Social movement strategies for articulating claims for socio-ecological justice: Glocal asymmetries in the Chilean forestry sector

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keywords: Chile, forestry, social movements, glocalisation, socio-ecological justice

ABSTRACT
Pinochet’s 1974 forestry law led to a rapid increase in development of the sector in southern Chile. Although there have been new employment opportunities and associated economic multiplier effects, the negative impacts of the sector, both socially and environmentally, have been widespread and have generated responses from diverse social organizations. Nevertheless, the capacity of these organizations to act collectively and create alliances against the sector’s dominant, mainstream actors has been weak. The article argues that different social movements fail to capitalise on horizontal linkages in order to press their claims for socio-ecological justice related to the development of the forestry sector. This is a product of a strong state-industry link and high concentration in a sector dominated by two firms, a relic of the power geometries established under the dictatorship. Different social movements - unions, environmental NGOs and indigenous groups - manifest these concerns about the socio-ecological impacts and make claims against the sector which often lead to direct conflicts. This paper focuses how these claims are made, both horizontally among actors within the region, and vertically beyond the region to the national and global scales (glocalisation). Despite developing stronger vertical networks, the movements remain fragmented and marginal relative to the influence of the forestry firms. Given this lack of capacity to generate collective demands, grassroots claims for redistribution and rights protection are severely restricted.

**Glocalization, the double hierarchy and changing power geometries**

This article poses a question about the ability of diverse social organizations to mobilize collectively in order to address the concentration of power in an industrial sector, in this case forestry in Chile. The question can be presented as follows: To what extent does the lack of collective organization of diverse actors inhibit their ability to make claims against the dominant, mainstream actors? The article analyzes how social organizations seek strategic alliances in order to challenge existing power relations and further their claims.

Contemporary globalization has involved the reconfiguration of political regimes at and across different scales (panarchy), in order to pursue capital accumulation on the one hand, and to block this process on the other. These political regimes and the alliances that are formed to sustain them are critical to understanding how different actors and interests groups establish their positions relative to others, how accumulation takes place or is blocked, and how the benefits from accumulation are shared locally or trans-locally. Given that capital accumulation involves both nature – raw materials – and labour, and that in local contexts these factors are closely entwined (Barton, 2006), processes of globalization can be understood as mechanisms for the promotion of socio-ecological justice, or the inverse. The role of the state in this process is key, however the processes of globalization have increasingly led to crises of legitimacy for the state, in terms of its ability to generate or protect public goods (Cerny, 2000).

The contemporary role of the state as a third space operating under strong globalizing forces, lying between private firms and civil society organizations, is best addressed in terms of ‘the

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double hierarchy’ (Fløysand et al., 2010). Under the double hierarchy the state plays a dual role: one that favours private sector investment, production and trade for national economic development objectives (capital accumulation emphasis); and the other that favours local and regional spatial development and seeks to regulate certain private sector practices that limit labour security and challenge environmental protection objectives (socio-ecological justice emphasis). For example, local governments in Chile are part of a structure that leaves them under this double hierarchy. As such, these local actors are also marginalized from decision-making processes which are led by national authorities and large firms who share a dominant view that local and regional development is an outcome of entrepreneurialism (Fløysand et al., 2010). The ways in which social organizations engage with the state to pursue their objectives is clearly critical, and there are also different sympathies within the state, across the double hierarchy and at different administrative scales, from the municipality to the province, region, national and global levels. This situation generates complex power geometries that in turn define potential strategies for different social organizations. This complexity is further enhanced by the contemporary context of organizations that transcends many of the ideological platforms that were common across Latin America in previous decades. There is a strong sense that contemporary social movements go beyond conventional political ideologies to open up new spaces of engagement and create wider bases, e.g. the Chilean student movement and the Chilean decentralisation mobilisations in Magallanes, Aysén and Calama (2011-2012). However, this lack of a common political project may also be a factor in the difficulties of creating solid alliances across prominent social organizations.

A highly appropriate form of defining this complexity is provided by Swyngedouw (2004, 4) with his concept of ‘glocalisation’. Glocalisation is a process-based phenomenon where “scalar configurations are the outcome of socio-spatial processes that regulate and organize social power relations.” According to Swyngedouw, processes are re-scaling on a permanent basis, taking on different nested arrangements. These processes are in line with changing political economy settings that give rise to new governance constellations, hence regulatory shifts. Swyngedouw notes that influence over decision-making is subject to the permanent tension that exists between scales of regulation and scales of networks. It is these tensions that can be teased out of the Chilean forestry case. Given the neoliberalisation of the Chilean economy and society since the mid-1970s and the powerful role of the market vis-à-vis the state, these tensions are considerable and are played out most often in the local and regional contexts where harvesting and processing take place (Boisier, 2005). At the same time, the return to democracy in 1990 gave rise to other actors’ involvement in local processes and regulatory actions. In this sense there are parallels with processes in other democracies during the 1990s (Cerny, 1995), including the influence of the ‘Third Way’ that would also be in evidence during the administration of Ricardo Lagos in Chile (2000-2006) (Giddens, 1998). Additionally, different spatial conditions can multiply the number of actors in a constellation (a network configuration) due to their increased glocal flexibility; this applies to capital as well as non-governmental actors.

In decision-making processes, there are permanent processes of exclusion and inclusion of actors that are a product or outcome of power relations. These power relations are, in turn, influenced by the alliances and associativity generated among actors at different scales (glocally). Since mainstream actors have established central positions over time (since the 1970s), allowing them to establish links with actors in similar positions and reaching several networks at ‘higher’ scales, their control over the sector is comprehensive (Swyngedouw, 2004; Jones and Search, 2009).
terms ‘mainstream’ and ‘marginal’ are used in an explicit way here. They refer to types of power relations that these actors generate and their ability to influence decision-making by state agencies and the firms themselves. These decisions may relate to general regulatory issues, local development issues, labour and environmental concerns, and fiscal matters. It is precisely this access to decision-making processes and outcomes that exposes the different power relations that exist across the board, and the unevenness that prevails in terms of this power among co-existing actors, across multiple networks at many scales (Santos, 1996).

An important element of the associativity of mainstream actors, in this case forestry firms and productivist state institutions, is that they also share understandings of cultural and organisational structures, and thus have a certain degree of ‘proximity’ or ‘co-presence’ which enhances their power (Allen, 2003; Jones and Search, 2009). The control exercised by mainstream actors can be seen in the shaping of the dynamics of local development and competitiveness (Hiernaux, 1995; Vázquez-Barquero, 2000). In contrast, marginalised actors are located, spatially and relationally, at the ends of networks. They have few direct links with actors in central positions and, given problems of contrasting agendas, they have limitations in connecting both with higher levels (Faulconbridge and Hall, 2009) and with local networks. Given this diversity of different organizations and agendas, they have low associativity, a situation that perpetuates a power geometry in which power is concentrated in a small number of private firms driven by capital accumulation.

We understand power as a dynamic relation which works as a catalyst of contingency by reducing the complexity of the system via a decision, by one actor, that limits the range of options for other actors (Luhmann, 1995). It is the basis of the political subsystem and also an outcome of political practices. This definition suggests that power is not a matter of more or less power in the sense of having quantities of it (Allen, 2003) or in terms of authoritarian links between actors, through which one exercises absolute control over the other. Lukes (1985) referred to this as a one-dimensional view of power. When we say that power is not about actors having more or less of it, we are pointing to an approach based on resources that are mobilised to control the political agenda by limiting options available to others. Actors can generate more or less resources, such as capital, media access or other factors that may be used to influence others, as well making it difficult for other actors to do the same; this construction has echoes of Lukes’ (1985) three-dimensional view of power.

There is a struggle between several actors as a consequence of these resource mobilisations and limited options. However this is not a classic struggle with only two defined groups, and it is not limited solely to economic considerations. The glocal constellation of actors suggests a restructuring of relations of power across scales whereby alliances and collaboration are complex and fluid (Faulconbridge and Hall, 2009). First, mainstream actors do not act alone. They can lead decision-making processes but are faced by other, often-marginal actors, because the political agenda is accessible to them via different channels if they choose to mobilise their resources in this way. In the case of Chilean indigenous movements for example, there are those who act within the framework of state-sanctioned processes, and those that operate beyond the state via direct action. Second, power as a relational effect implies that it is not a static property that flows into global space (Allen, 2003). Rather, power as a catalyst emerges with every contact between actors, so resources are not an indicator of influence before they are mobilised around a specific process. Actors reveal power in particular places around particular processes since they
are physically located or operate within specific territorial configurations. It is in these configurations that scales of regulation (which define institutional arrangements in certain spaces, according to Faulconbridge and Hall, 2009) are confronted by scales of networks through which considerable power is exerted. The outcome is a certain distribution of power among actors in terms of how they interact to influence decision-making (Allen, 2003) and thus control socio-spatial transformations.

The Chilean development model and the forestry sector

Over the last forty years, productive activities in Chile have been developed under a specific macroeconomic logic defined by the dictatorship and the “Chicago Boys” economic ideology of the mid-1970s. A strong component of this logic, which is similar to other experiences of neoliberalism, has been the role of public-private partnerships (Daher, 1992; Harvey, 2001). In the Chilean context, this has led to close cooperation between national state agencies (Ministries and related services) and larger economic groups. The term ‘economic groups’ has been employed for the largest private national conglomerates, such as the Matte Group, the Luksic Group and the Angelini Group. These groups rose to prominence following the privatisations during dictatorship (see Fazio, 2000). Forestry is a clear example of this process, although it has also occurred in other sectors, such as mining and agriculture. This cooperation in terms of regulation, research and technical assistance has been important in positioning the Chilean economy in the glocal space via its export-oriented development model. One of the outcomes of this historical process has been the localisation of the headquarters of these key economic players in Santiago, close to the state decision-making bodies and the legislative bodies in Valparaiso. Major decision-making for the sector is therefore highly concentrated in the capital, and not in the regions where extraction, harvesting and processing take place and which are most dependent on the sector’s evolution (Boisier, 2005).

The forestry industry was one of the first industries to be supported by the Pinochet dictatorship in 1974 and it rapidly became one of the leading sectors within what would be labeled the ‘non-traditional export sectors’, including wine, fruit and aquaculture. While this sector and others became consolidated within what was called the Chilean economic ‘miracle’, the forces of authoritarianism closed down the spaces for social mobilization. This is the context of the neoliberalization of the Chilean economy from 1975 and the social disciplining of the dictatorship. Although the street protests against the dictatorship at the time of the international recession in the early 1980s marked the start of certain forms of mobilization, almost a decade after the coup, it was only following the 1988 plebiscite that different social organizations would become formally constituted once again, such as political parties, unions, indigenous organizations and other groups, such as environmental NGOs. The political context of the early 1990s remained tense in terms of the civil-military relationship. However there was a slow and clearly defined return of civil society as an important actor, and there also formal recognition of certain groups and their demands, e.g. in the 1994 Indigenous Law (Barton, 2002).

Despite the return to democracy, the dominant economic model remained that of neoliberalization, albeit with a stronger social orientation. This social protection goal would be amplified following the removal of Pinochet from political life after his arrest in the UK, during
the administrations of Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet (2000-2010); programmes such as Programa Auge, Chile Barrio, Chile Solidario and Protege were important examples. Despite these advances in health, education and social protection, social organizations were increasingly critical of the neoliberal model, the labour and environmental impacts of the export-oriented model, and related distribution issues.

In the case of forestry, the grip of the two leading firms had remained constant from dictatorship to democracy; 71.8% of national exports are generated by two economic groups: Arauco (43.6%) and CMPC (28.2%). By 2009, forestry accounted for 7.8% of national exports (second only to copper exports), and dominated landscapes in the centre-south of the country. The Maule and Los Lagos regions had 86.2% of forestry plantations in 2002 (CONAF, n.d.; ProChile, 2010). This concentration was facilitated by the decision of the dictatorship to privatise several public firms during the late 1980s (AIFBN, 2009). However there was tension between local, small actors and large firms as a consequence of privatisation. Representatives of small firms argued that large companies were using the national association of producers as a platform for their own interests without regard to other voices in the industry. The Chilean Wood Corporation (CORMA), created in 1952 and representing over 200 companies, was the vehicle through which their interests were express in the public decision-making arena (CORMA, n.d.). This situation led to the creation of alternative associations, some of which were opposed to the largest firms (El Mercurio, 2009). For instance, PYMEMAD brought together around 300 firms operating in several branches of the industry.

The importance of the industry to the Chilean economy, its production structure, tensions between producers, inequality in the distribution of the benefits from forestry activities, and claims in labour, environmental and social fields have all contributed to a complex regulatory situation for the state agencies. Constraints to this public regulation include the legal situation of CONAF, which performs public regulatory functions but has remained a private corporation since its creation in 1973 (the successor of the Reforestation Corporation). And it includes a weakened national agency for forestry research – INFOR (The Forestry Institute) – which does not have a specific research budget and competes with universities and other centres for public funds (Donoso and Otero, 2005).

In the face of these relatively weak public regulatory regimes, some marginalised actors have seen certification process as a route to pressuring firms into improving their practices. In 2002, a Chilean forestry certification system was created. CERTFOR was set up by Fundación Chile, INFOR and the National Development Corporation (CORFO) (CERTFOR, n.d.; CIPMA, 2005) and certifies good practices across environmental, economic, social and institutional issues. International endorsement is provided by the Programme for the Endorsement of Forestry Certification (PEFC), which was created by producers from several countries to evaluate their practices under sustainability considerations (PEFC, n.d.). Both of these systems run in parallel with FSC, which has become the preferred certification mechanism around the world since the late 1990s (FSC-Chile, n.d.) and is stronger in terms of stakeholder involvement, incorporating participation by civil society organizations, unions and indigenous associations.

Although the issue of certification is just one of many instrumental outcomes based on decision-making processes and the exercise of power relations, it is significant in terms of the glocalised
issues that operate and that provide spaces for more diverse local engagement. It also reveals the counter-action mainstream actors employed in providing a parallel certification system that focuses on a more limited range of issues. It is one of the examples of verticalisation of marginalised actors whereby they glocalise their activities by linking up with the objectives of a non-national organisation in order to pressure firms locally. Despite their highly glocalised nature given their export profile and investments around the region, the response to certification by the firms was the reverse, seeking to localise certification around a domestic voluntary instrument.

This voluntary approach to regulation, minimising the role of the state and enhancing self-regulation of firms has not reduced social opposition, as can be seen in the different ‘moments’ of opposition noted in the following pages. During successive governments since 2000, there is evidence that there are more concerted efforts for social mobilization in Chile, mirroring similar experiences elsewhere in Latin America. Although there has been a strong shift towards left-wing political administration in the region, following the elections of Lula and Rousseff in Brazil, Vázquez and Mujica in Uruguay, the Kirchners in Argentina, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Ollanta Humala in Peru, Fernando Lugo in Paraguay and Rafael Correa in Ecuador, it is perhaps more relevant to focus on the role of social movements during the same period and earlier (Tedesco and Barton, 2004). The role of the Movimiento Sem Terra in Brazil, the cocaleros and the broader indigenous movement in Bolivia, the piqueteros of Argentina, and the specific resistance to the paper plant located on the Uruguay-Argentina border and the Tipnis highway project in Bolivia, all provide evidence of a strengthening of social movements in the region under these left-wing governments.

In the case of Chile, this social mobilization strengthened during the 2000-2010 period with indigenous radicalization, strong environmental opposition to specific mega-projects, the formation of a social housing debtors movement, and union and sub-contractor strikes. Perhaps the most internationally recognised of these is the student movement mobilization that began in 2006 (the ‘penguin revolution’) and was reignited during the whole of 2011 academic year. While there are historical and ideological roots to these movements, most of which were repressed, went underground or disappeared during the 17 years of dictatorship, the contemporary manifestations have much to do with the political arena of the 2000s and are strongly critical of the lack of distribution of wealth and benefits generated by decades of the neoliberal model, as well as the environmental impacts generated by it. One of the differences that characterise the contemporary movements is the absence of a single strong ideological framework. This would appear to be a significant reason why most movements, despite common opponents, e.g. forestry firms and centralised state institutions, struggle to form solid horizontal linkages.

**Mainstreaming and marginalization in a glocal constellation**

In the face of tensions within the state due to the double hierarchy and ‘associativity’, the potential for different social organizations to mobilise collectively in order to address diverse power relations and to assert different development priorities in the territories in which they are active has become increasingly important. This can be contrasted with situations whereby
different social organizations establish and pursue their claims in isolation from other organizations. The cases of unions, the indigenous movement and environmental movement are employed to explore this situation. More specifically, the examples relate to the mobilization of sub-contracted workers in opposition to forestry firm practices in 2008, the ongoing dispute between more radical Mapuche indigenous organizations and forestry firms over land ownership, and the specific environmental opposition to the contamination of the Carlos Anwandter nature sanctuary near Valdivia in 2005, attributed to the large cellulose production plant of the firm Celco (part of the Arauco group). The article points principally to the considerable differences between these actors in terms of objectives and claims and where they seek alliances. The failure to overcome more sectoral and fragmented positions weakens the possibility of generating a more collective position vis-à-vis forestry firm operations in the regions where forestry is most influential: Bío-Bío and Araucanía.

**Map 1: The Bío-Bío and Araucanía Regions of Chile**

*Cartography: Felipe Irrarrazabal*

The argument that is pursued here is that these social movements remain weak in terms of this power relation since they are unable to generate a shared view of local development needs and that without a common agenda and stronger local – horizontal – alliances, they are unable to compete with the strong associativity between the forestry firms and the productivist thread of the state hierarchy. It is this power relation that defines which actors are ‘mainstream’ and influence major decision-making processes, and which remain ‘marginalised’ and do not. This relation reveals the asymmetries of power that are present in these processes.

The glocal constellation that frames the Chilean forestry sector contains the range of actors that shape power relations and generate power asymmetries. As mentioned previously, the ways in which different actors can influence state institutions – the double hierarchy – is critical to how they are able to influence the political agenda and shape regulatory frameworks and other decision-making processes. This in turn defines the conditions under which firms can operate. Whereas the larger mainstream forestry firms - Arauco, CMPC and Masisa (also smaller firms that are not horizontally or vertically integrated as the leading companies but are also CORMA members) - seek to influence the economic-oriented, ‘productivist hierarchy’ ministries and agencies - Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Agriculture and National Forestry Corporation (CONAF) – and are represented by the influential CORMA (The Wood Corporation), the more marginalised organizations (unions, NGOs and indigenous groups) generally look to influence different state agencies, such as the Ministry of Environment (formerly National Environment Commission until 2010), MIDEPLAN (Ministry of Planning and Coordination), CONADI (the Indigenous Affairs Commission) and SUBDERE (Under Secretariat for Regional and Administrative Development). It is these institutions that are responsible for social development, indigenous affairs and local government. In all cases their representative bodies are considerably weaker than CORMA and they lack the consistent engagement through lobbying and other channels that characterises this private associative body.

The regulatory thread of the state hierarchy can be defined as the ‘protection hierarchy’, in which the Ministries of Labour, Health, Environment and Agriculture operate in the fields of work and sanitary conditions. INFOR, CORFO, ProChile and Fundación Chile lead promotion functions and support the industry with funds and institutional initiatives in technology, innovation and
marketing. At the same time the Ministry of National Property and CONAF act as administrative entities: the first in terms of the land owned by the state, and the second operating in forest regulation and management.

Marginalised actors come from NGOs, unions, indigenous and neighbourhood associations and even from within the productive sector and transnational regulatory groups. They include local, national and international NGOs such as Parques para Chile (a local initiative to conserve native forest), Forestry Engineers for Native Forest (a national organisation dedicated to promoting sustainable use of natural resources) and World Wildlife Fund, (an international organisation focused in ecological conservation). Another NGO that has had a particularly important influence on the sector in Chile, as in other parts of the world, is the Forestry Stewardship Council. FSC works very closely with forestry firms to certify their processes based on sustainability principles. In Chile, several actors use the network of this certification mechanism to further their aims. They include the Committee for the Defence of Fauna and Flora (CODEFF) (a national NGO focused on conservation), Leftararu (an association of indigenous farmers), and also Masisa (the third largest forestry company). Since FSC certification includes a wider range of social issues in its evaluation, and not only productive management issues (as in the case of ISO14001), the interactions between actors has been important and it has become an important network for regulation. Marginalised actors also include those forestry firms that hold a different position to those of the largest mainstream actors. This is the case of the associations that do not share the CORMA view of the sector. They include PYMEMAD and ASIMAD, both of which have adopted a more critical discourse about the influence of large companies. Labour unions have played different roles over the years but the main recent activities have been led by sub-contractors, rather than the in-house unions of the major firms.

Finally, there are two other actors that are hard to classify alongside the rest. One of these actors is the constellation of movements or groups that use violent, extra-legal methods to call attention to their claims. This is the case of the ‘Coordinador Arauco-Malleco’ (CAM), for example, which has localised demands about land ownership in the Biobío and Araucanía regions. The CAM has occupied the land of forestry companies, burned buildings and vehicles, blocked roads, and intimidated public officials. The other is neighbourhood associations which appear to lack the ability to participate in any significant way within glocal space but have significant influend locally. Their links are established because municipalities and companies have designed strategies to incorporate their demands. These claims usually relate to specific local neighbourhood issues and problems such as noise and damage to roads.

**Lone furrows: The weaknesses of marginalised actors**

As a sector that dominates the economic profiles and the landscapes of the Biobío and Araucania regions, it has become a by-word for their development processes. In social terms, the impacts of the sector are undoubtedly significant. Large investments in plantations and processing have transformed landscapes and local economies, leading to migration and changing livelihoods (Donoso and Otero, 2005). The most emblematic challenges relate to the ethnic conflicts that have arisen, contesting the role of the firms and their land ownership; Mapuche organisations make claims to their ancestral lands, which were stolen or taken by force by the state decades ago.
and then easily accessed following the 1974 Forestry Law. The most aggressive of these groups – particularly the CAM – has been involved in direct action such as organising demonstrations and property occupations to draw attention to their claims and achieving coverage in the national press. Their belligerence has earned them the label ‘terrorists’ by the authorities and the application of an anti-terrorism law in their judicial cases.

The industry employs approximately 133,000 people in different areas of production. A high percentage of employees are in a precarious position in terms of contracts, low incomes and vulnerability (AIFBN, 2009). This leads to questions about local redistribution of benefits generated by the industry within the regions since these same regions have the highest concentrations of poverty and lowest access to public services within the country (Donoso and Otero, 2005).

With respect to environmental opposition, there are conflicts about lake and river pollution, problems with the use of roads and damage to them, and erosion from clearcutting. Perhaps the clearest bone of contention for environmental groups is the replacement of native species forestry with exotic species monoculture plantations that threaten local ecosystems (AIFBN, 2009; OLCA, n.d.).

These different claims across social and ecological themes are connected in terms of local justice regarding the distribution of benefits and the rights of local movements either to land or to certain labour conditions. National socio-economic data for the regions where forestry is concentrated reveal that despite forty years of intensive forestry activity and the emergence and consolidation of the plantation model, local benefits have been minimal (compared with the development of other regions in the country). As a result, NGOs, unions, churches, neighbourhood associations, farmers and indigenous groups, among others, have been active in make claims about the sector and trying to enhance their power through horizontal and vertical strategic alliances. It is relevant to understand the ‘glocal’ context that determines these networks and the levels at which actors generate resources and confront obstacles to their goals of influencing the political agenda for the forestry sector.

Different moments of recent opposition reveal the diversity of these marginalised actors and their failure to generate a common agenda vis-à-vis the larger firms. These moments demonstrate a failure to communicate a broader agenda for collective social change that would potentially wrest decision-making power from the two main actors in the sector. The three moments noted here relate to three different social movements: environmental, trade union and indigenous. The sources of the information are secondary, derived from local and national press and accounts generated by the organizations involved. The information was selected to reveal the events that took place and the positions different actors have taken. There is no common position and each group has specific claims and objectives that are not necessarily shared by others, thereby fragmenting critical civil society opposition to the forestry sector in the regions themselves. Each organization ploughs its own lone furrow. This situation reinforces power relations in place since the 1970s and the asymmetries that these generate.

The first moment is the contamination in 2005 of the Carlos Andwater nature reserve close to the city of Valdivia. The contamination was first detected when black-necked swans who used the wetland died. These swans were in effect bio-indicators of the contamination that affected their
principal grazing species. The preliminary evidence detected contamination of the Cruces River that flows into the reserve, and that this contamination could be traced back to the new CELCO pulp plant. The principal actor that took up the cause was the Coordinadora por la Defensa del Santuario de la Naturaleza Carlos Anwandter, a local organisation. However this group came under intense pressure from other local people who were associated with the new job opportunities provided by the CELCO plant. ‘Science’ entered the conflict since reports from the University in Valdivia and the Catholic University based in Santiago put forward different interpretations of the source of the problem. This was not the first or the last forestry-related major contamination. One of the earliest pulp firms to be established – Licantel – was found guilty of contaminating the river Mataquito in 1999 and again in 2007. In light of the earlier CELCO event, the second incident generated considerable reaction.

One outcome was that production was halted at the plant and later resumed (which had much to do with local employment concerns) at reduced capacity. This is ongoing, despite the fact that the initial contamination occurred in 2005. One of the interesting spinoffs of this moment was that a CELCO discharge plant was identified as one of the causes of the contamination. An alternative solution was sought by the firm and regulators. One of the options the firm favoured was a new discharge outlet directly into the sea at a location called Mehuin. This would however affect a local fishing community and part of the community objected to this option. The opposition was so intense that local fishermen took direct action against the Chilean Navy that was supporting scientists taking samples to establish existing water quality. Moreover, the conflict has intensified within the Mehuin community by dividing fishers into two groups: one accepts the compensation offered by the firm while the other does not. This situation reveals the difficulties of offsetting potential conflicts and the inherent problems with initial weaknesses in industrial location and regulation. In 2010, the national authorities approved the construction of the pipeline.

The second moment relates to the sub-contractors strike in 2007. While official trade unions represent permanent workers, there are a considerable number of sub-contracted workers who operate in the industry; this is a legacy of the persecution of the labour movement following the 1973 coup and the 1978 Decree Law 2.200 legislation that allowed firms to fire workers without just cause (Schurman, 2001). In 2007, 5,000 these sub-contractors working for Bosques Arauco demanded better incomes through bonuses and struck on 1 May 2007. The unions demanded that the firm fix a minimum wage for sub-contractors as it had for permanent workers. However Arauco argued that this was not legal since Chilean law holds that each worker can negotiate with each individual employer, in this case sub-contacted small firms of a handful of operators and not the principal firm itself. Unsuccessful negotiations led to a more violent stand-off which led to a worker being killed by the police as he drove a machine in their direction. Six others (four police, two workers) were injured. The Minister of Labour, Osvaldo Andrade, intervened and asked the firm to make a better offer to the workers. Arauco acceded but workers later argued that the outcome was a fait accompli in that the conditions were already established. This situation typified the position of the government at the time, to leave firm and workers on their own to resolve differences (El Mercurio, 2009). A new law to limit the most abusive practices of sub-contracting had come into operation in January 2007 but did not resolve grievances that had been generated over time by the widespread practice of labour flexibilisation.
The outcome was that an increase was offered and Arauco agreed to discuss sub-contracting arrangements with the workers. In November the unsatisfactory situation led to a new strike, following the successes of sub-contractors in the mining sector against the state firm Codelco. In 2009, new strikes were announced in Arauco with 20,000 workers in pulp, transport, and at Bosques Arauco favouring action. They demanded a significant increase in wages. Arauco once again held the claim was illegal. Two weeks later the strike ended as the firm demanded that workers return to work prior to negotiation. Strikes in Mininco in 2007 and 2009 replicated similar actions, this time over the failure to provide certain benefits guaranteed in the last collective negotiation. Another concern voiced was that workers were involved in activities that were different from those specified in their contracts.

While the environmental group action in Valdivia was spontaneous and led to the creation of new movements and interests, the union and sub-contactors had had a more long-term relationship with the sector, primarily around wage demands and better working conditions. This is in stark contrast to the third moment. The Mapuche indigenous peoples of southern Chile have experienced decades of marginalisation that dates back to conquest and a long struggle with the Chilean state. This was not resolved by the 1993 Indigenous Law, and remains a point of conflict in spite of the Chilean signing of the ILO 169 on indigenous rights. What is interesting in this regard is how different groups within Mapuche communities have pursued their land interests. While many have followed a route of engagement with the state to generate the return of land to them, others have taken a direct and antagonical line of action based on previous rights and against the theft of successive generations of Chilean winka society dating back to the Pacifying of Araucanía between 1861 and 1883 (Carruthers and Rodríguez, 2009). Two important issues become evident at this stage. The first is that there is not one line of action among the Mapuche. The second is that this struggle is based on historical criteria and claims and so is in stark contrast to the CELCO pollution case that led to the emergence of local environmental opposition.

Within the Mapuche movement, the Coordinadora Arauco-Malleco (CAM), founded in 1998, has gained prominence as the leading direct action organisation. It has used land occupations, the burning of forestry property and other means as central components of its strategy of intimidation in order to argue for the return of land. While the actions of CAM have been high profile, they have also brought intense legal reaction since theirs and similar actions have been defined as ‘terrorist’ (using the 1992 anti-territorism law) (Toledo, 2006). During the time of the ‘miners rescue’ in 2010, many of the comuneros who were incarcerated on charges of terrorism were on hunger strike; but this received little coverage due to the politicised media strategy of the current government. One of the most wildly-publicised activities of the CAM has been the occupation of the farm of René Urban since 2002. This one farm has become emblematic of the stand-off between Chilean settlers in the Araucanía region and Mapuche. During these occupations there have been three fatalities generated by police repression: Alex Lemún in an occupation of the Mininco farm in Ercilla in 2002, Matías Catrileo who was killed in 2008 on a property of Jorge Luchsinger, located near Vilcún (Beaudry, 2009), and Jaime Mendoza who in 2009 was killed on the same property as Lemún.

What the case of CAM and the wider Mapuche movement reveals is that there are wide-ranging strategies and options for influencing decision-making within specific social movements. Nevertheless, despite the formation of CONADI, the passing of the Indigenous Law and ILO
169, the Mapuche remain marginal actors within their territorial spaces that are now by forestry activities.

What is important to draw out from these experiences is that there is not one common position within civil society vis-à-vis the forestry sector. These three groups have few common positions or claims. As such, they do not seek to ally themselves to generate a broader agenda for change and to mobilise others. Instead, each is embedded in a specific claim and generally mobilises specific resources to achieve specific outcomes. These are unlikely to benefit other social movements that also appeal to the firms themselves or to garner support from public bodies for their claims.

In the case of the environmental movement that mobilised in opposition to the CELCO contamination connections were made to national environmental NGOs but the issue was treated as a highly localised incident and was not connected to other contamination events. It was therefore limited in temporal and spatial terms. Nevertheless, the timing of the event prior to the presidential elections in December 2005 and prior to an OECD report on environmental performance in the country, made the mobilisation highly relevant to the formulation of different political positions. The outcome was that all presidential candidates agreed on the need for a reform of environmental institutions. During the Bachelet administration that followed, the Ministry of Environment was created (replacing a less influential environmental commission, CONAMA). The environmental movement around the contamination event was therefore effective in engaging nationally and also connected at the international level with the preparation of the country for entry into the OECD. Nevertheless, the movement did little to generate a stronger environmental organisation at the local or regional level. It did not make linkages to wider development issues; and there were major differences within the local community between those employed at the plant and those who wished to close it.

The lack of environmental movement support for the sub-contracted workers in the forestry sector also revealed this separation of movements and objectives, in spite of their common target. Although socio-ecological justice is sought by both, defining local development as employment and forestry firm practices associated with landscape transformations have been effective in isolating particular claims and parcelling them to discourage a common development agenda. Such an agenda would establish the limits to the sector and its employment in terms of sustainable development and socio-ecological justice. Nevertheless, this has not been achieved, thus fragmenting claims into discrete items that make little reference to the sustainable development of municipal areas, provinces or regions. The forestry firms are able to respond to these specific claims and make concessions. The case of CELCO is one of the few examples of the regulatory thread of the state apparatus using its full force to check the productivist ambitions of the state-business nexus.

The indigenous conflict is quite distinct from the two other movements. The sub-contractors share the same objectives as the permanent labour force: to maximise their benefits from production; and the environmental movement desires clean production (non-contamination from wood processing) and the guarantee of their constitutional right to live in an uncontaminated environment (Article 19.8 of the 1980 Constitution). The indigenous movement has two principal orientations: those who operate within the limitations of the Chilean state and those who operate extra-legally, against the Chilean state. As indigenous movements and considering the fact that
forestry has transformed the landscapes of the regions and many indigenous communities operate plantation forestry or have members who work in transport and processing, there is clearly an overlap with environment and labour claims. The ILO 169 is also evidence of the way in which the movement has sought globalised alliances, via the UN in this case (Cooperativa, 2010), to further their claims. Other alliances have been generated with indigenous movements in Ecuador, Mexico and Bolivia, as well as through academic links nationally such as the UFRO’s Institute of Indigenous Studies, and individual academics such as José Bengoa and José Aylwin (Carruthers and Rodríguez, 2009).

Another glocal actor that has been influential for both labour and indigenous movements has been the Catholic Church. As an intermediary, the church was influential in generating a national debate regarding an ‘ethical wage’ following the forestry and mining sub-contractors strikes in 2008. The church has also been an important intermediary in the indigenous conflict. The current Archbishop of Santiago, Monseñor Ezzati, played a role in both the 2008 labour conflict and has also been influential in mediating between the state and the indigenous movement over the hunger strikers and the application of the terrorism law to their activities.

The following diagram summarises the unique and common aspects of the three cases documented above.

Table 1: Key unique and common aspects of the three cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIQUE ASPECTS</th>
<th>COMMON ASPECTS</th>
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<tr>
<td>Identity emphasis in the indigenous struggle</td>
<td>Shared opponents: forestry firms and the centralised state</td>
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<tr>
<td>Division between labour and environment in the CELCO contamination</td>
<td>The ability to access national media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefit-based (sub-contractors) versus rights-based (indigenous) discourses</td>
<td>The use of direct action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of vertical, international linkages (indigenous)</td>
<td>Appeals to the regulatory framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalism versus reformism within and between organizations</td>
<td>Failure to establish strong horizontal linkages at the local and regional levels</td>
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</table>

At the local level, within municipalities and the wider regions, social movements operate along parallel lines. They seek to bring pressure to bear on the state and the firms that dominate the generation of local development options, limiting others that might be taken by other actors, whether local authorities or civil society organisations. However, they do not act in a concerted manner. They operate across scales and are constantly re-scaling their activities in terms of engagement with national level allies and the centralised state. In recent years, this re-scaling has involved global engagement. The UN, the Catholic Church and the Forestry Stewardship Council are examples of this engagement. Nevertheless, they fail to generate a shared voice in the regional arena or establish a common agenda. It is evident that what each desires for the forestry sector, the regulatory state and the productivist state is different and that overlaps are few and far between. This fragmentation perpetuates their asymmetrical power relation with the
mainstream actors. The outcome of these asymmetries is the anomaly of the second most important export sector in one of the most dynamic economies of the region generating the poorest regional social conditions within the country. These social conditions are particularly stark among the indigenous communities.

**Perpetuating asymmetries: Social organisation fragmentation and marginalisation**

What these recent episodes of social movement vis-à-vis the forestry sector in Chile reveal is that the political agenda is very broad, spanning a wide range of issues and interests. The different movements that have evolved over time have targeted specific outcomes for their political practices and have adopted specific strategies to pursue these claims. They have even sought to benefit from exploiting ‘higher’ scales to generate stronger alliances (Faulconbridge and Hall, 2009). However they all remain largely marginalised despite these different practices. The movements are quite distinctive in their constitutions, their objectives and their practices. The environmental movement that evolved spontaneously in opposition to the CELCO contamination event can be defined as an ‘episodic reactive mobilisation’, while the sub-contractors and their mobilisations are situated more clearly within what can be termed a ‘labour demands’ framework that is commonplace and not specific to this sector or this period. The third case is based on an ‘historical claims’ agenda that is typical of indigenous groups around the world who are seeking to challenge colonial histories of exploitation and appropriation of land.

Each of these evolves from and is situated in a different framework and modus operandi. For this reason there is not a great deal of common ground that is shared on which common alliances can be established. The state and the forestry sector (CORMA) – as mainstream actors – manage each challenge separately and concede the minimum to avoid damage to productive interests and social unrest. In this sense, there is engagement and, sometimes, these groups generate positive outcomes. However, for the most part their status remains marginal relative to the more institutionalised links between the state and CORMA in defining forestry policy and priorities for the sector (across a range of themes from regulation to certification to property rights).

In order to move from the outside to the inside, a paradigm shift is required in how these movements operate. One option is to strengthening associativity. Rescaling, as Swyngedouw (2004) notes, involves the use of networks in a creative way. While these different organisations have used networks – local, national and international – in specific ways, there is relatively little horizontal integration and only vertical integration with ‘like-minded’ organisations. For a more comprehensive overview of the sector and its role in territorial transformations, a broad-based initiative is required that assesses the wide range of related issues in play and how these can be dealt with in an inclusive way. For example, Victor Toledo (2005) indicates there is a need for the Chilean indigenous movement to focus on territorial identity and not only land. In this way it may be possible to rescale in terms of indigenous identity issues and capitalise on global networks that other indigenous groups have used effectively, e.g. in the promotion of ILO Convention 169. Currently this is not the case and is the major criticism that is expressed in different spheres at different times. In terms of the strategies of the social movements that are most active in the struggle against the forestry sector, the use of horizontal engagement to create
broad-based local alliances is not present. This is due to the fact that there are major differences between these groups and their objectives. The unions and sub-contractors do not question the environmental and land use issues. The environmental groups prioritise environmental protection over the labour implications. The indigenous groups want to remove the industry from their territories.

What is clear is these marginal groups do not share common practices and common objectives within the political agenda. For this reason, the mainstream actors who have established their position due to historical reasons – in this case consolidation under the Pinochet dictatorship – are able to deal with a fragmented set of claims and mobilise relevant mechanisms to resolve these, e.g., social responsibility strategies, regulatory shifts, and new governance regimes (such as CONADI from 1993). It is evident that the roots of the movements are so different that local alliances are not easily made. This situation in many ways reveals the weaknesses of these marginalised groups and their inability to press claims in more systematic ways and to take control of the political agenda related to the sector, or at least challenge existing power asymmetries. Without changes in this power geometry, one can imagine that concessions will be made by the mainstream actors over time but that this will be to maintain support for their operations and to protect the macroeconomic and microeconomic logics of the industry, thereby effectively relegating human rights, labour rights and environmental protection issues to a marginal status. The likely outcome is therefore a perpetuation of the status quo for the regions in question: strong economic performance by two major economic groups alongside a perpetuation of relative poverty and inequality.

Social organizations and the means by which they create associativity to make certain claims are often difficult to establish given their unsystematic nature. Alliances and different power geometries are fluid and vary over different spaces and over time. The same is true of the double hierarchy that defines the tensions inherent in the contemporary state, struggling for legitimacy in the face of globalization processes. Despite this fluidity however, it is imperative that these processes can be explained and understood better. This requires theory-building. The case of Chilean forestry has unique aspects but the experience is universal, as scales of networks and scales of regulation influence the ways in which different social organizations and firms claim to improve socio-ecological justice. It is no longer the case that local conflicts or local alliances related to globally traded products can be understood in isolation. The implications of panarchy, and glocalization as a framework for analysis are critical to understanding globalization processes and how they influence the spheres of action of locally constituted social organizations. Double hierarchy is a complement to glocalization and once the elements of marginalization and associativity are also introduced, it is possible to ‘read’ local power geometries, to interpret them and not only describe them in terms of isolated conflicts. It is through such theory-building processes that analyses of social-ecological justice can be enhanced and socio-ecological justice itself can be consolidated.
References


