaging with grassroots globalization on the other. To begin, many universities in countries outside the OECD do not have “research services” offices to support faculty members’ research, particularly in the humanities and social sciences. In addition, the autonomy of universities from the state that is usually found in OECD countries is often much less elsewhere: in some countries, universities are part of the state’s executive apparatus and thus under direct control of the head of state. To transfer monies to universities in this situation is more a transfer to the state than to the researchers involved. Finally, in the absence of these other structures, many countries outside the OECD do not have required ethics protocols for humanities and social science scholars. To varying degrees, each of these institutional differences was in play in the relationship between the project and the Tunisian team.

Addressing these “problems” took nine months of negotiations between the granting council, the research office at McMaster University which received the grant funds from the Council and the project director. The negotiations resulted in a formal protocol of several pages signed by the Council, McMaster University, the project director, and the head of the Tunisian group. In the end, the latter had to agree to follow the Canadian ethics protocol and the Council and McMaster University accepted that the funds could be transferred in a different way than to a “research services” office of a university.

These steps were inconsistent with cognitive justice on several grounds. Most important of these is the imposition of a very particular research ethic on scholars living, researching and teaching in a very different cultural and political environment. As Appadurai (2000) observes, the Western research ethic is a culturally situated one; to universalize it can amount to a Western imposition. In addition, in many countries outside the OECD, receiving official funds from a government-related research council by an individual scholar can be construed as a criminal act: receiving funds from a foreign government. The scholar in question might be open to arrest and jail.

Finally, the Council’s stipulation that the funds go to a person affiliated with a postsecondary institution reflects a Western view of research as well. As Appadurai and
Santos have both observed, it overlooks the fact that research on globalization is being done by social movements and other non-governmental organizations as they struggle to understand and to elaborate alternative globalizations. The pursuit of cognitive justice thus must also put into question the definition of research itself and who are doing research and the possibility that the practices involved depart from standard models in the OECD countries.

As an educational tool designed to address Appadurai’s double apartheid by bringing knowledge about globalization to those outside the academy, the Compendium too can be seen as having limitations when reviewed under the lens of cognitive justice. The problem again might be described as a focus on dissemination of research findings, rather than a dialogue about them. When it comes to the research summaries provided in accessible language by team members, researchers were asked to address several questions:

- What are your research questions?
- Why are these questions important for understanding globalization and autonomy?
- What answers did you find to your questions? What did you learn?
- How do these findings relate to key globalization and autonomy issues?
- (Where appropriate) what are the implications of your findings?

These questions focused on summarizing the research findings from the researchers’ points of view. Nor did the site incorporate any vehicle for dialogue with these research findings: no blogs, no email addresses for authors, and so on. An expanded definition of research and a more dialogical research process would have led to a rather different design of the website.

The glossary articles about places, persons, concepts, events, and events suffered from similar problems. Team members opted for peer reviewed texts, albeit written in accessible language, in focusing on dissemination rather than dialogue. A lack of funds to operate in languages other than English complicated the Compendium’s goals further. And the large bibliography compiled over the project came to be composed principally of journal articles and books published by the dominant publishers in the OECD countries, particularly the US, the UK and France. In this respect, our project reflects some of the
larger problems emerging from globalization itself: the consolidation of publishing for academic work within the hands of a few large companies and the dominance of global English.

Globalization Studies and Cognitive Hierarchies: Some Concluding Thoughts

The research and teaching field of globalization studies in the OECD countries, the field that is being defined, in part, by the articles published in this journal, is at a crossroads. To date, the orientation and shaping of the field have taken place principally in the universities and research institutes of the OECD countries. Scholars in these institutions have joined with others in the wealthier countries to name as “globalization” the processes at the center of the research field. Once named, historians and others have observed that these processes are not unique to the current period, opening up further avenues of research. In having the field enunciated in the West, taken up by academic disciplines in the West, and becoming the focus of research in the West, an important question arises. Is the field of globalization studies still complicit with such insufficiently examined myths as that of progress, and with conceptions of time and space, and the notions of being more or less “advanced” that characterized earlier studies led by the West of the non-West? Does the word “globalized” become invested with the same valences as advanced versus backward, civilized versus primitive or savage, modern versus traditional, industrialized versus industrializing, developed versus developing or underdeveloped? The question arises because based on usual definitions of globalization, it would seem that those parts of the world that are advanced, civilized, modern, industrialized and developed are also those that are perceived to be more globalized.

Concern about this kind of question was part of what was behind Appadurai’s article on the research imagination and its relation with “grassroots globalization” in the first place. In reflecting upon this concern, some scholars have made distinctions parallel to Appadurai’s one between “globalization” and “grassroots globalization”. For example, Spivak proposes speaking about the planet rather than the globe. “Globalization”, she writes, “is the imposition of the same system of exchange everywhere. . . . . The globe is on our computers. No one lives there. It allows us to think that we can aim to control it (2003:72).” To refer to the planet, in contrast, is to think about an undivided natural
space, rather than demarcated political spaces. She adds (2003:73), “If we imagine ourselves as planetary subjects rather than global agents, planetary creatures rather than global entities, alterity remains underived from us; it is not our dialectical negation, it contains us as much as it flings us away.”

Mignolo is another scholar who suggests alternative or parallel concepts to globalization because of the term’s hegemonic implications. Borrowing from the writings of Hélé Béji (Tunisia) and Édouard Glissant (Martinique), he counterposes *mundialization* to globalization and the “world” to the “globe”. What he wishes to distinguish is the conception of a global design and its implementation in different places from the enactment locally of that design, and its adoption, adaptation, transformation and rearticulation (2000:77,278). In this respect, he rejoins Mbembe (2001) who calls for research to respect entanglements, different temporalities, and complexity in local places as they confront global designs. All the while he emphasizes that studying the local without including globalization is impossible.

Anna Tsing’s writings about the ethnography of global connections complement Mignolo, Mbembe and Spivak in these aspects of their thinking. She argues that the “universal” ideas and sources of knowledge upon which these connections are based do not travel easily into local places. The forging of global connections based upon those universals involves “friction”, “the awkward, unequal, unstable, and creative qualities of interconnection across difference” (2005:3). She notes how such connections are engaged and that in the process of engagement, the universals -- the global designs -- are themselves transformed even if the connections are made. Local bodies of knowledge are brought into dialogue, if not confrontation, with the knowledge upon which global designs are formed. Those on the front lines of these engagements become involved in “border thinking”: thinking from dichotomous concepts rather than ordering the world in dichotomies. They live in loci located at the borders of the global and the world/mundial/planetary (Mignolo 2000:85).

These observations are important for research in globalization studies for two reasons. First, they reiterate the point that research on the global/mundial/planetary must include the enactment of global plans and connections and accompanying frictions in the everyday everywhere. Second, these enactments and resistances are generating
knowledge and understanding of globalization. Those involved in engaging with global processes and contesting global connections are interpreting, learning about, reflecting on, and gathering understanding of these same processes and connections. In this respect, if we follow Appadurai’s (2006) argument, they are engaging in “research”. But often this research does not travel beyond the locality either because of a want of resources and connections between the researchers in each place or because they do not fit with the dominant Western research ethic (Boden and Epstein 2006: 229).

For these reasons, researchers in globalization studies need to reflect further upon what collaborative research should entail. Collaboration is usually assumed to take the form of the kind of relationship that existed between the Globalization and Autonomy project and its Tunisian team: scholars in one place join together with scholars in another place, both committed to work under the dominant research ethic. Recognizing that researchers with different ethics are active outside the academy in social movements, transnational activist networks, and communities on the “borders” engaging with global projects (Mignolo 2000: Chap. 1) means that collaborations will need to be more extensive than usually considered. Moreover, they will require “translating” between research ethics and engaging in a deeper form of dialogue. If followed, such a “new architecture for producing and sharing knowledge about globalization” would end up democratizing the flow of this knowledge (Appadurai 2000:20). There are models to consider for such collaboration with Walden Bello’s writings (see 2005, 2001) and work with Focus on the Global South (http://focusweb.org/) being one example and Jan Aart Scholte’s project on building global democracy being another (http://www.buildingglobaldemocracy.org/).

Obviously, such collaboration would need to take account of the thinking about how to construct dialogue across cultures reviewed earlier in this article. We need to recognize, however, that there are important structural obstacles in the OECD countries to democratizing research on globalization matters in this way. Boden and Epstein (2006: 229) argue that flows of ideas about what it means to be a “good” academic researcher are being driven by prominent universities with the backing of their governments in English-speaking countries. As a result, “English language journals from such countries have established themselves as the ‘world leaders’ and English language
universities dominate league tables of ‘global’ universities (2006:229). Public and private organizations that fund research in the OECD countries have routines, requirements, rules of eligibility, and disciplinary definitions of knowledge that erect serious barriers to deeper forms of collaboration. In a way, these structures and practices are an inheritance of the West’s dominant standpoint, one that defines the researchers as subjects and others outside the West as objects of research. Good intentions in the absence of structural reforms will not be adequate for addressing continuing cognitive injustice and epistemological exclusion.

Notes

1. Admittedly, with the Compendium being conceived in 2002 and 2003, and the site being constructed in 2003 and 2004, some of the dialogical and social networking tools were only then becoming available. To add them on at the end of the project would have involved significant unplanned for costs.

References


