Strategic Resource Dependence

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Summary
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Keywords: Dynamic Bilateral Monopoly, Markov-Perfect Equilibrium, Depletable Resources, Energy, Alternative Fuels, Oil Dependence

JEL Classification: D4, D9, O33, Q40

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Strategic Resource Dependence

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October 2007

Abstract

We consider a situation where an exhaustible-resource seller faces demand from a buyer who has a perfect substitute but there is a time-to-build delay for the substitute. We find that in this simple framework the basic implications of the Hotelling model (1931) are reversed: over time the stock declines but supplies increase up to the point where the buyer decides to switch. Under such a threat of demand change, the supply does not reflect the true current resource scarcity but leads to increased future scarcity, felt during the transition to the substitute supplies. The analysis suggests a perspective on costs of oil dependence.

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1 Introduction

Policies such as fuel taxes, technology programs, or even international agreements on pollution emissions reductions are likely to entail a demand change in some important exhaustible-resource markets. When resource sellers are strategic, they have an incentive to distort these policies to their own advantage, potentially leading to an increased

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dependence on the resource. To understand the seller side effort to distort the adoption of demand-changing policies, we consider a simple framework where a monopolistic seller (or a group sellers coordinating actions) of an exhaustible resource faces demand from a buyer (or a group of buyers coordinating actions) who has a perfect substitute but there is a time-to-build delay for the substitute. We find that in this framework the basic implications of the Hotelling model (1931) are reversed: over time the resource stock declines but supplies increase, rather than decrease, up to the point where the buyer decides to initiate the transition to the substitute. Under such a threat of change in the demand infrastructure, the supply today does not reflect the true resource scarcity, but it seeks to postpone the buyer’s decision and to increase the future scarcity felt during the transition time to the substitute when the buyer is still dependent on the resource.

Our research builds on Hotelling’s theory of exhaustible-resource consumption (1931), Nordhaus’ (1973) concept of a backstop technology,\(^1\) and the extensive literature on strategic equilibria in resource economics. Our main addition to the standard framework for analysis is the inclusion of a time-to-build delay for the backstop. Previous literature closest to our approach can be divided on the assumptions made for the strategic variable on the buyer side.\(^2\) First, there is a large literature on optimal tariffs in depletable-resource markets showing how coordinated action on the buyer side can be used to decrease the seller’s resource rent (e.g., Newbery, 1983, Maskin and Newbery, 1990; see Karp and Newbery 1993 for a review). Kamien and Hörner (2004) provide a general view on these models by showing that the problem faced by a monopsonistic exhaustible-resource buyer is formally equivalent to that faced by a Coasian durable-good monopoly. We depart from the Coasian framework because the buyer is not a pure monopsony and has a different strategic variable (the substitute). While import tariffs

\(^1\)Nordhaus (1973) was the first to define and analyze the concept of backstop technology in exhaustible-resource markets. He defined it as follows: "The concept that is relevant to this problem is the backstop technology, a set of processes that (1) is capable of meeting the demand requirements and (2) has a virtually infinite resource base" (Nordhaus, 1973, pp. 547-548).

\(^2\)There is a large but less closely related literature focusing purely on seller power in the exhaustible-resource framework. Hotelling himself (1931) already analyzed the monopoly case. Salant (1976) considered an oligopolistic market structure with one dominant firm, and Lewis and Schmalensee (1980) analyzed an oligopoly with all firms some market power. This literature has developed on two frontiers. First, it has focused on developing less restrictive production strategies: from path strategies as in Lewis and Schmalensee, Loury (1986) and Polansky (1992), to decision rule strategies as, for example, in Salo and Tahvonen (2001). Second, the literature has developed more natural cost concepts for extraction under which the resource is economically rather than physically depleted. See Salo and Tahvonen (2001) for a discussion and contribution on this.
and fuel taxes are important, they are more flexible instruments as compared to the development or adoption of substitute technologies that have a permanent effect on the resource dependence. The latter thus creates potentially greater or at least very different strategic threats to the seller. To be effective, optimal tariffs have to be successful in changing the dynamic demand perceived by the seller. The degree of success obviously depends on the precise formulation of the game, but generally the seller’s sales path still follows a Hotelling rule modified to take into account the buyers’ tariff policy. This leads to supplies declining over time. We believe that the technology threat potentially is a more important determinant of how sellers perceive their future demand.

Second, there is a large but somewhat dated literature on the same bilateral monopoly situation where the buyers’ strategic variable is to develop or adopt a substitute technology. Early papers such as Dasgupta et al. (1983), Gallini et al. (1983), and Hoel (1983) assume the buyer exploits a Stackelberg leadership and can commit to a deterministic R&D program for the development of the substitute. The results provide interesting insights into how the buyer side can extract the seller’s rent by altering the timing of sales. Later developments analyzed the role of leadership and commitment (Lewis et al., 1986) and, finally, probabilistic success in R&D and Markov-perfect strategies (Harris and Vickers, 1995). None of the above papers predict that the basic Hotelling implications are reversed, although Harris and Vickers (1995) obtain a result that sales path may be non-monotonic (but not generically increasing).³

The market structure we describe is such that not only sellers have market power but also buyers enjoy some power so that no party is in explicit leadership. The nature of the strategic interaction between buyers and sellers is preserved in the limiting case without discounting, which allows an essentially static analysis and it shows the way to analyze the discounted case. Moreover, in addition to market structure assumptions and asymmetric information, we depart from previous literature in that we abstract from the precise instrument implementing the structural change in demand: when action is taken, it changes the demand irreversibly after a time lag. This abstraction simplifies the strategic variable on the buyer side while keeping what seems essential in the relationship.

The structure of the paper is the following. In Section 2, we discuss some developments

³It should be clear that we are focusing on how strategic relationships in the resource market shape the supplies. There are also other ways to explain the failure of the standard Hotelling model (see Dasgupta and Heal (1974) for the standard model), or its extensions, to match reality (see Krautkramer (1999) for a review of the literature). And there are other ways to extend the traditional economic growth-resource depletion model such that supplies increase over time (cf. Tahvonen and Salo 2001).
in the oil market that motivate our study. In Section 3, we introduce the basic resource allocation problem by considering the social optimum, consumers’ optimum, and also by having a first look at the equilibrium. In Section 4, we introduce and analyze the game under perfect information. In Section 5, we investigate the changes to equilibrium and robustness of overall findings under discounting. In Section 6, we conclude by discussing alternative approaches to the problem and potential implications for the oil market.

2 Motivating example: the market for cheap oil

Our contribution is to the basic exhaustible-resource theory but we are motivated by some recent developments affecting the oil market. First, while there is no single buyer in the oil market, policies aiming to reduce dependence on imported oil imply a collective action on the consumer side. Whatever the reason for policies – need to safeguard the economy against macroeconomic risks or perhaps global warming – they are likely to affect how oil producers perceive their future demand, influencing supplies today. The results suggest that, under such a threat of structural change in oil demand, the true resource scarcity cannot be read from current supply.

Second, while it is clear that the world will never run out of all fossil fuel sources, it is equally clear that we may run out of conventional, cheap oil. The ownership of the cheapest oil reserve is extremely concentrated by any measure and concentration is expected to increase in the near future. The concentration of ownership implies that strategic management of the cheap oil stocks is likely even without a formal cartel among producers. Cheap oil producers understand their influence on market development and take an active role in "demand management"; they often communicate like central bankers with the market, emphasizing credibility and security of supply. The resource that, for example, Saudi Arabia is controlling is unique in that it allows extraction of high

4The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (2006), while being a very comprehensive cost-benefit analysis, is also a political document illustrating the willingness to take actions changing the demand for fossil-fuels.

5See the "2007 Medium-Term Oil Market Report" published by the International Energy Agency for estimates of the Core OPEC reserves. The Saudi share of the Core OPEC stocks is expected to increase over time.

6The following citation describes this: “We’ve got almost 30 percent of the world’s oil. For us, the objective is to assure that oil remains an economically competitive source of energy. Oil prices that are too high reduce demand growth for oil and encourage the development of alternative energy sources” (Adel al-Jubeir, foreign policy adviser of crown prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, Herald Tribune, Jan 24, 2007).
quality output with relatively little capital investment. It also allows for rapid and large production rate changes. Reserves with such properties are at the heart of the economics of the oil dependence because, roughly put, the remainder of the fossil fuel supply is capital intensive and costly when used for the production of liquid fuels. In fact, what is essential for the strategic interaction that we consider is the existence of a low-cost but finite reserve with concentrated ownership and inelastic short-run demand; the rest of ‘oil’ production can be seen as part of substitute fuel production, including costly conventional oil sources, nonconventional oils, biofuels, and alternative energy sources.\footnote{There are different definitions of conventional and nonconventional oils, and these also change over time; see the Hirsch Report (prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy, 2005). The report makes clear that the important scarcity is in the reserves of high-quality conventional oil.}

While the relationship between major oil importers and exporters is clearly not an open bargaining situation, as explicit contracts are not conceivable in the context, it has a flavor of bargaining taking place through markets where offers and responses are implicit. Sellers’ focus on secure supply suggests a compensation to the importing party for continuing potentially costly dependence. On the buyer side, trust in the relationship is expressed by voluntary inaction, that is, postponement of actions changing the demand structure. Our timing assumptions for strategies are perhaps better suited for capturing what is material in this kind of relationship than those used in earlier literature.

3 The resource allocation problem

3.1 Socially optimal resource dependence

Before going to strategic interactions, we start the analysis by looking at socially optimal resource use. This way we will introduce the basic elements of the model and provide a benchmark so that distortions introduced by strategic interactions become clear. Throughout this section we assume that time is continuous.

Consider an economy starting at time $t = 0$ with a finite resource endowment $s_0$ that can be consumed at rate $q_t$ yielding a strictly concave utility $\tilde{u}(q_t)$. We assume no extraction costs. The resource has a substitute that provides the same service and ends the need to use the resource. The economy can choose to adopt the substitute by paying one-time cost $I > 0$ at any $t$, wait for interval of time $k$, so that the alternative replaces the resource at $t + k$, and then pay ongoing cost $c > 0$ per time unit for using the substitute. The substitute thus replaces the resource fully: cost $c$ is a flow cost of maintaining the
alternative supply infrastructure independent of the supply level. We ask the following simple question: how much of the resource should be used before actions are taken, and how much should be left for the transition time interval towards the substitute?

The maintenance costs will prevent an early development of the substitute by the buyer before the substitute is used.\(^8\) We abstract from the substitute’s marginal production costs and resource extraction costs, but could as well have assumed that marginal production costs for the substitute fall short of resource extraction costs so that the resource has no use when the substitute is in place. The assumptions on costs ease the exposition but are not central to our results. Even if the resource can compete with the substitute, the three main features that support our analysis can be maintained.\(^9\) First, if supplied in large quantities, the buyer prefers the resource to the substitute. This feature gives the seller some bargaining power as it ensures that the buyer has an interest in exhausting the resource. Second, profits for the resource owner decrease when the substitute is available compared to the situation without the substitute. This feature ensures that the seller will try to delay the investment in the substitute and it transfers some bargaining power to the buyer. Third, early investment in the substitute is costly. This feature ensures that the substitute does not become available before it is used capping the buyer’s strategic power. Introducing extraction cost for the resource, introducing reversibility of the change in demand, or including uncertainty regarding success of the process do affect the precise answers. However, that the substitute is costly and that it takes time to build up the new demand infrastructure are the two assumptions that capture most of the action in the strategic interaction.

To describe the social optimum, it is useful to treat the interval of time over which there is some resource consumption as an excursion from the long-run situation where the substitute is present and consumers enjoy surplus \(\bar{u}\) per time unit. The consumer price is \(p_t = \psi(q_t) = \bar{u}'(q_t)\), and demand is subsequently defined by \(q_t = D(p_t) = \psi^{-1}(p_t)\), so we can write the long-run surplus flow as

\[
\bar{u} = \bar{u}(D(0)) - c.
\]

For future reference, we separate the consumers and producers overall surplus from resource consumption. Sellers’ profit flow is \(\pi(q_t) = \psi(q_t)q_t\) and assumed to be strictly

---

\(^8\)With discounting, maintenance costs are not required as saved interest on investment costs are sufficient to ensure that the investment does not take place too early.

\(^9\)In the footnote after lemma 1, we show that the equilibrium does not change qualitatively if the substitute and the resource can compete.
concave. Consumers’ surplus is \( u(q_t) = \bar{u}(q_t) - \pi(q_t) \), and need not be concave.\(^{10}\) We assume that surplus \( u(q_t) \) is everywhere nonlinear,\(^{11}\) differentiable, and bounded at some level above \( \bar{u} \). The resource can thus provide surplus above long-run level \( \bar{u} \). Throughout the paper we assume that stock \( s_0 \) is large enough, so that actions to end resource consumption are not taken immediately but at some \( T > 0 \).

We assume no discounting for now.\(^{12}\) We denote the seller’s stock-dependent payoff by \( V(s_t) \) and consumers’ payoff by \( W(s_t) \) if there has been no investment before \( t \). Expression \( V(s_t) \) measures cumulative (undiscounted) future profits while \( W(s_t) \) measures cumulative surplus from the excursion above the long-run surplus from time \( t \) onwards:

\[
V(s_t) = \int_t^{T+k} \pi(q_\tau) d\tau 
\]

\[
W(s_t) = \int_t^{T+k} [u(q_\tau) - \bar{u}] d\tau
\]

The social optimum depends on the time interval of resource use, \( T + k \), and the supply path \( q_t \), that maximizes total resource surplus

\[
W(s_t) = V(s_t) + W(s_t) = \int_t^{T+k} [\bar{u}(q_\tau) - \bar{u}] d\tau
\]

Notice that we leave the investment costs out of the welfare function since, without discounting, the timing of investment has no bearing on the net present value of its costs.\(^{13}\) The socially optimal supply solves a simple problem: Maximize (3) with respect to \( q_\tau \) and \( T \) and subject to \( s_\tau = -q_\tau \). Let variable \( \lambda_\tau \) measure the marginal value of the resource. The optimality conditions are: (i) marginal utility should equal the marginal value of the resource, \( \bar{u}'(q_\tau) = \lambda_\tau \), (ii) marginal value of the resource at the end point \( T \) is equal to the extra utility it provides per extra unit of the resource, \( \lambda_{T+k} = (\bar{u}(q_{T+k}) - \bar{u})/q_{T+k} \), and (iii) without discounting, the marginal value of the resource should be constant, \( \lambda_\tau = \lambda \). From

\(^{10}\)Consumer surplus will be a central determinant of the buyer’s investment decision, but our results do not require a particular form for \( u(q) \). For example, under linear demand, \( u(q) \) is convex on \([0, D(0)]\) and constant thereafter. For constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions, \( u(q) \) is concave for all values of the coefficient of relative risk aversion.

\(^{11}\)That is, there is no non-empty interval \((a, b)\), with \( a < b \), such that \( u(q) \) is linear over \((a, b)\).

\(^{12}\)In Section 5, we extend the model to positive discounting. It is not obvious that the undiscounted case is the true discounted equilibrium limit (see Dutta 1991), but in our case it is, as we will verify.

\(^{13}\)As we will see, in the case without discounting, the level of investment required does not affect supply levels in the equilibrium. In the discounting case, it does, see (22), as costs of investments enter negatively in the costs of waiting \( \bar{u} - rI \). For investments costs too large, \( I > \frac{r}{2} \), no investment takes place.
these three conditions, we can see that the resource surplus is linear, \( W(s_t) = \lambda s_t \), and the maximization is equivalent to maximizing the average excursion above the long-run payoff \( \bar{\pi} \):

\[
\lambda = \max_q [\bar{u}(q) - \bar{\pi}]/q.
\]

It is instructive to see Figure 1, where we can find the social optimal supply level \( q = q^{**} \) on the curve of utility \( \bar{u}(q) \) such that the line through \((0, \bar{\pi})\) and \((q, \bar{u}(q))\) has the steepest slope.\(^{14}\) Recall that utility \( \bar{u}(q) \) is concave, and thus \( q^{**} \) must also satisfy

\[
\bar{u}(q^{**}) = \bar{\pi} + q^{**}\bar{u}'(q^{**}).
\]

Since consumer surplus is \( u(q) = \bar{u}(q) - q\bar{u}'(q) \), we must have

\[
u(q^{**}) = \bar{\pi}. \tag{4}
\]

**Proposition 1** In the social optimum, consumers receive reservation utility level \( \bar{\pi} \) in all stages, while producers receive all the resource surplus. Consumers do not benefit from an increase in the resource stock, \( W'(s_0) = 0 \).

**Proof.** The first part of the proposition states that along the social optimal path, the buyer side is indifferent between resource dependence and the substitute technology. This part follows immediately from (4). The last part of the proposition then follows from the definition of the buyer’s payoff (2). ■

***Insert Fig. 1 here ***

### 3.2 Buyers’ first-best

Consider then what would be the first-best for the buyer side. This corresponds to a situation where producers are perfectly competitive and the time of investment is chosen to maximize \( W(s_t) \) only. Competitive sellers rationally foresee when the buyer side is going to invest and based on this, they choose a constant supply path to equalize prices across times before and after the investment. We can copy the template from the social optimum to show that along consumers’ first-best path, welfare \( W(\cdot) \) is linear, that is, \( W(s) = \lambda s \) for some constant \( \lambda \). In figure 1, we can maximize the buyer’s value of the

\(^{14}\)We use one asterisk for equilibrium constants, and two asterisks for social optimum constants. Some equilibrium constants are first presented as part of the buyers’ optimum, and these are therefore also denoted by one asterisk.
resource if we find the supply level $q^*$ on the curve of utility surplus $u(q)$ where the line through $(0, \pi)$ and $(q, u(q))$ has the steepest slope. The solution either takes the maximum demand level, with optimal supply $q^* = D(0)$,\textsuperscript{15} or otherwise, optimal supply $q^*$ must satisfy

$$u(q^*) = \pi + q^* u'(q^*). \quad (5)$$

We have a simple graphical determination of the consumers’ optimum,\textsuperscript{16} which is unique as $u(.)$ is nonlinear everywhere. In turn $q^*$ determines the date of investment, by $T + k = s_0/q^*$. Relative to the social optimum, consumers can increase their payoff by forcing sellers to sell the resource faster:

**Proposition 2** The resource supply in the buyers’ optimum exceeds resource supply in social optimum: $q^* > q^{**}$. The time interval of resource dependence is shortened.

**Proof.** From (5) and $u' > 0$, it follows that $u(q^*) > \pi$, and thus $q^* > q^{**}$. ■

The opposing interests are now clear: the seller side would like to delay investment as much as possible (to spread supplies thinly over time as profits are concave), the social optimum requires that consumers at least receive reservation utility, and the buyer side prefers even faster depletion.\textsuperscript{17} It is obvious that in the equilibrium of the game supplies and investment time must lie between the extremes identified here.

For the equilibrium, an important feature is whether the maximal supply that the seller is willing to provide (maximizing instantaneous profits) increases consumer surplus compared to the buyer’s first best, or not. Recall that a larger $q^*$ follows from a greater long-run surplus $\bar{u}$: the buyer wants to consume the resource faster the better is the outside option, that is, the lower is the cost of the alternative, $c$. If the substitute provides a high consumer surplus so that the buyer prefers faster depletion compared to the maximal supply the seller is willing to deliver, we call the substitute strong.

**Definition 1** The buyer has a weak substitute if $q^* < q^m = \arg \max \{\pi(q)\}$. Otherwise, the substitute is strong.

\textsuperscript{15} This is, for example, the case with a convex surplus function $u(.)$.

\textsuperscript{16} The graphical presentation of $q^*$ is very similar to the presentation of $q^{**}$ in Figure 1. The only difference is that $u(.)$ should substitute for $\bar{u}(.)$, and that $u(.)$ need not be concave.

\textsuperscript{17} These results are consistent with the common view that the seller’s market power makes the resource-depletion path more conservative (see Hotelling 1931). Buyers’ market power speeds up consumption both in the optimal tariff literature (see Karp-Newbery 1993) and strategic R&D and technology literature (see the papers cited in the introduction).
Throughout this paper, we assume that the substitute is weak, unless explicitly otherwise stated.\textsuperscript{18} Thus, we assume that the cost of the substitute is high enough such that $q^* < q^m$. The assumption ensures that the buyer’s first-best is given by (5).\textsuperscript{19} For future reference, we define the buyer’s first-best marginal value of the resource as

$$\lambda^* = \frac{[u(q^*) - \overline{u}]}{q^*}. $$

In the buyers’ optimum, the consumer share of total resource surplus $V(s) + W(s_0)$ is $\lambda^* s$; the seller receives the remainder.

### 3.3 First look at equilibrium: investment indifference

As we will show formally in Section 4, the key to the equilibrium is the seller’s strategy to keep the buyer side indiﬀerent between the following two actions: (i) invest today and consume the remaining stock during the transition time interval $k$, and (ii) postpone the decision by one marginal unit of time, maintaining the possibility for investing tomorrow. The seller side postpones investment as long as possible by sustaining the buyer’s indiﬀerence. When the time interval is continuous, the indiﬀerence can be characterized, at each time $t$, by

$$u(q_t) = \bar{u} + q_t u'(s_t/k).$$

Under the postulated indiﬀerence, surplus $u(q_t)$ should cover the cost from postponing the long-run surplus flow $\bar{u}$ by marginal unit of time, and the cost from depleting the stock at rate $q_t$.\textsuperscript{20} In view of Fig. 2, which depicts a concave surplus frontier and a line summing up the two cost terms for a given $s_t$, we see that the supply making the indiﬀerence to hold is uniquely defined by the intersection of the surplus curve (left-hand side of (6) as a function of $q_t$) and the cost curve (right-hand side for given $s_t$). As the resource is depleted, $s_t/k$ declines, which for concave $u(.)$ causes the depletion cost to increase. That is, the slope of the cost curve (RHS) increases and, therefore, quantity $q_t$

\textsuperscript{18}For the analysis of the strong substitute cases that we do not consider in this paper, we refer to Gerlagh and Liski (2007).

\textsuperscript{19}Since $D(0) > q^m$, the assumption $q^m > q^*$ implies that $q^*$ must be given by (5) and not by the corner $D(0)$.

\textsuperscript{20}We immediately see that this condition closely resembles the buyer’s optimum (5). There is one important distinction. Whereas the right-hand-side of the buyer’s optimum indiﬀerence condition (5) takes the constant marginal value of the resource at the buyer’s optimal path and so defines a constant $q^*$, the strategic buyer’s indiﬀerence condition (10) is based on the marginal value of the current resource and so it defines a supply scheme $q_t$ that is dependent on the current resource level $s_t$. 

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needed for the indifference must increase as well:  \( \frac{dq_t}{ds_t} = \frac{q_t u''(s_t/k)}{k(u'(q_t) - u'(s_t/k))} < 0 \) for \( q_t < s_t/k \),
as the numerator is negative while the denominator is positive. Thus, to postpone the investment, *supplies must increase when the remaining resource stock declines*, until the point where the buyers’ optimum given by (5) and the indifference (6) coincide. That is, buyers will always invest when by doing so they can implement their first best. The resource level at which investment must take place \( s^* \), is thus defined by buyers’ first-best supply \( q^* \)

\[
\begin{align*}
  s^* &= kq^*. 
\end{align*}
\]

It follows that at the time of investment, supplies under continuation and after investment coincide, at level \( q^* \). The overall path of supplies is thus increasing up to the point of investment, after which it is constant. Later on, we will be more precise about the supply path.

***Insert Fig. 2 here***

### 4 Strategic resource dependence

There are three types of agents in the model. First, producers of the resource form a coherent cartel (from now on, the seller). Second, large number of competitive consumers derive utility from resource consumption or, if present, from consuming the substitute service provided by the substitute. Third, there is the consumers’ agent who cares only about the consumer surplus. The buyers’ agent can affect the surplus only by making the decision to end the relationship with the seller. The decision is about changing the demand infrastructure; we abstract from the precise policy instrument implementing the change.  \( \footnote{Note that the buyer’s agent does not need to carry the burden of the investment. It suffices to assume that there is some coordinated policy (the buyer’s agent) that initiates the (market) transition towards the substitute.} \)

\( \footnote{The main model section will describe the general case of a not necessarily concave surplus.} \)

Since the only strategic actions are taken by the seller and the buyer’s agent, from now on we use the words ‘buyers’ agent’ and ‘buyer’ interchangeably. There is one single market: the spot market for the resource flow.
4.1 Timing and strategies

The economy has three stages, starting in initial stage before investment, $t < T$, labeled with superscript ‘0’. The next stage follows investment, $T \leq t < T + k$, also called the post-investment stage, and labeled with superscript ‘1’. The final stage starts at the arrival of the new substitute technology, $t \geq T + k$. During the pre-investment stage, buyer and seller interact strategically such that the seller chooses a supply level $q_t^0$, and the buyer decides whether or not to invest, $d_t \in \{0, 1\}$. Since the investment decision is irreversible, the game moves to the investment stage permanently once the buyer invests. During the post-investment stage, there are no strategic interactions. The seller can only sell the remaining stock in interval of time $k$ (or the monopoly quantity $q^m = \arg \max \{\pi(q)\}$ if the stock is too large to be sold in this time span), and the buyer side can only accept what is offered to the market. We denote the quantity sold at time $t$ in the second stage by $q_t^1$. In the final stage, all resources remaining at time $T + k$ are left unused.

All strategic interaction thus takes place before investment and technically the equilibrium is a stopping game. At any time $t$, if the game is in the pre-investment stage, we denote the seller’s supply by $q_t^0$ and assume that there are three sub-stages with the following timing:

1. Seller chooses a supply $q_t^0$;

2. Buyer chooses $d_t \in \{0, 1\}$;

3. If $d_t = 0$, market clears at $q_t^0$. If $d_t = 1$, the economy moves to post-investment stage.

Here, the seller’s initial resource stock $s_0$ is known by the buyer side with certainty, and we can condition strategies on the remaining stock $s_t$. We thus look for Markov-perfect strategies of the form $q_t^0 = \eta(s_t)$, and $d_t = \mu(s_t, q_t^0) \in \{0, 1\}$. In section 77, where we introduce asymmetric information about the stock size, we look for perfect Bayesian strategies that depend on past sales rather than directly on stocks. In most other aspects, the model set up will be the same in both sections.

Time is continuous but it proves useful to introduce the strategies for discrete time periods, and let the time period over which strategies are defined converge to zero.

Note that because of the timing assumption (the three substages above), the buyer’s Markov strategy depends not only on the state but also on the seller’s offer. In this respect, a similar formulation is used in Felli and Harri (1996) and Bergemann and Välimäki (1996).
4.2 The buyer’s problem

When buyers have taken the action to move to the substitute, the game is over: buyers have no more decisions to make and the seller can only sell the remaining stock during the transition time. When not yet used, the buyer’s strategic investment option will affect the supply levels. To describe the buyer’s payoff, we need to make it contingent on whether the strategic variable has been used or not. We define \( W^I(s_t) \) as the value of the excursion above the long-run payoff measured again from current from time \( t \) onwards, immediately after investment when resource dependence still continues for \( k \) units of time. \( W^I(s_t) \) is unambiguously determined by the seller’s post-investment supply policy which is just \( q^0_t = \min\{q^m, s_t/k\} \) for the remaining sales window.\(^{24}\) If the buyer’s decision is made at some time \( T \) with \( s_T > 0 \), then

\[
W^I(s_T) = \begin{cases} 
  k(u(s_t/k) - \bar{u}) & \text{if } s_T < kq^m \\
  k(u(q^m) - \bar{u}) & \text{otherwise,}
\end{cases}
\]  

(7)

It follows that for \( s_T < kq^m \) we have \( W^{II}(s_T) = u'(s_T/k) \), which measures the scarcity cost to the buyer from continued resource dependence.

We assume that the seller has a strategy \( q^0_t = \eta(s_t) \), and based on the seller’s strategy we find the strategy for the buyer to invest. The buyer’s best response to \( \eta(s_t) \) is best understood when we consider supply constant over a small interval \([t, t + \varepsilon]\), and let \( \varepsilon \) converge to zero. Using the above expression for \( W^I(s_t) \) and assuming the seller’s strategy \( q^0_t = \eta(s_t) \), we can write the expression for the payoff before the investment, \( W(s_t) \), when the buyer optimizes over a short interval with length \( \varepsilon \):

\[
W(s_t) = \max_{d_t \in \{0,1\}} \{[\varepsilon u(\eta(s_t)) - \varepsilon \bar{u} + W(s_t - \varepsilon \eta(s_t))](1 - d_t) + W^I(s_t)d_t\}.
\]  

(8)

Term \( \varepsilon \bar{u} \) is the direct cost from postponing the investment since the buyer side loses long-run surplus \( \bar{u} \) for \( \varepsilon \) units of time by not investing today. As \( \varepsilon \) approaches zero, (8) can be approximated as follows:

\[
W(s_t) = \max_{d_t \in \{0,1\}} \{[\varepsilon u^0_t - \varepsilon \bar{u} - \varepsilon q^0_tW'(s_t) + W(s_t)](1 - d_t) + W^I(s_t)d_t\},
\]  

(9)

where we use shorthands \( u^0_t = u(\eta(s_t)) \) and \( q^0_t = \eta(s_t) \). Thus, if choosing \( d = 0 \) is optimal, then \( W(s_t) \geq W^I(s_t) \) and

\[
u^0_t = \bar{u} + q^0_tW'(s_t).
\]  

(10)

\(^{24}\)Recall that profit \( \pi(q) \) is concave so it is optimal to allocate the remaining stock evenly, or leave some stock left if this would imply exceeding the monopoly quantity \( q^m \). In the presence of discounting, the sales path is not flat, but declining as in Hotelling (1931). However, it still holds that all strategic interactions end at the investment date. See the section on discounting.
This is the key indifference throughout this paper. It says that the consumer surplus under continuation of the resource dependence, \( u_0 \), covers the direct cost from continuing, \( \bar{u} \), and the marginal reduction in payoff from the fact that the stock available for consumption during the remaining overall time interval of resource dependence is depleted, \( q_0 W'(s_t) \).

### 4.3 The seller’s problem

Let \( V^I(s_T) \) denote the seller’s payoff if buyers make their decision to end the relationship at stock level \( s_T \). This value is simply given by

\[
V^I(s_T) = \begin{cases} 
  k\pi(s_t/k) & \text{if } s_T < kq^m \\
  k\pi(q^m) & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\]  

(11)

To consider the seller’s problem before the decision is made, let \( V(s_t) \) denote the value of the remaining stock to the seller conditional on no investment before \( t \). For short time interval \( \varepsilon \), and given the buyer’s strategy \( d_t = \mu(s_t, q_t^0) \), supply in the next \( \varepsilon \) units of time is \( q_t^0 \) if \( \mu(s_t, q_t^0) = 0 \). The economy immediately moves to the investment stage if \( \mu(s_t, q_t^0) = 1 \). The seller’s best response satisfies

\[
V(s_t) = \max_{\{q_t^0\}} \{ [\varepsilon\pi(q_t^0) + V(s_t - \varepsilon q_t^0)](1 - \mu(s_t, q_t^0)) + V^I(s_t) \mu(s_t, q_t^0) \}.
\]  

(12)

When \( \varepsilon \) approaches zero, this value can be approximated by (letting \( \mu(\cdot) = \mu(s_t, q_t^0) \)):

\[
V(s_t) = \max_{\{q_t^0\}} \{ [\varepsilon\pi(q_t^0) - \varepsilon q_t^0 V'(s_t) + V(s_t)](1 - \mu(\cdot)) + V^I(s_t) \mu(\cdot) \}.
\]  

(13)

Given \( \mu(s_t, q_t^0) \), the seller can choose if there will be investment or not. If choice \( \mu = 0 \) is implemented, then by (13), we must have

\[
-q_t^0 V'(s_t) + \pi(q_t^0) = 0.
\]  

(14)

If choice \( \mu = 1 \) is implemented, then

\[
V(s_t) = V^I(s_t).
\]  

(15)

From these conditions we can immediately see that the seller always prefers to continue the relationship irrespective of the stock level. Recall that \( s^* \) denotes the stock level at which the buyer’s first-best is to invest.

**Lemma 1** If \( q_t^0 \leq s_t/k \) for all \( s_t \geq s^* \), then the seller prefers continuation to stopping. In particular, \( V(s^*) = V^I(s^*) \), \( V'(s_t) > V^I'(s_t) \) for all \( s_t \geq s^* \), and thus \( V(s_t) > V^I(s_t) \).
Proof. Equality at $s^*$ follows from the buyer’s choice to invest at $s^*$: $V(s^*) = V^I(s^*)$. Assuming $q_t^0 \leq s_t/k$, we have

$$V^I(s_t) = \psi(q_t^0) \geq \psi\left(\frac{s_t}{k}\right) > \psi\left(\frac{s_t}{k}\right) + \frac{s_t}{k} \psi'(s_t) \geq V''(s_t).$$

The first equality follows from (14), the second (weak) inequality is by assumption ($q_t^0 \leq s_t/k$), the third (strict) inequality follows from a negative price slope, and the last (weak) inequality follows from (11). By integration, $V(s_t) > V^I(s_t)$ follows.

Thus, the ‘smooth pasting’ condition does not hold for the seller for an intuitively obvious reason: the buyer’s decision to invest implies a binding time-to-sell constraint for the seller. The seller will never end the dependence before the buyer wants to end it, as it is always profitable to extend the sales time interval beyond $T + k$ when discounting is absent. For this reason, when the stock level is public knowledge and $q_t^0 \leq s_t/k$, it will be the buyer’s indifference that determines the time to end the resource dependency. As we will see below, with publicly observed stock levels $s_t$, the seller will have no reason to supply more before than after the investment, so condition $q_t^0 \leq s_t/k$ will always hold.

4.4 Equilibrium

Establishing and characterizing equilibrium supply is a simple undertaking based on the analysis of buyer’s indifference between continuation and stopping, given that the seller side never prefers stopping. We first prove that (7) defines the buyer’s welfare any time before investment:

**Lemma 2** In equilibrium, the buyer is indifferent between continuing the resource dependence and investing at any given $t$ prior to the investment date:

$$W(s_t) = W^I(s_t) \text{ for all } s_t \geq s^* \quad (16)$$

25. The lemma shows that the model can easily be extended to cover the case when the seller has the opportunity to sell its stock after the arrival of the substitute. The important feature is that the marginal value of the resource after the arrival of the substitute must be less than $\psi(q^*)$. Assume that the substitute has marginal production costs $mc$. The marginal value of the resource after the arrival of the substitute is thus $mc$. As long as marginal substitute costs are sufficiently small, $mc < \psi(q^*)$, the lemma will hold. Constant extraction costs do not change the trade-off between supply before and after the arrival of the substitute.

26. We will derive this same condition also with discounting but there we need restrictions on the utility formulation.

27. However, when stock levels are unobserved, we will see that the condition can break down: the seller may supply more before investment as compared to supply after investment. Such a strategy can be used to make the buyer to believe that the stock is larger than it actually is.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume \( W(s_t) > W'(s_t) \) at some \( s_t > s^* \). The inequality implies that the buyer will always choose \( d_t = 0 \) in (8), irrespective of the seller’s supply. In turn, the seller is not constrained to reduce supplies and he can extend the time interval of resource dependence to obtain higher prices from all dates. Supply will fall arbitrarily close to zero, the utility excursion compared to \( \bar{u} \) becomes negative for a time interval of unbounded length, and \( W(s_t) \) becomes negative (2), which contradicts \( W(s_t) > W'(s_t) \).

It is thus the buyer’s indifference that determines equilibrium supply policy, \( q_t^0 = \eta(s_t) \). The buyer’s indifference condition (16) together with (10) requires

\[
u(q_t^0) = \bar{u} + q_t^0 u'(s_t/k) \quad \text{if } s_t < kq^m \quad (17)
\]
\[
u(q_t^0) = \bar{u} \quad \text{otherwise.} \quad (18)
\]

This is a slightly adjusted version of (6) because \( W'_t(s_t) = u'(s_t/k) \) when \( s_t < kq^m \), but \( W'_t(s_t) = 0 \) otherwise as the stock level does not affect supply if \( s_t > kq^m \). We have already illustrated this indifference for a concave surplus \( u \) in Fig. 2. Recall that the investment point satisfies \( q_t^0 = s^*/k = q^* \), which is the buyer’s first-best supply as it maximizes the buyer’s payoff from this stock level onwards. The seller cannot compensate the buyer for continuation after the stock has fallen just below \( s^* \) because the buyer can implement his first-best by ending the relationship there. Alternatively put, the scarcity cost exceeds the maximal marginal value of the resource,

\[
W'(s_t) > \lambda^* = [u(q^*) - \bar{u}] / q^*,
\]

when \( s_t < s^* \) and \( u \) is (locally) concave.

We describe now the general case with \( u \) not necessarily concave. Recall that the buyer’s first-best supply \( q^* \) satisfies

\[
u(q^*) = \bar{u} + q^* u'(q^*)
\]

and that buyers never accept stock levels below \( kq^* \), as buyers can always implement their first-best from time \( t \) onwards if they end the relationship at \( s_t = kq^* \). In the following it is convenient to redefine \( s^* \) not to be the investment point in the buyer’s first best, but to be the equilibrium investment point. It is clear that we must have \( s^* \geq kq^* \) for two reasons. First, the buyer will always invest at \( s_t = kq^* \) to reach his first best. Second, the buyer’s indifference (17) cannot be satisfied for a resource level \( s_t \) just below \( s^* \).\(^{28}\) This

\(^{28}\)This follows from \( u(.) \) being nonlinear everywhere. It needs no concavity of \( u(.) \).
way \( q^* \) suggests the lowest stock level \( kq^* \) where investment takes place. However, since the consumer surplus is not generally concave, the buyer may also end the relationship at some higher stock level \( s_t > kq^* \), because the scarcity cost \( u'(s/k) \) may locally increase above \( \lambda^* = u'(q^*) \) as \( s_t/k \) declines from \( s_0/k \) towards \( q^* \). To deal with this, we define \( s^* \) to be the first stock level below \( s_0 \) such that \( u'(s^*/k) = \lambda^* \). Stock \( s^* \) is unique for given \( s_0 \), and we have by construction

\[
u'(s_t/k) < u'(q^*)
\]

for all \( s^* < s_t \leq kq^m \). By continuity of \( u(\cdot) \), \( q^0_t = \eta(s_t) \) satisfying (17) to keep the buyer indifferent between stopping and continuing exists and varies with the remaining stock for \( s^* < s_t < kq^m \).

**Proposition 3** There exists a unique Markov-perfect equilibrium with \( s^* \) as defined above, \( q^0_t \) defined by (17)-(18), and \( q^1_t = s^*/k \).

**Proof.** It suffices to prove that \( s^* \) is determined properly. Clearly, we cannot take \( s^* \) to be smaller as such would imply an infeasible resource supply from (17). We will now prove that \( s^* \) cannot be larger either. For this, it is sufficient to prove that \( s^* \) maximizes the value of the resource to the seller. But this follows from Lemma 1: the seller maximizes profits by continuing as long as possible. □

Under nonconcave surplus, the increase in supply over time may not be monotonic as the buyer’s scarcity cost \( u'(s_t/k) \) may change sign. However, when the equilibrium path approaches the investment point, supplies must increase, so that our main conclusion holds irrespective of the utility functional form.

**Proposition 4** The equilibrium supply path \( q^0_t \) is

1. constant at level \( u^{-1}(\bar{u}) \) when \( s_t > kq^m \);
2. varying over time in \( u^{-1}(\bar{u}) \leq q^0_t \leq q^* \) when \( s^* < s_t < kq^m \), but ultimately increasing to \( q^* \) as \( s_t \) approaches \( s^* \);
3. strictly increasing for all \( s^* < s_t < kq^m \) if consumer surplus \( u(\cdot) \) is concave

## 5 Discounting

Discounting is an important element in resource use when the relevant time horizon is at least decades. In the traditional Hotelling model, discounting is what distinguishes
markets at different dates, which, in the presence of market power, leads to intertemporal price discrimination. Discounting is thus one reason to discriminate buyers at different dates. Another reason is the buyer’s changing opportunity cost of continuing the resource dependence due to stock depletion, which we have identified in the undiscounted analysis.

The purpose of this section is two-fold. First, we show that the discounted equilibrium converges to the undiscounted limit we have described. Second, we explain how the above two distinct reasons for price discrimination evolve as the stock depletion progresses. We present a situation where supplies initially decline, when the stock is large, as in a traditional Hotelling exhaustible resource market. However, ultimately supplies must increase, when stock declines and the buyer’s outside option starts to drive the equilibrium dynamics as in the undiscounted case.

Let now the continuous-time discount rate be positive, \( r > 0 \). Apart from discounting, the model is the same as before. In the post-investment phase, discounting does not change much: for the seller, there is a unique profit-maximizing supply path, equalizing present-value marginal revenues over the remaining sales time interval, and resulting in an associated value function \( V'(s_t) \) at the time of investment when the remaining resource stock is \( s_T \).

In the pre-investment time interval, at each stock level, the seller’s optimal sale \( q_t^0 \) is a best-response to the buyer’s stopping rule \( \mu(s_t, q_t^0) \) satisfying

\[
V(s_t) = \max_{\{q_t^0\}} \{ \varepsilon \pi(q_t^0) + e^{-c_t} V(s_t - \varepsilon q_t^0)(1 - \mu(s_t, q_t^0)) + V'(s_t) \mu(s_t, q_t^0) \}, \tag{19}
\]

where, as in the undiscounted equation (12), the strategies are defined over some discrete period of time \( \varepsilon \). In the limit of short time period \( \varepsilon \), the value function \( V(s_t) \) satisfies

\[-q_t^0 V'(s_t) + \pi(q_t^0) - rV(s_t) = 0. \tag{20}\]

The unique seller’s supply path after investment also defines the buyer’s welfare \( W'(s_T) \), where we note that since \( W'(s_T) \) measures only value of the excursion above the long-run situation where flow payoff \( \bar{u} \) is achieved, the overall welfare at the investment time is equal to \( W'(s_T) + \bar{u}/r - I \). The buyer’s payoff before investment is now given by

\[
W(s_t) + \bar{u}/r - I = \max_{d_t \in \{0,1\}} \{ \varepsilon u(\eta(s_t)) + e^{-\sigma c_t} W(s_t - \varepsilon \eta(s_t)) + e^{-\sigma r} \bar{u}/r - e^{-\sigma I}(1 - d_t) \\
+ W'(s_t)d_t \}. \tag{21}
\]

Letting \( \varepsilon \) converge to zero, we find the positive discounting equivalent of (10):
When the buyer is indifferent between continuation and stopping, (22) holds as an equality with obvious interpretation: waiting cost of continuation is now $\bar{u} - rI$ and, in addition to the depletion effect $q_t^0 W''(s_t)$, buyers must receive return on the asset they are holding (investment option), $r W'(s_t)$. Assuming that the buyer’s indifference condition is uniformly continuous in $(s_t, q_t^0)$, it is also continuously differentiable in $r$, and so it is clear that for $r \to 0$, the equilibrium uniformly converges to the zero-discounting equilibrium. Thus, the zero-discounting equilibrium describes well the equilibrium features of a low-discount rate equilibrium. The investment point $s_T = s^*$ occurs when the seller cannot compensate the buyer for any lower stock level, that is, when

$$u'(q_T^0) = W'(s_T).$$

For zero discounting, we have seen that this condition is equivalent to $u'(q^*) = u'(s^*/k)$, $q_t^0 = q^*$, which ensures that supply (immediately) after investment $s^*/k$, which we labeled as $q_T^1$, is equal to supply immediately before investment, $q_T^0 = q^* = q_T^1$. With positive discounting, there may be a jump up (or down) in supply at the moment of investment if $u'(q_T^1) \neq W'(s^*)$. To ensure continuity, we need restrictions on demand.

We can solve the equilibrium explicitly by assuming constant elasticity of demand $\epsilon = -\frac{1}{1-\sigma}$, generated by a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility, $\bar{u}(q) = q^\sigma$, with $0 < \sigma < 1$. Thus, $\psi(q) = \sigma q^{\sigma - 1}$, $\pi(q) = \sigma q^\sigma$, and $u(q) = (1 - \sigma)q^\sigma$. Under positive discounting, the supply $q_T$ after investment satisfies $\pi'(q_T) = e^{r(t-T)}\lambda$, for some $\lambda > 0$ (marginal revenues are equalized in present value). Using this condition, some manipulation gives

$$V'(s) = \sigma A s^\sigma,$$

$$W'(s) = (1 - \sigma) A s^\sigma - \frac{e^{-rk}}{r} \bar{u},$$

where $A = \left(\frac{\omega}{1-\epsilon - \omega}\right) \left(1 - \frac{1 - \epsilon - \omega}{\omega}\right)$ and $\omega = \frac{r}{1-\sigma}$. Notice that $A \to k^{1-\sigma}$ for $r \to 0$ consistent with the zero discounting results. For the investment to yield a positive return, we assume $\frac{e^{-rk}}{r} \bar{u} - I > 0$. The buyer’s indifference condition (22) becomes

$$q^* = \frac{e^{-rk} \bar{u} - rI}{1 - \sigma} + r A s^\sigma + q A s^{\sigma - 1}. \quad (23)$$

where, for convenience of notation, we substituted $q$ for $q_t^0$. 

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The first below Lemma shows that supply is continuous at investment point: $q_T^1 = q^*$. This requires $u'(q_T^1) = W^I(s)$. The second Lemma uses this finding to prove that the seller prefers continuation to stopping at the investment point, which ensures that (23) holds up to the point where investment takes place. The third Lemma then uses continuity of supply and (23) to establish the values for the resource stock and supply level at the investment point. It also shows that the slope for $(s, q)$ defined by (23) is downwards for values of $s$ close to $s^*$, but upwards for large values of $s$.

**Lemma 3** Under constant elasticity of demand, equilibrium supply is continuous at the investment point.

**Proof.** See Appendix. ■

**Lemma 4** Under constant elasticity of demand, the seller prefers continuation to stopping at the investment point.

**Proof.** See Appendix. ■

**Lemma 5** Given $\sigma$, assume $k$ and $r$ satisfy

$$\sigma(1 - e^{-\omega k})^\sigma > 1 - e^{-\omega k}. \quad (24)$$

Then,

$$s^* = \left[\frac{e^{-k \tilde{u}_0} - r I}{(1 - \sigma)^2 A^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} - (1 - \sigma) r A}\right]^{-1/\sigma} \quad (25)$$

$$q^* = A^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} s^*$$

For $s \geq s^*$ but sufficiently close to $s^*$, seller’s supply $q_t^0 = \eta(s_t)$ is defined by (23) and declining in $s_t$. For $s$ sufficiently large, $q_t^0 = \eta(s_t)$ is increasing in $s_t$.

**Proof.** See Appendix. ■

These Lemmas lead to the following:

**Proposition 5** For constant elasticity of demand and (24) satisfied, pre-investment equilibrium supplies first decline and then increase over time when $s_0$ is sufficiently large.

We depict the equilibrium time path for supply in Fig. 4, as well as the buyer’s optimal path. The latter involves choosing the highest supply path such that (i) prices are equal in present value, and (ii) the stock remaining at the investment time, $T^*$, is
consumed during the technology transition time interval. The equilibrium $s^*$ is, like in the undiscounted case, exactly equal to the buyer’s optimal $s^*$ because, due to constant elasticity of demand, in the post-investment phase, the seller supplies a competitive path in both cases as constant demand elasticity eliminates the seller’s benefit of price discrimination at different dates after the investment. The two paths in Fig. 4 are therefore identical during the technology transition time interval, starting at $T^*$ and $T$, respectively. However, before investment, the strategic seller can discriminate buyers at different dates according to (22) (the explicit constant elasticity of demand solution is given in (23)) and delay the arrival of the substitute as in the undiscounted case. When the stock is still large, supplies decrease over time as in the standard Hotelling model. When the stock becomes smaller and approaches $s^*$, supplies increase over time as in the undiscounted case because the buyer’s indifference becomes binding.

For very large cumulative interest rates over the transition time interval, either investment takes place immediately, or not at all.

***Insert Fig. 4 here***

6 Concluding remarks

In this paper, we considered strategic interactions between sellers of a depletable resource and consumers who have interests in ending their dependence on the resource. We modeled the situation using a framework that departs from explicit bargaining but allows offers and responses such that neither party is in explicit leadership. The approach seems relevant since there is significant coordination of actions on both sides of the market, but at the same time explicit cooperation of the two sides is not feasible by the difficulty of enforcing international agreements. The key question in the relationship is when to start the process ending the resource dependence, that is, when to change the demand. The process changing the demand takes time and therefore a potentially significant fraction of the resource has to be saved for the transition time interval. Our insights to the problem follow from this simple allocation problem.

The main insight from our analysis is that producers’ market power is reduced over time as continuing the relationship becomes more costly to consumers when the stock available for the demand transition is depleted. This means that changing the demand infrastructure becomes more relevant as a choice, leading to the conclusion that producers must increase supplies over time.
What are the main lessons from these results for understanding the oil market? We believe it is the insight that energy technology policies in oil-importing countries can act as an increasingly effective strategic instrument, in part destroying producers scarcity rents. While in general this insight is not new, our approach is new as it accounts for the fact that the transition is not an immediate event, and this insight results in explicitly increasing supplies in a stationary market environment.

On a theoretical level, there are some obvious extensions. As we have seen, the size of the remaining stock is what determines the seller’s ability to entice the buyer side to postpone actions ending the resource dependence: it is critical for the buyer to observe how much resource is left for the transition, otherwise the seller can take advantage of the buyer’s imperfect information for the right timing of the demand change. See Fig. 3 again, and note that the larger is the stock, the lower is the equilibrium supply (at earlier points on the sales path stocks are larger). In this precise sense, a large stock implies more power to reduce supplies than a small stock. If the stock is not observed by the buyer side, a small seller can potentially mimic large seller’s policy of reducing supplies and, thereby, extend the investment date from what would otherwise hold for the small seller.

The above observation suggests an extension to situations where there is asymmetric information about the size of the seller’s resource stock. The study of asymmetric information in resource extraction can also be motivated by the developments in the oil market. The core reserves of cheap oil are not managed like most productive assets in market economies; management of cheap oil is characterized by secrecy. The dynasties of Middle East do not disclose technical production information and make efforts to prevent auditing of the reserves. The future availability of conventional oil is a major public concern in oil importing countries; industry experts’ opinions on the size of economically viable stocks diverge widely.29

Other extensions are the following. Adding a fringe of competitive producers would reduce the seller’s market power in a rather straightforward way; the fringe would free-ride on the seller’s market power by selling first when the prices are high. Uncertainty about the technology transition time interval would affect the precise timing of investment

29These concerns are reviewed in the Hirsch report. A book by Matthew R. Simmons (2005) explicates carefully the industry experts concerns regarding the Saudi stocks. While it is hard to judge the validity of the arguments in general, one cannot escape the fact that the market cannot evaluate the maturity of the main Saudi oil fields; Saudi Aramco has not disclosed technical production information since the early 1980 (Simmons).
and the level of the supply path, but not the basic insights. A less straightforward extension is a reversed asymmetric information situation where the buyer side privately knows whether the adoption decision has been made but the resource stock size is public information. Alternatively, under the R&D interpretation, the buyer privately knows the state of the technology. We leave these interesting topics open for future research.

7 Appendix: Proofs

7.1 Proof of Lemma 3

Proof. Let \( q_T^1 \) refer to optimal monopoly supply immediately after investment. With zero discounting, we had \( u'(q_T^1) = W'(s^*) \) as \( q_T^1 \) equals the consumption level throughout the post-investment phase until the substitute arrives. With positive discounting, this equation does not always hold. Let \( q_T^1 \) be supply immediately after investment, so that \( \lambda = \pi'(q_T^1) \). Thus, when the resource stock increases by small amount \( \Delta s \), then supply changes \( \Delta q_t \) satisfy \( \pi''(q_t) \Delta q_t = e^{r(t-T)} \Delta \lambda \), for some \( \Delta \lambda \) such that \( \int_T^{T+k} \Delta q_t dt = \Delta s \), that is, \( \int_T^{T+k} e^{r(t-T)} \Delta q_t dt = \Delta s/\Delta \lambda \). For notation, let us use \( \mu_t = \pi'(q_t) = \frac{\bar{a}''(q_t)}{\bar{a}'(q_t)} + 1 \). The value of \( \mu \) measures one minus the relative risk aversion.

\[
W'(s^*) = \frac{\Delta W'(s)}{\Delta s} = \frac{\int_T^{T+k} e^{-r(t-T)} u'(q_t) \Delta q_t dt}{\int_T^{T+k} \Delta q_t dt} = \frac{\int_T^{T+k} e^{-r(t-T)} \mu_t \pi'(q_t) \Delta q_t dt}{\int_T^{T+k} \Delta q_t dt} = \frac{\int_T^{T+k} \mu_t \Delta q_t dt}{\int_T^{T+k} \Delta q_t dt} \lambda = \frac{\int_T^{T+k} \mu_t \Delta q_t dt}{\int_T^{T+k} \mu_t \Delta q_t dt} u'(q_T^1). \tag{26}
\]

The difference between \( W'(s^*) \) and \( u'(q_T^1) \) is caused by the difference between the average value of \( \mu_t \) over the post-investment time interval \([T, T + k]\), and its value at time \( T \). It is clear that, for utility with constant relative risk aversion, \( W'(s^*) = u'(q_T^1) \). If utility has decreasing relative risk aversion, relative risk aversion will increase with decreasing \( q_t \), and \( \mu_t \) will increase, so that \( W'(s^*) > u'(q_T^1) \). Similarly, if utility has increasing relative risk aversion, \( W'(s^*) < u'(q_T^1) \). ■

7.2 Proof of Lemma 4

Proof. We will show that the seller’s value function has a kink at the time of investment, \( V'(s^*) > V'(s^*) \) when \( W'(s^*) = u'(q_T^1) \), so the sellers would always prefer continuation
rather than stopping in such a situation. Changes in $k$ play a role in the argument, and so we write the seller’s payoff as a function of both the stock level and the transition time length $k$. We write $V^I(s_t, k)$ and $V^I(s_t)$ interchangeably, and similarly $V^I_k(s_t, k)$ and $V^I(s_t)$. Flow profits are concave by assumption, and supplies strictly positive at the end of the overall sales time interval, $q_T > 0$, so it is clear that the seller’s value of the resource increases with the transition time length $k$, $V^I_k(s_t, k) > 0$. After investment, the value function satisfies the following Bellman equation

$$V^I(s^*, k) = \varepsilon \pi(q^I_T) + e^{-\tau T} V(s^* - \varepsilon q^I, k - \varepsilon).$$  

(27)

Taking the limit for $\varepsilon \to 0$ (leaving $k$ out of notation), we get

$$\pi(q^I_T) - r V^I(s^*) - q^I_T V^I_0(s^*) - V^I_k(s^*) = 0.$$  

(28)

Thus, $\pi(q^I_T) > r V^I(s^*) + q^I V^I(s^*)$. This together with continuous supply implied by Lemma 3 and value matching, $V(s^*) = V^I(s^*)$, implies $V'(s^*) > V''(s^*)$. ■

7.3 Proof of 5

Proof. We find the equilibrium $s^*$ in the lemma by using $W^I(s^*) = u'(q^I)$, which defines $q^*$, in (23) and noting that the buyer’s indifference can hold only if (24) holds; we can focus on buyer’s indifference based on Lemma 4.

Given (24), we verify that $q^I_t = \eta(s_t)$ defined by (23) is decreasing in $s$ for $s > s^*$. Condition (23) implicitly defines two values of $q$ given $s > s^*$. The equilibrium strategy must satisfy $dV^I(s)/dq < 0$ where $V^I(s)$ is given by (20) and evaluated at $(s, q) = (s^*, q^*)$. Condition (24) ensures that this holds and implies that the lower trajectory ending at $(s^*, q^*)$ is the equilibrium strategy. Thus, equilibrium supply $q^I_t = \eta(s_t)$ defined by the buyer’s indifference (23) is decreasing for levels of $s_t$ close to $s^*$. The downward slope of $q^I_t = \eta(s_t)$ continues until a point is reached where $q^I_t = \omega s_t$. After this point, $q^I_t$ defined by (23) becomes increasing in $s_t$. Since, at the investment point, (24) ensures that $q^* > \omega s^*$, we must have that the point with $q^I_t = \omega s_t$ is reached for $s_t > s^*$. At the same time, the seller’s profit maximization also defines a supply level that increases with the stock level for reasons similar to the Hotelling rule. Thus, for large stock levels, whether the sellers prefer to sell more than needed to prevent the buyer from investing, or whether the buyer’s indifference condition determines supplies, for large stocks, supplies will initially fall when the stock is depleted. ■

Condition (24) can be seen as a restriction on $rk$, the cumulative discount rate over the entire transition time. For $rk = 0$, LHS=RHS=0 in (24). For $rk \downarrow 0$, the LHS derivative
w.r.t. \( rk \) becomes infinite (the LHS is proportional to \( \sigma\left(\frac{rk}{1-r}\right)^r \)), while the RHS becomes proportional to \( \frac{rk}{1-r} \), thus the inequality holds. For \( rk \) large, the LHS converges to \( \sigma \), while the RHS converges to 1, thus the inequality fails. If either the discount rate \( r \) or transition time \( k \) is sufficiently large, investment will take place immediately without any time interval of strategic interaction. In terms of the equations, this can be seen as follows. When (24) comes close to an equality, the denominator of \( s^* \) in (25) goes to zero, and so \( s^* \) goes to infinity.

References


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Figure 1: Determination of socially optimal supply

\[
\bar{u} + q\bar{u}'(q^*)
\]

\[
\tilde{u}(q)
\]

\[
q^*
\]

\[
\bar{u}
\]
Figure 2: Determination of equilibrium $q^0_t$
Figure 3: Equilibrium supply path under discounting
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