The Effect of Global Exposure on the Attitudes toward Tradition, Patriotism and Foreigners: Multilevel Analysis of Fourteen Asian Societies

Numerous scholars claim that globalization affects people’s everyday lives and value orientations, yet very few empirical studies using systematic data to examine the micro level influences of global forces on individuals’ behaviors or values. This study grounds globalization theories in a detailed empirical analysis. It provides an empirical examination of claims that, until now, have been untested theoretical arguments. It does so by asking two critical questions: (1) Does an individual’s global experience, represented by his or her involvement in global flows and the building up of personal relationships across borders, reduce his or her attachment to the national tradition?; and (2) Does it increase his or her concern for “global others,” those conceived as the outsiders and strangers who may reside within or beyond the borders of an individual's nation of origin? If this is so, we could assert that globalization indeed exerts critical effects on quotidian life and values.

Our empirical inquiry is based on two major theories of globalization. The idea of globality proposed by Roland Robertson (1992) offers a fundamental conceptual framework for interpreting the interaction of local and global forces and a possible
outcome of telic concern. World society theory (Meyer, 2007, 2010) also contributes important concepts in global awareness from a natural rights approach, and stresses the significance of educational socialization in establishing individuals' enlightened regard for generalized others. Our empirical analysis examines hypotheses derived from both theories. Data drawn from a recent large survey of 14 Asian countries are used to conduct empirical tests of these hypotheses. Our findings indicate remarkable patterns of global exposure and certain notable influences on individuals' conceptions of nation, as well as on their human concerns.

This study offers an example of globalization research which adopts a micro level approach attempting a fuller understanding of cultural dynamics of contemporary globalization. Prevailing debates of global culture, admittedly, focus on the processes how global mobilities and flows, rather than result in convergence and isomorphism of cultures and values across the globe, in fact bring forth a system of relational disjunctures. Numerous working women, for instance, enter burgeoning local labor markets benefitting from inflows of foreign capitals, which at the same time cause grave concerns with the nationalist ideas of tradition, honor, and authenticity (Appadurai 1990, 1996). It is in this complex of dialectical global-local relations that an individual frames own patterns of existence and value positions. As Tomlinson nicely argues (1999, pp. 30), globalization dissolves the securities of
locality as much as it offers new understanding of experiences in wider—ultimately
global-terms. Where our study does not directly pursue the question of cultural
disjunctions globally, it is embedded within these grand discourses and provide urgent
needed evidence about how an individual’s global connectivities relate to the critical
notions of a shared tradition, national identity and ideal human relations.

**Theoretical Argument**

Globalization represents an accelerating set of flows and connectivities that encompass ever-greater numbers of the world’s spaces (Ritzer, 2007, pp. 1). As it expands and deepens, the worldwide diffusion of ideas and practices increasingly parallels the huge flows and mobilities of people and goods across countries and continents. Current theories of globalization concentrate on conceptualizing such huge structures and large transformations on the global scale, as well as their immense impact on both national and sub-national units (Beck, 1999; Castells, 2000; Giddens, 1990; Sklair, 2002; Urry, 2007). The authors of these grand theories of globalization have coined numerous phrases and terminologies, such as “global network society” (Castells, 2000), “time-space compression” (Harvey, 1989), “time-space distantiation” (Giddens, 1990), and “globalization-creolization” (Robertson, 1995; Hannerz, 1992),
to name a few, in the effort to describe holistically a “global” formation spreading
over the globe along with continuous attempts to preserve distinctive cultures
(Lechner and Boli, 2005; Friedman, 2008). Either way, globalization asserts its
sweeping impact on everyday life in contemporary society.

Yet how globalization affects life experience and value orientation at the
individual level is relatively underspecified. A few empirical studies are worth noting.
Sun’s (2008) study of a small sample of residents in Shanghai, China, investigates
certain elements of global connections (having been abroad, surfing foreign websites,
having relatives or friends abroad) and indicate their close correlation with
self-expressive values and consumption of foreign brand goods. Woodward et al.
(2008) explore a group of Australians’ assessment if globalization is good for national
economy, personal consumption and maintenance of diverse cultures across the globe.
An interesting finding of theirs is non-English speaking backgrounds stands out to
influence favorable attitudes of globalization. Recent empirical studies concerning
cosmopolitan values focus much on capturing nuances of various attitudes toward
people of origins and trust in international organizations. Pichler (2011) investigates a
large sample from across the globe and identifies influences of the socio-economic
properties of respondents on global identities (seeing oneself as a “world citizen”) and
cosmopolitan orientations (trust in international organizations and acceptance of
people of different ethnic origin). However, these efforts do not offer a satisfactory measure of individual global experiences. Nor do they attempt systemic theorizing how individual experiences as such exert impacts on values concerning own nation and the global community. In contrast, there exists a rich literature of global ethnography surveying a transnational professional class that is able to build intensive interpersonal relationships across border. For instance, Kennedy’s (2004) study of the global building design industry shows that these professional workers were capable of constructing *in situ* transnational social ties through their inter-firm links across global cities (see also Burawoy et al., 2000; Larsen et al., 2006). This case-based approach gives more attention to the structuration of global networking among a small group of high-skilled workers than to the mass public’s global involvement and its impacts on personal values.

**Education, Global Awareness, and Natural Rights**

For our purpose of systemic examination of individuals’ global exposure, the world society approach appears to fit our fundamental interest well as it is a less ambitious but more empirically oriented impulse in the family of global studies. The main interest of WS theory is the emergence of institutional homology across countries. It argues that countries increasingly adopt or construct rationalized
institutions and practices that reflect the global influences of certain world-cultural principles (Meyer, 2007; Meyer et al., 1997). Drawing quantitative evidence from cross-country comparisons, this theory identifies international non-governmental organizations as major agencies of “world-cultural conceptions” that provide social identity and roles not only for individuals but also for collective entities (firms, states, national organizations). The resulting institutional similarities across countries represent a rational culture of scientific development, educational expansion, gender equity, identity assertion, and environmental values that has been expanding across the globe (Boli and Elliott, 2008; Boli and Thomas, 1997; Frank et al., 2000; Frank and McEneaney, 1999; Schofer, 2003; Schofer and Hironaka, 2005; Schofer and Meyer, 2005). Globalization is herein conceived as a universal evolutionary process that foregrounds certain world-cultural models by which nation-states undergo necessary adaptations and changes in order to manage externally defined requirements (Meyer et al., 1997).

Despite these distinctive insights on global economic and cultural transformation, the WS theory does not advance effective theorizing of the mediating mechanisms between the global forces and acceptance of cosmopolitan values at individual level. To fill the gap, John Meyer (2007, 2010), the founding scholar of world society theory, recently formulated a critical hypothesis linking educational
socialization, natural rights thinking, and global consciousness. Paralleling a global convergence of normative cultures and institutional organizations that emphasize rational governance (rule of law, government’s organizational transparency, and attack on corruption, etc.), Meyer (2007, pp. 264) forcefully argues that there emerges a universal way of defining “people.” Modern individual persons, regardless of their origins and current presence, are seen as entitled to justice, equality, and self-expression, beyond basic needs and freedom. Moreover, other liberal values also become standards as they diffuse and are celebrated in many countries: social equality, science, minority rights, environmentalism, etc.

To grasp this global awareness of the rights of people more effectively, the WS theory proposes a model of the “agentic actor” for clearer conceptualization (Meyer, 2010). “Agentic actors” are characterized as more autonomous, coherent, and purposive than a regular “person.” Because this is a generalized category, it directs our concern to “agentic others.” “Other” people not only are entitled to the above-mentioned rights, but also should be endowed with adequate capacities and powers to pursue legitimate benefits. All people, regardless of their origins or locations, their being labor immigrants residing in the neighborhood or foreigners living in a distant island, should be respected in their pursuit of empowerment to fulfill their agency. Global awareness extends people’s commitments to global social
movements that advocate the rights of agentic others in all corners of the world.

The WS theory contends that the worldwide expansion of education explains the evolving global awareness of agentic others: “Education seems a natural locus for the installation of a culture of high natural law in a greatly expanded set of persons now seen as endowed with enormous human rights and human capacities to manage action” (Meyer, 2007, pp. 269). Tertiary education is particularly important in that it emphasizes scientific rationality and removes individuals from particularistic linkages and links them to universalistic and rationalized cultural rules (Meyer, 2010, pp. 8-9). Educational socialization thus is hypothesized to be positively correlated with an individual’s awareness and empathy of generalized others.¹ This speculation of a linkage between educational socialization, world consciousness and natural rights, though being a minor hypothesis in the system of WS theory, cannot be stressed too much of its importance as it attempts to bridge a grand globalization and the changing values and behavioral patterns of individuals.

Global Exposure and Cosmopolitan Values

¹ Establishing mass education to foster any individual’s entitled rights and personal growth by way of modern curriculum become a “global script”, whose form might trumps function in many countries that even lack sufficient resources to implement basic facilities for schools (Lechner and Boli, 2005). The WS theory further adopts an institutional account of the “myth” of global educational expansion, which is beyond the scope of our interest (Meyer and Rowan, 1991; Meyer et al., 1997).
An alternative theory of global consciousness focuses on the cultural
conjunctions derived from interactions and connections between global and local
forces. For Robertson, globalization happens when two “tribes” meet, which starts a
lengthy process of constructing “collective selves” and confronting “collective others”
(Robertson and White, 2003). The encountering of different forms of life necessarily
bring up what he terms a dialectical process of relativization, in which a
consciousness of, and participation in, the world as a whole emerges, being
juxtaposed with a powerful challenge to the stabilities of particular perspectives in the
local fields (Robertson, 1992, 1995). The consequences can be observed in two
reactions: toward the nation and toward outsiders. Concerning the first, global
encounters may elevate the problems of value generalization and greater inclusion,
reflecting potential, if not inevitable, tensions between local and global forces. It can
be expected that reactionary responses in the form of fundamentalism or atavistic
nationalism can be plausible outcomes for the expression of discontent with
globalization. This is more true of Asian and other less developed countries when
interactions between societies happen in the context of Western imperialist intrusions.
Moreover, an ideology of delayed modernization can be formulated along a nostalgic
concern of the glorious tradition and past. Robertson (1992, pp. 148) therefore claims
that “the discovery and invention of tradition has to be situated within complex sets of
relations between penetrating and penetrated societies in the global context.” Yet the
response to globalization can be more complex, as Robertson suggests recasting
globalization in the concept of diffusion. Those people involved more deeply in global
flows and connections more likely exemplify the ideal of unicity, the world as one
place (Robertson and White, 2007). In this sense, one may simultaneously develop a
futuristic and progressive rejection of tradition, while decoupling from a glorious past
that usually leads to a supercilious feeling of cultural superiority and an ethnocentric
ranking of others as lower or backward.

For the reaction toward generalized others, Robertson suggests a *positive*
relativization of trans-societal reference which can evolve universally. In the process
of “relativization of citizenly involvement” that emerges out of engaging oneself in
the Others’ cultures, a universalistic conception of the individual as “human, with
rights and needs” can be adopted consequently (Robertson and Chirico, 1985, pp.
237). An individual’s global conception, or what Robertson called “globality,” is no
longer situated in a local society’s viewpoint. Rather, it is more reflexive and
cosmopolitan: that is, a new telic realignment of the relationship between the self, the
concrete (nationalist) society, and humankind—in the end, an *empathy* with men and
women from all the places on the globe. For Robertson, globality involves two shifts
simultaneously: a release from local ethnocentrism, and a movement to increased
concern for the meaning of what humanity or mankind really is (Robertson and Chirico, 1985, pp. 237). A key variable for this value shift is increased global connectivity and global consciousness (Robertson and White, 2007, pp. 64). Without this mediating mechanism, the outside world is indeed distant, unfamiliar and even alien.

Both world society and relativization theories concern micro encounters between a local person and strangers and outsiders from other countries. They observe along increasing global mobility and fluidity a global awareness emerging. WS theory pays special attention to the evolving of a homogeneous world society and world culture (Lechner and Boli, 2005), while relativization theory proposes a cognitive position which simultaneously can house primordial identities and universalist concerns and values, avoiding assuming an inevitable contention between local and global. Both agree to the possibility of an individual’s acceptance of others and strangers particularly from outside a nation’s border. The proposed explanatory factors of global awareness are distinctive in the two arguments: WS theory clearly stresses the importance of *educational expansion* that establishes a rational institutional basis of socialization to breed an awareness of global openness and the acculturation of universalistic values. For relativization theory, globality as a way of engaging in the world beyond one’s own homeland can best develop from in-depth contact and
involvement with the others’ worlds; that is, *global exposure and connections* lead to self-problematizing in adapting to a cosmopolitan imagination (Delanty, 2006). Our elaboration of the two theories and their proposed hypotheses represents a new attempt to understand the intriguing relationships between global experiences and value positions concerning nations and outsiders.

Our research, based in Asian societies, demarcates a distinctive departure from previous efforts that conventional approaches that contrast familism or collectivism (Hofstede, 1980) with materialism or post-materialism (Inglehart, 1981, 1997) in making sense of cultural changes in this region.

**Method and Measurement**

The data for this study were drawn from the AsiaBarometer (AB) survey, which is a collaborative project currently based at the University of Niigata Prefecture, Japan (www.asiabarometer.org). We used the 2006 and 2007 data. The AB survey began in 2003 to collect information on various dimensions of social and political lives from Asian societies. We used the most recently released 2006 and 2007 data that cover 14 countries in the region. The techniques of multistage stratified sampling were

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2 The 2006 survey covered seven countries: Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Vietnam, and Singapore. The 2007 survey included another seven
applied to conduct face-to-face interviews with respondents aged from 20 to 69. The sample size was approximately 1,000 people in each country except China, in which 2,000 respondents were interviewed.

This study particularly focuses on two sets of independent variables. To test the effects of education as proposed in the WS theory, we regrouped various educational levels into a set of dummy variables: “college and above,” “senior high school,” and “junior high school or less,” with the last group being a reference. In measuring an individual’s global exposure, the AB survey provides information on five measures. The first relates to border crossing: whether a respondent “traveled abroad at least three times in the past three years, on holiday or for business purposes.” Of course, people don’t have to cross borders to be part of globalization. To avoid stressing too much on the element of “space”, we consider additional components that may represent connections of “agency-structure”. We thus consider four additional indicators that taps transnational relationships, as these overseas connections feature countries: the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

3 In some situations quota sampling was used as a supplementary method to obtain a sample comparable with that of a country. There were some compromises, however. For Viet Nam, major urban populations were sampled. Some proportions of the population, for example, people in isolated islands or rural areas, were excluded due to practical constraints in the field. The questionnaire was first formulated in English. This common questionnaire was then translated into local languages by local survey companies. Local language questionnaires were checked through back translation.
kin relationships (item 1 below), acquaintances (2, 3), or job-related contacts (item 4; although item 3 may belong to this genre). The above measures are binary (1=yes, 0=no). These aspects of global exposure have been highlighted in previous studies of transnational mobilities (Beaverstock, 2005; Conradson and Latham, 2005; Kennedy, 2004; Larsen et al., 2006, 2007; Ritzer, 2004).

1. A member of my family or a relative lives in another country.
2. I have friends from other countries who are in (my country).
3. I often communicate with people in other countries via the Internet or e-mail.
4. My job involves contact with organizations or people in other countries.

We further attempted to include another element that shows foreign culture consumption via a respondent’s answer to a question about “often watching foreign-produced programs on TV” as was provided in the AB questionnaire. While intuitively this measure seems suitable, it actually reflects more insufficient supply of competitive locally-produced TV programs than keen interest in western cultural artifacts. 4 We decided not to include this element in our measure of global exposure.

4 We found that most Southeast Asian countries were highly exposed: Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar ranked among top three in this region. In Myanmar, the only two publicly-owned broadcasting companies fed Korean dramas in prime time to local audiences that would have no other way to access this genre of entertainment due to government restrictions. In contrast, respondents in East Asian countries watched foreign programs less frequently. A fully grown industry of TV and movie production in Hong Kong, Japan and South Korea is one primary reason for the low exposure of people in these countries to foreign programs. Indeed, Hollywood does not dominate local television or cinema in these three counties (also see Moretti, 2001). On the contrary, these three countries export numerous TV programs, as well as films, to
Our measures correspond well with often-used indexes of macro-level globalization (Dreher, 2006) when the social aspect is concerned. Dreher (2006), for instance, incorporates international letters and internet uses, as well as other elements of global culture consumption such as Ikea and McDonald’s restaurants.

Dependent variables. We first mobilized two items of attitude toward one’s own nation: (1) **superior tradition**: “(your country’s) traditional culture is superior to that of any other country”; and (2) **patriotism**: “(your country’s) government should emphasize patriotic education to foster patriotism.” The first measure indicates a posture in vertically ranking one’s culture of origin as superior and others as inferior. This “judgmental” attitude is contrary to an open-minded attitude that every country has its own respectable national characters and should not be placed in any ranking scale. We expect that this measure should be negatively correlated with education and global exposure. The second measure implies simply a pride in or an attachment to one’s own nation. It most likely represents a support to strengthening a love of one’s country. It does not carry an implication of superiority to others. We expect a positive relationship between the independent variables and this measure. Another dependent other Asian countries. The recent phenomenon of what is called the “Korean Wave” exemplifies the increasing attractions of Asian-made films and dramas shown in the region, which increases the variety of choices of “foreign” programs for local consumers. Many other background factors, for instance, government restrictions juxtaposed with the increasing global acceptability of Western movies (Lee, 2008), need be considered to understand the vast variation in audience preferences related to foreign programs across countries, an issue we are not able to pursue here (see Lee, 2008; Walls, 2009).
variable concerns attitudes toward natural rights and “foreign others.” We focus on (3)

accpetance of foreign workers: “(your country’s) central government should restrict
the inflow of foreign workforce to protect domestic people’s interests” (five point scale). We recoded this question into a pro-foreign worker attitude with a higher score representing acceptance.

Individual-level control variables. We consider a respondent’s sex (male=1, female=0), age, family income (z scores computed within individual countries)\(^5\), occupational status and religious affiliation (Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Buddhist, other East religions, with “no religious affiliation” used as reference group). The AB survey listed a dozen job categories in soliciting information about jobs. While this design falls short in some ways, it nevertheless allows us to differentiate white collar workers from other major categories of occupational status. The resulting occupational status scheme distinguishes: property owners in business; white collar workers, defined as skilled office workers; and blue collar workers, who possess lower-grade skills and work in manufacturing or agricultural sectors.

Nation-Contextual Variables and the Multilevel Model

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\(^5\) We use family income to explore the influence of a family’s economic resources; information on individual income was not collected in the AB survey. Our operationalization allows us to capture the effects of relative economic status within a country. Note that zero is imputed if income information was unavailable.
Since the perception of national superiority and universal rights can be a result of a society’s affluence and interactions with other countries, we further take into account a country’s (1) economic development, as measured by gross domestic product per capita in 2005 on the basis of purchasing power parities (World Bank, 2008) to obtain reasonable comparative grounds; and (2) the ratio of foreign trade (the sum of import and export) over gross domestic production (the average of 2004-2006 in percentage)\(^6\), which reflects a country’s economic linkage to the world economy; (3) the percentage of foreign migrants, that is, the percentage of people born in a country other than that in which they live as of 2005 or at the time of the most recent information (the logarithm taken) (World Bank, 2007). International migration stock indicates a country’s relative openness to “outsiders,” as well as local people’s increased chances to have contacts with foreigners and to develop accepting attitudes. It is expected that these three macro socio-economic conditions provide a favorable societal environment for the acceptance of natural rights thinking and people from other countries. Our preliminary analysis also tested the potential influence of two societal characteristics—overall educational enrollment rate and democratization\(^7\)—and found both generated little influence. We decided not to

\(^6\) The data were drawn from data.worldbank.org/data. Access date: 2/5/2011.

\(^7\) The educational enrollment variable, an indicator of combined gross enrollment in various education levels, was drawn from the Human Development Report (United Nations Development Programme, 2008). A democracy index was provided by
incorporate them in the following analysis.

Respondents from fourteen participating countries are pooled for evaluating cross-country differences. Because our data involve both individual and national units, the conventional least square techniques, based on an assumption of independent observations from a homogeneous sub-population, can be inadequate, as it tends to give smaller standard errors and produce “spuriously significant” results (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). As a remedy, we use hierarchical linear modeling to estimate individual and contextual effects simultaneously, because this multilevel estimation method allows flexible specification of individual- and country-level information and the error structures at both levels.

We begin our estimation with global exposure variables to investigate its patterns across countries. Because they are binary in measurement, we use the logistic function for estimation. The specification of individual level modeling, using traveling abroad as an example, is:

\[
\log \left( \frac{\varphi}{(1-\varphi)} \right) = \eta \\
\eta_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{(Male)} + \beta_2 \text{(Age)} + \beta_3 \text{(College)} + \beta_4 \text{(Senior H.)} + \beta_5 \text{(Business Owner)} + \beta_6 \text{(White Collar)} + \beta_7 \text{(Family income)}
\]

Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org). We calculated an average of both political rights and civil liberty scores during 2004-2006. We were only able to find a significant negative relationship between democracy and contacting foreigners through jobs, while all other estimations failed to obtain significant effects.
Where $\eta_{ij}$ is the probability (that is, log of the odds) that respondent $i$ from country $j$ ever traveled overseas within three years. Our modeling allows national differences to vary, which usually is referred as a random-intercepts model. The specification of country-level influence is:

$$
\beta_0 = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(GDP \text{ per capita}) + \gamma_{02}(\text{Trade}) + \gamma_{03}(\text{Foreign migrants}) + u_{0j}
$$

Individual level effects are fixed and not “centered,” as the preliminary analysis does not show improvement from such a procedure. The intercept $\gamma_{00}$ in the model can be interpreted as the expected average of the dependent variable, given that all predictors in a model are equal to zero. The residual $u_{0j}$ is the random term across countries, with a mean=0 and variance= $\tau$.

**Global Exposure and Transnational Networking in Asia**

Asian countries have been expending their social and economic ties extensively, both within the region and with other continents. In this context of dynamic transnational engagement, we wonder about the extent to which the Asian population has become “globalized.” Our evidence suggests that, contrary to our expectations, border crossing (measured over the past three years) remains an uncommon
experience for Asian people in the fourteen analyzed societies (column 1, Table 1).

Significant variation exists, however. Singaporeans registered the highest percentage, most likely reflecting the openness of Singapore's neighbor, Malaysia, to Singaporean visitors. People from Hong Kong, Japan, and Taiwan also registered higher incidences. Note that people in Laos were ranked second on this variable, less likely from leisure seeking than from seeking jobs as undocumented workers in neighboring countries, especially in Thailand’s garment factories and fishing industry.\(^8\)

<<Table 1 about here>>

Transnational networking activities are shown in columns 2-5 of Table 1. Singapore and the Philippines stand out in having numbers of family members overseas. Numerous Laotians worked illegally in neighboring countries. As a result, this inland country scored high in having transnational relationships. In contrast, China’s relatively lower percentage reflects its large population base, rather than its lower global mobility. The observed transnational connections may be limited to people from the coastal region (Nyíri, 2002; Poston and Luo, 2007). Japanese’s lower score might reflect a different, inward- pulling force owing to its affluence and higher

\(^8\) KPL Lao News Agency, “At least 100,000 Illegal Laotian Workers Worked Quietly in Thailand.” August 31, 2009.
Having friends from other countries is a “partial” statistic because, according to the AB questionnaire, the referenced “friends” were restricted to those living within domestic territories, while those friends residing abroad were not counted. Singapore scored the highest, followed by Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Japan (column 4).

Contacting foreigners by internet reflects one of the foremost mechanisms of transnational personal linkages. Two elements are implicit in this measure: an individual’s fluency in a certain lingua franca (when persons contacted are speakers of different languages) and a country’s communications infrastructure. The respondents from Singapore and Hong Kong constitute the most globally connected in this regard (column 5). Column 6 maps contact with foreigners or organizations regarding jobs. Once again, Singapore stands out; Hong Kong and Japan also demonstrate substantial overseas connections, owing to their thriving export economy. The last column is the average of global exposure indicators. A factor analysis we conducted also showed high convergence among these indicators. A single factor was extracted and all factor loadings were no smaller than .50.

Estimation Results and Analysis
The cross-country variations in global exposure as reported above suggest that both individual and societal level factors may generate substantial effects. We now turn to an assessment of their potential determinants. Table 2 displays the outcomes of multi-level regression estimations for our sample of over 15,000 respondents.

Education enhances an individual’s border crossing and transnational relationships, net of effects of other predictors. Not surprisingly, college degree produces particularly favorable outcomes throughout the table. Note that occupation represents another socio-economic differential in global exposure. Our operationalization mainly compares business owners and white collar workers with members of the working class. The coefficients for the former are significant in five out of six equations (except contacting foreigners regarding employment). The white collar workers registered remarkable effects throughout the table. These results replicate a recent study of a single country case (Taiwan), in which four aspects of global exposure (border crossing, foreign contacts, overseas investment, and foreign culture consumption) were found to vary across social classes (Tsai and Appelbaum, 2010).

We also note that both Catholics and Protestants are more globally exposed, whereas Muslims in average register lower scores in overall global exposure (column 6).

<<Table 2 about here>>
Economic development does not produce the expected contributions to individual-level globalization, as is shown in the lower panel of Table 2. GDP per capita, in fact, has a significant negative relationship with having relatives overseas. Japan is a typical case as its affluence may keep emigration low that having overseas kin is relatively infrequent in comparison.

Trade produces only scant influence as it increases border crossing only at the aggregate level. In contrast, the percentage of foreigners in a society, and their function as a medium of intercultural exchange, is positively correlated with all dependent variables, indicating the importance of this contextual factor in enhancing micro-level global exposure.

Column six uses the sum of the five global indicators as a dependent variable and can be considered a summary of our estimation. The obtained regression result indicates the relative importance of social stratification variables in global exposure. The variance components of the equations are all significant, revealing there are cross-country variations unexplained by our modeling.

The second empirical issue this study investigates is whether education and global exposure affect national attachment and global human concerns, as the WS and reflexive relativization theories have proposed. Table 3 provides basic statistics of
three value items we chose for testing. Southeast Asian people, in general, score higher on “superior tradition” and patriotism but lower on the acceptance of foreign workers. Admittedly, the national income might also exert certain influences herein, consistent with modernization theory's prediction that economic advancement reduces the popularity of collective identities but encourages openness towards outsiders (Hauser, 1966; Inkeles and Smith, 1974). However, increasing inflows of foreign workers in this region (Stahl, 2003) can lower support from the host population. These complex relationships between societal and personal characteristics justify our simultaneous consideration of both societal and individual level effects. Table 4 presents the results of our multilevel estimation.

<<Table 3 about here>>

<<Table 4 about here>>

The outcomes we obtained from the overall global exposure measure are mixed. Education reduces feelings of national superiority, which is what the WS theory predicts. However, it registers a weak negative influence on patriotism and pro-foreigner worker attitudes (p=.07). As for global exposure, it similarly reduces a notion of superior traditions, and yet strengthens patriotism, reflecting exactly what
reflexive relativization considers typical expressions of globality (columns 1 and 2).

However, global exposure does not lead to acceptance of foreign workers.

Our regression result reveals that Muslims and Buddhists tend to be more assertive when it comes to keeping tradition and patriotism. Attitudes toward guest workers are negatively associated with these two religious affiliations. Note that we added two control variables for social trust and economic worry in the equations.

Trust denotes a belief in others despite some risks. It correlates with increased social diversity in the population (Misztal, 1996; Tsai, Laczko and Bjørnskov, 2011). An individual with high levels of trust (a binary measure from the AB data) is more likely to express empathy, especially toward strangers or outsiders (see column 3). Secondly, a grave concern with national economic difficulty tends to lead to more protection measures than openness policy for remedies (O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2001). If a respondent choose “economic problems in your country as an issue that causes great worry” (coded=1, otherwise=0), he or she would expectedly be inclined to patriotism and less supportive toward guest workers. Our analysis asserts this relationship and justifies the insertion of this additional control in modeling.

Regarding contextual effects, national income shows remarkable effects on all three equations. The increasing wealth of a nation tends to reduce the significance a respondent would give to a nation’s traditions or to patriotic education. The statistics
in Table 3 reveal that Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong exemplify such correlations.

Singapore is particularly known for its limitations in establishing an “imagined community” as this city state, in order to boost its development level, had long adopted an open market strategy that inadvertently resulted in a pragmatic attitude among the population when it came to issues of social cohesion and collective identity (Kluver and Weber, 2003; Koh, 2005). Perhaps because economic growth in this region benefited notably from exporting its manufactured exports to the global market, foreign workers were relatively welcome in countries with higher income. Trade moderates a thinking of superior tradition, but a large stock of immigrants tends to boost it. Both factors are weak on patriotism and acceptance toward foreign workers. We also add two additional societal level factors herein. The first one is interstate tension, which is a binary variable for countries that experienced severe tension or conflict 10 within a decade before the AB survey (coded 1), in contrast to others (coded 0) that avoided such conflicts. As expected, the former group observed higher levels of endorsing national tradition and stressing patriotism in education. The second is ethnic fractionalization (Alesina et al., 2003), as a society with greater

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10 Five countries were classified to having experienced interstate tensions: South Korea (based on two events: a North Korean submarine ran aground on a South Korea beach in 1996, and North Korea exercised its nuclear weapon tests in 2006), Taiwan and China (China fired missiles on 60 kilometers north of Taiwan's Pengchaicyu Island in 1996), Myanmar and Thailand (military conflicts along the northern border of Thailand during 2002). Other countries were treated as reference group. Source: International Crisis Behavior Project, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland (www.cidcm.umd.edu). Accessed date: December 8, 2012.
ethnic diversity tend to cause grave alertness to national unity and integration (Smith, 2010). The obtained findings confirm that fractionalization leads to more widespread concern with issues of tradition and patriotism. It also induces antipathy toward guest workers.\textsuperscript{11}

Our further analysis of \textit{cross-level} interaction effects shows that only a cross-level term of “economic development x college education” produced notable positive influences on favorable attitudes toward foreign workers (not shown to save space), suggesting that in wealthier countries tertiary education more likely generates stronger concern for generalized others. Yet in general these operations add very trivial evidence and thus can be safely ignored.

\textbf{Conclusion}

This study of individual global exposure provides empirical evidence for our central argument that globalization induces values changes through an individual’s border crossing and transnational networking. By analyzing the individual experiences across East and Southeast Asian countries, we arrive at several important findings

\textsuperscript{11} Note that the coefficients for ethnic fractionalization are drawn from estimations without Hong Kong and Myanmar, due to their lack of information (all other factors were incorporated in equations). I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting to incorporate these structural factors.
from testing the hypotheses of the world society and relativity theories. Both education and global exposure appears to lower a thought of superiority inherent in the tradition of a country, confirming WS theory. Moreover, global exposure, rather than weaken patriotic feelings, in fact fortifies them, which reflects exactly what relativization theory regards as typical expression of globality. Despite these favorable outcomes, we are not able to find supportive evidence with regard to acceptance of foreign workers, which is more closely related to a country’s wealth level. This affluence factor also forcefully decreases national pride and discourages attitudes for patriotic education.

In sum, the evidence we gather from this study indicates the importance of the idea of globality in that global exposure appears to foster (rather than disrupt) national attachments despite its weak relevance to tolerance of guest workers. Those Asian persons that had shuttled across countries and engaged themselves in transnational connectivities were able to securely situate themselves in a flux of global and local forces and negotiate a proper collective affinity, while holding a modest appraisal of their country's national legacy or glorious past. Yet, global exposure does not effectively foster a general human concern by way of cultivating empathy for migrant workers, as the relativization theory would anticipate. Individual global experience, as conceptualized and measured in this study, does not activate a cosmopolitan ideal of
universal fraternity. Those persons with intensive global exposure may as well constitute what Sklair (2002) has called the “transnational capitalist class,” choosing to concentrate on individualized endeavors for private gains and pleasures, as they recognize that national organizations (welfare state, industrial enterprises, market economies, etc.) failed effectively to deliver needed functions and utilities (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Beck and Grande, 2010). Adopting a concern for “global others” is deemed irrelevant at best in this scenario. Outcomes from global exposure are thus diverse, open to several possibilities whose multiple routes and mechanisms require further theorizing. Both theories of world society and reflexive relativization lack sensitivity to such “deviations.”

Our empirical analysis, methodologically, can be considered as a connectivist approach to grasp the impacts of global exposures. In contrast, an institutional approach which evaluates such impacts from huge structures and big processes of enduring globalization have adopted different research designs to gather evidence on diffusions of specific rules, norms and regulations that large-scaled social organizations are formulating across the globe (Meyer et al., 1997). Indeed, symbolic matters such as reflexive response to market-driven growth model, assertive national identities, and universal humanistic concerns represent a new flow of ideas that cater to the changing interests of numerous states situated in long cycles of fluctuations of
the global value system (Modelski, 1987). The research of micro global experiences
serves as a necessity to any holistic attempts of constructing comprehensive schemas
to more firmly grasp diverse global sources of value positions toward one’s own
nation as well as universal others.
References


Robertson, R. (1992) Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture (London:
Sage).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>(1) border crossing</th>
<th>(2) family/relatives in another country</th>
<th>(3) have friends from other country</th>
<th>(4) contacted foreigners by internet</th>
<th>(5) contacted foreigners in job</th>
<th>(6) overall globalization</th>
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<td>7.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>.49(.71)</td>
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Table 2: Global Exposure and Transnational Networking in Asian Countries: Multi-level Logistic Analysis

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) traveled abroad</th>
<th>(2) family/relatives in another country</th>
<th>(3) have friends from other country</th>
<th>(4) contacted foreigners by internet</th>
<th>(5) contacted foreigners in job</th>
<th>(6) overall global exposure</th>
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<td>.511***</td>
<td>.028*</td>
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<td>.007***</td>
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<td>-.027***</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>.0004</td>
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<td>.401***</td>
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<td>.451***</td>
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<td>1.471***</td>
<td>.918***</td>
<td>.123***</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Business owner</td>
<td>.533***</td>
<td>.375***</td>
<td>.445**</td>
<td>.682***</td>
<td>.252</td>
<td>.146***</td>
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<td>White-collar</td>
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<td>.117*</td>
<td>.240**</td>
<td>.616***</td>
<td>.295**</td>
<td>.126***</td>
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<td>.230***</td>
<td>.256***</td>
<td>.304***</td>
<td>.275***</td>
<td>.128***</td>
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<td>.016</td>
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<td>Protestant</td>
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<td>.456***</td>
<td>.343*</td>
<td>.281</td>
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<td>.171***</td>
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<td>-.353</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
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<td>-.979*</td>
<td>.540</td>
<td>-.033</td>
<td>.122</td>
<td>-.078</td>
</tr>
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<td>Trade</td>
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<td>.151</td>
<td>.152</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>.055</td>
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<td>Percent of foreign migrants</td>
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<td>.540**</td>
<td>.432*</td>
<td>.699**</td>
<td>.508***</td>
<td>.259**</td>
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<td>Variance components-uj</td>
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<td>.437*</td>
<td>.311*</td>
<td>.444*</td>
<td>.194*</td>
<td>.101*</td>
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<td>Model $\chi^2$</td>
<td>523.8***</td>
<td>488.1***</td>
<td>514.4***</td>
<td>723.4***</td>
<td>519.3***</td>
<td>1721.3***</td>
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<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
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<td>15022</td>
<td>15022</td>
<td>15022</td>
<td>15022</td>
<td>15022</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The coefficients for the dummy of respondents grouped in “not in labor market” and “other East religion” are not shown to save space.

2 the dependent index is continuous (range 0-5).

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$; $^+$ $u_{ij} > 2$ s.e.
Table 3: Value Positions in Asian Countries: Mean and SD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>(1) superior tradition</th>
<th>(2) patriotic education</th>
<th>(3) pro-foreign workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>East Asia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>3.64 (.88)</td>
<td>4.12 (.74)</td>
<td>2.67 (.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>2.97 (.83)</td>
<td>3.47 (.81)</td>
<td>1.95 (.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>3.54 (.80)</td>
<td>3.23 (.93)</td>
<td>2.65 (.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>3.90 (.83)</td>
<td>3.76 (.81)</td>
<td>2.79 (.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>3.40 (.90)</td>
<td>3.70 (.82)</td>
<td>2.13 (1.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Southeast Asia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>3.97 (1.01)</td>
<td>4.09 (.95)</td>
<td>1.43 (.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>3.88 (.90)</td>
<td>4.19 (.71)</td>
<td>1.91 (.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>4.27 (.79)</td>
<td>4.64 (.56)</td>
<td>1.50 (.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>4.02 (.84)</td>
<td>4.15 (.73)</td>
<td>1.72 (.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>---¹</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>3.49 (.89)</td>
<td>3.94 (.80)</td>
<td>2.25 (.95)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>3.16 (.87)</td>
<td>3.49 (.85)</td>
<td>2.14 (.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>4.36 (.69)</td>
<td>4.44 (.61)</td>
<td>1.61 (.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>3.22 (1.00)</td>
<td>4.15 (.76)</td>
<td>2.25 (1.00)</td>
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</table>

¹ Lack of data in Myanmar.
Table 4: Tradition, Patriotism and Foreign Workers in Asian Countries: Multilevel Analysis\(^1,2\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 1(^3)</th>
<th>(1) superior tradition</th>
<th>(2) patriotic education</th>
<th>(3) pro-foreign workers</th>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-.048**</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.226***</td>
<td>.177**</td>
<td>-.377***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (Junior H.=0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>-.083***</td>
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<td>.027</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior H.</td>
<td>-.050**</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>-.087***</td>
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<td>Occupation (Blue-collar=0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Business owner</td>
<td>-.028</td>
<td>-.044</td>
<td>.043</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-.033</td>
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<td>Worry about national economy</td>
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<td>Level 2</td>
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<td>GDP per capita</td>
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<td>-.764***</td>
<td>.601**</td>
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<td>-.033</td>
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Variance components
\[ u_{oj} = .033^+ \quad .029^+ \quad .073^+ \]
\[ r_{ij} = .745 \quad .602 \quad .785 \]
Intra-class correlation
\[ .184 \quad .199 \quad .190 \]
Model \( \chi^2 \)
\[ 238.4*** \quad 145.0*** \quad 173.8*** \]
\[ N = 13588 \quad 13622 \quad 13715 \]

\(^1\) See note 1 on Table 2.
\(^2\) Myanmar was not in analysis in equations due to lack of information on dependent variables. See also footnote 11.
\(^3\) All coefficients for age are enlarged in scale by 100.
* \( p < .05 \), ** \( p < .01 \), *** \( p < .001 \); \( u_{oj} > 2 \) s.e.