Does National Identification Always Lead to Chauvinism? A Cross-national Analysis of Contextual Explanations

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the premise that national identification inevitably leads citizens to endorse chauvinism in the international arena. It argues that the relationship between national identification and chauvinism is affected by three contextual factors: globalization, inter-state conflict, and social division. A multilevel analysis of cross-national survey data from the International Social Survey Program National Identity II (2003) was employed in order to observe these three contextual effects, the sample consisting of 33 countries. The results demonstrate that closer relations exist between national identification and chauvinism in more globalized countries. The effects of inter-state conflict vary according to the indices used to measure conflict. Those countries that experienced a large number of deaths during the 2000s and mobilized resources and personnel evinced a higher level of chauvinism. This effect is not evidenced by other measures of conflict, however. Social division did not affect the level of chauvinism or its relation with national identification. These findings are used to critically evaluate the notion that citizens who identify with their nation tend to be nationally chauvinistic.

Keywords: National identity; Chauvinism; Conflict; Globalization; Social identity theory
Introduction

Students of peace and conflicts have long recognized the importance of national identity (Anastasiou 2009; Cook-Huffman 2009; Fisher 2006; Langman 2006; Spears 2008; Van Evera 1994). Scholars also acknowledge that national identity is a multidimensional concept (Li and Brewer 2001; De Figueiredo and Elkins 2003; Huddy and Khatib 2007; Reicher and Hopkins 2001). The current paper focuses solely on national identification—defined as the feeling of closeness to one’s national group (Doosje et al. 2004). National identification is commonly assumed to be closely related to antagonistic views towards the international system and lower levels of support for inter-state cooperation (Van Evera 1994). Put differently, national identification is related to a sense of national chauvinism in the international sphere. A prominent example of this link is post-9/11 America, where higher levels of national identification were found to be intimately related to the endorsement of conflict and greater resistance to international collaboration. Americans who identified with their country were more supportive of the war in Iraq, perceiving the UN to be an irrelevant force and believing that the US should act to fight terror even in the face of a lack of international cooperation (Crowson 2009; Kinder and Kam 2010).

Recent studies have challenged this deterministic interpretation, however (Kelman 2001; De Figueiredo and Elkins 2003; Herrmann, Isernia, and Segatti 2009;), suggesting that the issue should be subject to scrutiny rather than presupposed. Insights from social-psychology research indicate that the relationship between in-group identification and other groups does not follow a universal pattern. To date, these studies have been based on single cases or a focused comparison between cases, neglecting broader social and political factors. It is now evident, however, that social and political contexts directly affect the relationship between identification with one’s social group and attitudes towards other groups (Brewer 2001; Christie 2006). Several studies have found, for example, that the relationship between national identification and attitudes towards immigrants is directly influenced by political or cultural factors (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Weldon 2006)—such as the meaning attributed to national identity across countries (Pehrson, Vignoles, and Brown 2009).

This paper develops the social-psychology approach by focusing on the ways in which macro social and political contexts affect chauvinism and the relation between national identification and chauvinism. The first section of the paper reviews the implications of social-identity theory for the link between national
identification and chauvinism. The second part presents the theoretical justification for adopting globalization, inter-state conflict, and social division—analyzed by a cross-national multilevel analysis of survey data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) National Identity II (2003)—as contextual explanations. The concluding section discusses the implications of the findings for peace research.

**National identification and chauvinism**

People exhibited a loyalty to their nation that has superseded their pursuit of personal interest(s) or other-group attachment—the most prominent example being the playing of the national anthem as troops march off to war.\(^1\) Identification with one’s nation is relevant not only during times of disruption, however, national identity also continuing to play an important political role in peaceful Western states (Billig 1995). While national identity affects various policy domains—such as immigration laws—it constitutes a key element of inter-state conflict (Langman 2006), frequently being recognized as pertaining directly to the state or goal of statehood. Even in the twenty-first century, the state remains the primary authority for the legitimate use of violence and arms (Haller 2003). As Anastasiou has highlighted, the right to use force in the name of the nation—“the ultimate collective value and the imperative basis for community, identity, security and well being” (2009: 37)—constitutes a major challenge to peace. The significance national identity holds for conflicts and such concepts as “national dignity” and “national honor” that are common in the international arena indicates the key role national identification serves in mobilization societies (Druckman 2001). The popular belief that national identity is generically related to hatred towards out-groups and that national identification and chauvinism are deterministically associated is nonetheless misleading. Research suggests that the links between group identification and inter-group conflict are multifaceted and multilayered (Cook-Huffman 2009). Adopting a social-psychology approach that takes the broader context into consideration facilitates a demonstration of the way in which the relation between national identification and chauvinism is affected by social and political factors.

Before the theoretical framework is elaborated, it is important to note the complexity of national identity itself. Scholars have distinguished between different forms of national identity. Blind and uncritical forms are generally more related to out-group hostility, constructive forms even being related to positive attitudes.

\(^1\) This is not true of civil wars, of course.
towards out-groups (e.g., Blank and Schmidt, 2003; Schatz, Staub, and Levine, 1999). In this paper we follow Huddy and Khatib’s (2007) contention that such forms are “open to criticism as general measures of national attachment” (p. 64). Responding to their call for a strong theoretical framework for analyzing national identity, we locate the discussion of national identity and chauvinism within the framework of social-identity theory (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1986).

National identity is, after all, a type of social identity. Anderson (1991) coined the term “imagined community” in order to explain the essence of the nation. Individuals who regard themselves as members of a collective bound together by a common bond do so because they feel this solidarity to form a type of social identity. As Miller maintains, “nations are not aggregates of people distinguished by their psychical and cultural traits, but communities whose very existence depends upon mutual recognition” (1995: 23). Despite the fact that the importance attached to national identity varies from person to person and country to country, it forms a significant framework within which people view the world. Understanding national identity as social identity allows scholars to utilize the social-identity approach (Doosje et al. 2004; Huddy and Khatib 2007; Reicher and Hopkins 2001; Theiss-Morse 2009).

A social group is a type of common social reference point for its members. When people declare that they belong to a particular social group—such as their national group—they distinguish themselves from members of other groups. A person is an American rather an Italian, for example. According to the social-identity approach, identifying with a group has important ramifications with respect to people’s attitudes and behaviors. When people categorize themselves as belonging to a specific group they adopt its stereotypes and norms and think and behave like their fellow members. They are also more likely to sympathize with the group’s goals and be more willing to advance its interest over their own. In the domain of national identity, high levels of national identification are related to the adoption of norms and behaviors considered typical of the national group (Theiss-Morse 2009). Social-identity theory asserts that members of a national group will seek to differentiate themselves positively from out-groups. Higher levels of national identification are correlated with higher levels of feeling distinct from out-groups—such as immigrants.

Crucially, however, differentiation and positive evaluation do not necessarily lead to feelings of superiority over out-groups. Brewer (2001) criticizes the idea that in-group identification is always related to antagonism towards out-groups. In keeping with this approach, Spears (2008) suggests that such a
deterministic view constitutes a misinterpretation of social-identity theory, which seeks to understand social change by examining how social contexts shape social identity and behavior. Social identity is defined in terms of the differences between social groups. Differentiation and positive evaluation of the in-group does not necessarily lead to a feeling of superiority over out-groups. Based on a comparison of valued dimensions, it can encourage the acceptance and devaluation of out-groups alike, that which is valued depending on the specific context (Spears 2008). No necessary relation thus exists between in-group identification and hostility towards out-groups. In order to properly understand this relationship, the broader social context must be taken into account.

Results from studies support the notion that national identification is not always related to antagonism towards out-groups. A Belgian study, for example, found dissimilar relations between national identification and attitudes towards out-groups (Billiet, Maddens, and Beerten 2003). While identification with Flanders is related to negative attitudes towards foreigners, the inverse case exists in Wallonia, identification with Wallonia’s sub-national identity correlating with a positive attitude towards foreigners. A comparative study between the USA and Italy indicates that attachment to one’s nation is associated with lower levels of support for militarist options and greater support for international cooperation (Herrmann et al. 2009). A comparative study looking at 31 countries found that some evinced a positive relationship between national identification and negative attitudes towards immigrants while in others this relationship was insignificant. This variation can be explained by the dissimilar meanings of national identity across countries (Pehrson et al. 2009). These studies indicate that the linkage between national identification and hostility towards out-groups should not be presumed but rather recognized as a dynamic process influenced by contextual factors (Reicher and Hopkins 2001).

Supported by numerous studies (Tajfel 2010), social-identity theory suggests that, by and large, identification with the in-group will lead to out-group hate. One might therefore expect national identification to be positively related to chauvinism in the international arena. At the same time, however, we expect that such positive relations will be affected by the broader context, as elaborated in the following section.
Contextual effects on national identification and chauvinism

External factors – Globalization

The multifaceted nature of globalization—the “increasing cross-border flows of goods, services, money, people, information, and culture” (Held et al. 1999: 16)—means that it has diverse effects on different aspects of politics and society. Some consider it to undermine national identification and promote cosmopolitan values; others argue that it reinforces national feelings (Calhoun 2007; Guibernau 2001). The discussion of globalization and its effects on national identification chauvinism must be set within these two perspectives.

Some view globalization as eroding people’s attachment to their country. In today’s “global village,” the ability to produce and maintain a homogenous national identity is challenged by the fact that people have become global consumers of goods and information. In a wired world, the government no longer possesses the exclusive right to exert cultural control over its citizens and/or territory (Guibernau 2001). The cross-border flow of information further impinges on a nation’s identity’s ability to retain its unique significance and distinguish itself from others. As Hobsbawm argues, attachment to the nation having become “historically less important,” it is likely to cease comprising a vital political program as the world becomes “largely supernational” (1992: 191). As the global framework diminishes the role of national identity, the ability to mobilize national sentiments in the face of cosmopolitan worldviews also declines. The more globalized and interdependent a country becomes, the more its citizens tend to adopt cosmopolitan views and abjure hostility towards the international arena. Globalization thus encourages a reduction in chauvinism—the link between national identification and chauvinism thus also weakening.

The complexities of the globalization process argue against making such an unequivocal link between globalization and national identification, however. Some scholars argue that globalization may even increase the importance of social identities such as national identity. Calhoun (2007), for example, asserts that in organizing ordinary people’s “sense of belonging,” globalization heightens the importance of this factor. In the face of the effects of globalization on people’s lives, they attempt to maintain their identity by increasing their identification with key social categories—such as the nation (Castells 2011). Kinnvall likewise claims that globalization has a destabilizing effect on people’s sense of security—nationalism and religion being
“[p]articularly powerful stories and beliefs because of their ability to convey a picture of security, stability, and simple answers” (2004: 742) to people threatened by the process.

Empirical evidence supports these conflicting interpretations regarding the influence of globalization. Using the World Values Survey, Norris and Inglehart (2009) have demonstrated that living in globalized countries is related to less nationalistic attitudes and lower levels of national pride. On the other hand, Jung interprets the same data as supporting the notion that it is a “myth to expect cosmopolitan attitudes and supranational identities to increase significantly in the current globalizing world” (2008: 600). Davidson, Poor, and Williams’ (2009) analysis of elite cosmopolitan reflects a similar view.

In light of these theoretical and empirical inconsistencies these competing hypotheses are plausible. We sought to examine the effects of globalization on chauvinism and the link between national identification and chauvinism without forming hypotheses. Our research questions are therefore: RQ1: *How is globalization related to levels of chauvinism?* RQ2: *How does globalization affect the relationship between national identification and chauvinism?*

**External factors—Conflicts**

The role conflicts play in shaping inter-group relations is well recognized in the sociological literature (Coser 1956; Quillian 1995). Their influence on the development of modern nation-state is reflected in Charles Tilly’s well-known maxim that war makes the State and the State makes war (Tilly and Ardant 1975).² National emergencies lead to the mobilization of national feelings in support of the collective efforts demanded by the situation. External threats and international crises motivate people to “rally around the flag” (Mueller 1973). Conflicts are also essential in shaping the distinction between in-groups and out-groups (Brewer 2007; Tajfel 1981), the link between in-group identification and attitudes towards the out-group become clear and manifest when groups compete or clash—especially in zero-sum conflicts (Brewer 2001).

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² Yet, one should avoid deterministic view regarding the relations between nation-building and conflicts. Sometimes, nation building can succeed without major conflicts (see Centeno 2002 for the Latin America Example).
Evidence from different cases indicates that a close relationship exists between in-group identification and conflict. The protracted Israeli-Palestinian struggle has had a tremendous influence on the shaping of Israeli and Palestinian national identity alike (Kelman 1999). A study amongst Israeli Jews, for instance, found that higher levels of national identification are positively related to support for the ethos of conflict and antipathy towards compromise with the Palestinians (Bar-Tal et al. 2012). While such identification forms an important factor in conflicts, it has a varying impact. A study examining the relationship between in-group identification and the willingness to forgive in Northern Ireland and Chile found that the effect of in-group identification varies across types of groups (Noor, Brown, and Prentice 2008). Another study using survey data from the USA, UK, Australia, France, and Spain found that the divergence in support for the war in Iraq can be attributed to the variation in the meaning ascribed to national identity in these countries (Becker 2009). While Becker did not examine the relationship between national identification and support for the war per se, his findings indicate the importance of social context in analyzing this links. A broader cross-national analysis across 43 countries found that the type of conflict is pertinent to national identification (Gibler, Hutchison, and Miller 2012). Territorial conflicts—more severe than other types of inter-state conflicts—increase people’s willingness to identify as citizens of their country.

Social-identity theory provides support for the expectation that intense struggles will increase chauvinism, as well as for the link between national identification and chauvinism. We therefore expect that H1: Conflict intensity will be related to higher levels of chauvinism; and H2: Conflict intensity will positively affect the relationship between national identification and chauvinism

Internal factors: The divisionary theory of national mobilization

The emergence of the European nation state is frequently described in terms of an increasing homogenization of the population that dissolves class, ethnic, linguistic, and religious distinctions (Tilly 1995). Elites demand that commitment to the nation take preference over all other allegiances in order to ensure the legitimatization of the nation-state (Posen 1993; Wimmer 2012). In order to ensure that national loyalty overrides economic divisions, redistribution programs were introduced (Deutsch 1964). At the same time, elites appealed to national identity in order to deal with social cleavages. According to the diversionary theory of war and nationalism, elites plagued by domestic problems tend to engage in international conflicts or wars in order to boost the nation’s cohesiveness (Levy 1989). More specifically, when states face unrest
generated by economic inequality they mobilize national sentiments and promote a sense of national unity amongst across different segments of society in order to sustain mass support for the social order and distract citizens from issues of economic inequality or inner-state ethnic tension. Because national sentiments foster a sense of solidarity irrespective of unequal conditions and discourage opposition to national institutions that benefit only the few, they help political elites mask their discriminatory policies (Posen 1993). Some studies have found empirical evidence for a link between economic inequality and the likelihood of national sentiments. On the basis of survey data from dozens of countries, Solt (2011), for example, has demonstrated that income inequality is positively related to feelings of national pride (see also Shayo 2009).

It may thus be assumed that elites in countries experiencing economic or social tension will endeavor to mobilize national sentiments—this in turn creating higher levels of chauvinism and a closer relation between national identification and chauvinism. Yet, while theoretically this link is mediated throw mobilization efforts, this study does not examine mobilization per-se do to data limitations. Instead, it focus solely on the links between social tension chauvinism and the the relations between national identification and chauvinism. We therefore hypothesize that: H4: Higher levels of social division will be related to higher levels of chauvinism; and H5: Higher levels of social division will positively affect the relationship between national identification and chauvinism.

Method

Data

Individual-level data were drawn from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) National Identity II (2003). The ISSP is a continuing cross-national collaboration that explores different social and political issues annually (Haller, Jowell, and Smith 2009). The National Identity modules have been used in past research, most particularly in the context of immigration (cf. De Figueiredo and Elkins 2003). We analyzed data from 33 countries: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Latvia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 

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Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay, the USA, the United Kingdom, and Venezuela. The overall sample consisted of 45,993 respondents, but a balanced sample was used in the multilevel analysis of the pooled sample.\(^4\)

**Measurements**

*Individual-level variables*

Three items were used to construct the dependent variable *chauvinism*: “[Respondent’s country] should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts with other nations”; “International organizations are taking away too much power from the [respondent’s country] government”; “Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in [respondent’s country].”\(^5\) Previous studies have employed some of these items to measure policy preferences in the international arena (Kunovich 2009). Another study employs them as part of a chauvinism scale (Hatton and Williamson 2005). In this study they are used to measure national chauvinism in the international arena, respondents who agree with these statements tending to endorse conflictual perception in the international domain.

The principal independent variable of *national identification* was measured by two items: “How close do you feel to your country” and “Some people say the following things are important for being truly [respondent’s country]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following

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\(^4\) Details of data collection, sampling, and response rates can be found on the ISSP website: [http://www.issp.org](http://www.issp.org). The ISSP collecting data from a representative sample of the adult population in each country, they include both respondents from the “core national group” (e.g., Slovaks in Slovakia) and minorities (e.g., Hungarians in Slovakia). While in some countries—such as the USA—perceptions of national identity amongst the majority correspond quite closely to those of minorities (Citrin and Sears 2009), substantial differences exist across other countries (Staerklé et al. 2010). Replication of the analysis after excluding minorities from the samples yielded a similar set of results, however.

\(^5\) As detailed in Appendix A, respondents range of answers was from “agree strongly” (1) to (5) “strongly disagree”. The questions were recoded to reflect chauvinism. Given the nearly identical loadings of the three questions on the factor, simple mean was used to construct the variable.
is:—to feel [respondent’s country].” Huddy and Khatib (2007) used these two items to measure national identification in the American context. In addition, “How close do you feel to your country?” was also used to measure national identification in studies that used the ISSP (e.g., Staerklé et al. 2010; Pehrson et al. 2009).

Measuring attitudes across a dissimilar national context constitutes a challenging task. Guaranteeing scale-construct validity requires the application of various methods in order to ensure that it accurately reflects the theoretical concept. While this study did not make use of the entire range of methods to establish the robustness of the scales, measurement equivalence was examined by adopting a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to appraise the measurement equivalence of the scale (Billiet, 2003; Davidov 2009). A multiple-group CFA was conducted across the 33 countries, the analyses indicating that the scale is equivalent—to a certain degree—across the majority of the countries in the sample.

In addition to these two focal scales, all the models also included age and education as predictors of chauvinism. Older people tend to be more chauvinist, those with more education to be less prone to national

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6 Respondents range of answers for the first question was from “very close” (1) to “not close at all” (4) and for the second question from “very important” (1) to “not important at all” (4) The questions were recoded to reflect national identification. Simple mean was used to construct the variable given their factor loadings.

7 Huddy and Khatib (2007) also used another item not available in the ISSP 2003.

8 It must be observed that group identification is multidimensional (Roccas et al. 2008) and that our scale does not address all its aspects.

9 The single-country CFA reveals that in most countries the model had good fits (using the CFI, REMSA, and Pclose) and sufficient factor loadings on the constructs. The multiple group CFA indicates that partial metric equivalence can be established across nearly all the countries. The reduction in the CFI between the configural model (.974) and the partial metric model (.958) and the REMSA reduction was .001. The loadings in the partial model were nearly all above .4 and some modification across countries was required to establish the models’ comparability. These changes do not deviate from Davidov’s 2009 illustration. Replication of the analysis after excluding countries in which the CFA was not acceptable led to similar results.
chauvinism (Huddy and Khatib 2007). Including these variables in the analysis ensures a better control of the divergences between different segments of society in each country.

**Country-level variables**

The KOF globalization index was used to measure *globalization* (Dreher et al. 2008). This index defines globalization as the “process of creating networks of connections amongst actors at multi-continental distances, mediated through a variety of flows including people, information and ideas, capital and goods … a process that erodes national boundaries, integrates national economies, cultures, technologies and governance, and produces complex relations of mutual interdependence.”

The KOF index examines various parameters—such as internet hosts and the amount of international trade. The index was measured on a 100-point scale. Using the average of 2000-2005, the countries’ rankings vary between 91 (Austria) and 58 (the Philippines).

In light of the multidimensionality of conflict and the divergent methods of measuring it (Anderton & Carter 2011), we chose to focus solely on two dimensions: a) the existence of external conflict; and b) mobilization for conflict. Five indices were used to measure the former: a) A simple dummy variable for the existence of any conflict during the 1990s, based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program; b) the number of deaths from conflict for the same period, drawn also from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program; c) negative relations between neighboring countries, measured by the Global Peace Index developed by the Institute for Economics and Peace in conjunction with the Economist Intelligence Unit; d) the number of terror attacks, obtained from the Global Terrorism Database and e) the exposure to high causality terrorist attacks (Center for Systemic Peace). Mobilization for conflict was measured by two indices: a) The proportion of military expenditure within the central government overall expenditure (World Bank); b) Military mobilization—measured as the percentage of armed-service personnel from the total workforce (according to the World Bank definition). The diversity in the set of countries in our sample is reflected in the differences in the intensity of conflict across the countries: peaceful Nordic countries that lack citizen mobilization vs.

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11 For further details regarding the scale, see http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/.
countries such as Israel that are engulfed in struggle. Overall, however, positive correlations obtained between the indices of conflict, reflecting their common dimension.

Two aspects of social division were examined—economic inequality and ethnic diversity. Economic inequality was measured by the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Solt 2009), an index maximizing the comparability of the income inequality data that comprises such a crucial factor across such a large set of countries. An average of 2000-2005 was used. Ethnic diversity was measured by the index of fractionalization—defined as the probability that two randomly-selected individuals from a single population will belong to different ethnic groups (Alesina et al. 2003). Economic inequality and ethnic fractionalization were positively correlated \( r=.46^{***} \) across the 33 countries.

**Results**

The first part illustrates how the correlation between national identification and chauvinism varies across the countries. Figure 1 presents the correlation for each country. While a positive correlation exists in most countries, four countries exhibited no significant correlation. The magnitude of the correlation also varied across the countries—from relatively weak to stronger. The multilevel analysis enabled us to examine to what extent this variation is related to dissimilar contexts in the 33 countries.

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12 Conflicts are defined as a “contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year” (Uppsala Conflict Data Program).

13 For further details, see the Institute for Economics and Peace website: http://www.visionofhumanity.org/about/. All the peace indicators scales being ranked 1-5 (very low to very high), they enable comparative evaluation of their impact upon the analysis. Overall, the countries in the data are ranked as low as 1 (Sweden, Switzerland) to as high as 4 (Israel).

14 Military expenditure includes all current and capital expenditure devoted to the armed forces.

15 Armed forces personnel are active-duty military personnel. The labor force is comprised of all those people who meet the International Labor Organization’s definition of the economically-active population.
We analyzed the data using a multilevel approach that allowed us to elucidate the relation between individuals and the social structure—i.e., the way(s) they affect the correlation between the variables at the individual level. The first stage of the multilevel analysis calculated the degree to which the variance in chauvinist attitudes is explained at the country level. For this purpose, the Interclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) was calculated. Found to be 8%, this represents the percentage of the variance for explaining chauvinism at the country level. Such an ICC justifies a multilevel analysis (Hox 2010).

The first contextual analysis addresses the effect of globalization (see Table 1). Model 1.1 focuses solely on the individual-level variables. The control variables are in the expected direction, older people tending to be more chauvinist, the educated less so. The positive relation between national identification and chauvinism summarizing the pattern is demonstrated in the pooled sample in Figure 1. Model 1.2 examines the contextual effect of globalization—the direct effect on the mean level of chauvinism and the interaction effect on national identification slope. The findings suggest that no direct effect obtains. The level of chauvinism does not vary across the countries’ levels of globalization. The answer to RQ1 is thus that globalization is unrelated to chauvinism across the 33 countries. While there is no direct effect, there is a positive effect on the national-identification slope; higher levels of globalization being related to a closer relation between national identification and chauvinism (see Figure 2). The steeper line in Figure 2 represents the slopes for national identification and chauvinism when country-level globalization is high (the upper quartile), the other line representing these relations for lower levels of globalization. The slopes test reveals that the differences between the slopes is significant at p<.05. Figure 3 presents a non-formal illustration of the results of Model 1.2 via the plotting of globalization on the aggregate relation between national identification and chauvinism. Despite the variation along the line, it is clear that in less globalized countries—such as the Philippines, Venezuela, and Uruguay—the relation between national identification and chauvinism is weak or insignificant, while the more globalized Northern European countries evinced a

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16 Grand mean centering was used in the analysis.

17 We also included gender and level of religiosity as controls but they were found to be insignificant.
positive relation. The answer to RQ2 is thus that, on average, a closer relation obtains between national identification and chauvinism in more globalized countries than in less globalized countries.

The second contextual analysis examined conflicts, focusing on two specific dimensions—the presence of conflict and mobilization for conflict. The first model (Models 2.1) investigated whether the existence of any type of conflict during the 1990s was reflected in higher levels of chauvinism amongst the public and/or a closer relation between national identification and chauvinism. Contrary to our expectations, the existence of conflicts had no effect on the level of chauvinism or on the national-identification slope. Similar results obtained when alternative indices for conflict were employed (Models 2.2, 2.4). The number of terrorist attacks in the country and negative relations with neighboring countries were also not related with the level of chauvinism or the national-identification slope. Only two index of conflict were found to be relevant. In countries that were exposed to high casualty terrorist attacks there are significantly higher levels of chauvinism (Model 2.3). In countries with higher number of deaths from conflict there are also, to a limited extent, higher levels of chauvinism (see Model 2.5). While a direct effect exists, there is no effect on the national-identification slopes.

The last two models relate to the effects of mobilization for conflict. The results of Model 2.6 indicate that where a conflict places a great economic burden on a country, the higher the levels of chauvinism exhibited. The direct effect is not only statistically significant but also meaningful, accounting for a 31% reduction of the unexplained country-level variance. Similarly, the more personnel serve in a country’s security services

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18 Even when we examined only territorial conflicts we did not find any significant effects.

19 In addition to the examination of the number of terror attacks in the country as reported in the Global Terrorism Database alternative models examined also the impact of the terror attack by taking into account the total number of death and wounded from the attacks. Yet, they were found to be unrelated to chauvinism.
the higher the levels of chauvinism its citizens display (Model 2.7). While a direct affect of these two aspects of mobilization for conflict obtains, there no effect on the national-identification slope. These results provide partial support for H2—only some aspects of conflict intensity being related to higher levels of chauvinism. Countries that have suffered large numbers of deaths in conflict and mobilized resources and personnel evince higher levels of chauvinism. No support was found for H3—that the greater the degree of conflict the closer the relation between national identification and chauvinism.

With respect to internal explanations, the effects of income inequality and ethnic diversity are presented in Table 3. Models 3.1 and 3.2 indicate that neither directly affects chauvinism. H4 is therefore not supported. The results suggest, however, that both have a negative effect on the national-identification slopes. Contrary to our expectations, countries with higher levels of economic and ethnic division appear to exhibit a weaker relation between national identification and chauvinism. While these findings might seem to contradict H5, the pattern was caused by outliers. After excluding South Africa—the most unequal and ethnic diverse country in our sample—the effect of ethnic diversity is not even of borderline significance. After excluding Chile—the most unequal country in our sample—the interaction effects for economic inequality were also far from significant. The results, therefore, do not support H5.

Table 3 around here

Conclusions

During the historic phone call between President Obama and Iranian President Sheikh Hasan Rouhani in September 2013, the latter stated that his country’s nuclear program “represents Iran’s national dignity.”

Replication of the analysis after excluding Israel—the country with the highest rate of death from conflicts and the largest military personal—produced similar results.

As a robustness check for Model 3.2 we examined ethnic segregation (available only for 30 countries in our sample) as this measure examine the actual gaps between ethnic groups and not only the existence of ethnic diversity (Alesina and Zhuravskaya 2011). Yet, the inclusion of the ethnic segregation index does not alter the results.

Al-Manar news (accessed 28/9/13):

This declaration reflects the common perception that Iran’s *nuclear program* mobilizes Iranians in support of resisting further national humiliation at the hands of foreigners (Moshirzadeh 2007). This reflects the important role national feelings play in the contemporary international arena. Evidence from other examples—such as the Israeli-Palestine conflict—indicates that national identity serves as a key factor in conflict resolution. The prominence of national feelings is not limited to the Middle East, their effect on public attitudes towards international issues and conflicts also being manifest in the West (Billig 1995; Kinder and Kam 2010).

It is thus hardly surprising that scholars seeking to develop a better understanding of conflicts adopt a social-psychology perspective, replacing the *deterministic* view that identification with one’s in-group necessarily leads to antagonism towards out-groups with an examination of the broader social context. In line with this approach, the present paper focuses on the way in which political and social contexts encourage chauvinistic views towards the international arena and how they affect the relation between national identification and chauvinism.

Integrating various social and psychological theories, we investigated two external contextual explanations (globalization and conflict) and an internal explanation (social division). Employing cross-national survey data, we examined the relation between national identification and chauvinism across 33 countries. The findings indicate that a positive relationship exists between national identification and chauvinism across most of the countries, although the level differs from country to country. Using a multilevel regression analysis, we tested to see whether globalization, conflict, and social division correlate with this variation. The results indicate that social and political contexts are related to chauvinism and the ways national identification and chauvinism are linked. Although a closer relation exists between national identification and chauvinism in more globalized countries, globalization failed to explain the variation in chauvinism itself. These findings support the notion that globalization highlight the importance of national identity (Calhoun 2007; Castells 2011). While those sections of globalized societies that are attached to their country also tend to resist international cooperation and endorse hostile views, the complexity of the phenomenon—as evinced by the divergent findings of previous studies (e.g., Jung 2008; Norris and Inglehart 2009)—calls for further research of this interpretation. The fact that the current study is cross-sectional must also be taken into account, the findings adducing the relation but not the causal relations.
between the variables. In contrast to experimental studies, the present design is similarly limited in its ability to offer a robust control for alternative explanations.

Another external factor found to be relevant—to a certain degree—was conflict. Countries that suffered large numbers of deaths in conflicts and mobilized resources and personnel exhibited higher levels of chauvinism. When other indices for conflict were used, however, these results were not replicated. A possible explanation for this finding lies in the inherent limitation in the way in which conflicts are measured across various countries. Measuring international conflicts is a challenging task (Anderton and Carter 2011). While the ways of measuring conflict were chosen because they reflect different dimensions of conflict in order to be representative of a wide range of countries, the problem of comparability cannot be ignored. An alternative explanation may derive from the fact that only deaths from conflict and resources/personnel mobilization are sufficiently significant to contribute to chauvinism. The limitations of our measurements of conflict and research design mean that this idea must remain speculative, however. In addition, it is important to emphasize that the sample of countries is also limited as many countries are not involved in conflict and there is also limited variation in the types of conflicts.

Contrary to what the divisionary theory of national mobilization would lead us to expect, neither economic inequality nor ethnic diversity were related to chauvinism or affected the relation between national identification and chauvinism. This finding might also be explained by the limitation of the current research design. The number of countries included in the ISSP 2003 National Identity Module being relatively small and the sample only covering countries with available survey data, the results relate solely to this specific sample of countries. Across another set of countries, social division might play a far more significant role. Another explanation might be the meaning given to national identification and chauvinism across the countries. While evidence exists for the comparability of the scales across most of the countries, the divergent meaning probably attributed to them in Germany, the United States, and Israel might form an additional limitation.

The central finding is that both chauvinism and the relation between national identification and chauvinism are related to contextual factors. What ramifications do these results possess for peace research? Firstly, the fact that national identification and chauvinism are not axiomatically related to one another across all the countries supports the notion that national identification and chauvinism should not be viewed
as deterministic or generic in nature (Brewer 2001; Cook-Huffman 2009; Spears 2008). The relation between national identification and conflict is far more complex than has traditionally been assumed and is directly affected by social context. In view of the multiple transformations national identity is undergoing in the contemporary world, research would do well to pay greater attention to the impact of such changes on conflicts.
References


Table 1. Multilevel regression for the effects of globalization on chauvinism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models:</th>
<th>1.1</th>
<th>1.2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.003(.000)***</td>
<td>.003(.000)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.108(.008)***</td>
<td>-.108(.008)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National identification</td>
<td>.158(.014)***</td>
<td>.158(.012)***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Country level variables:

| Globalization | -.000(.004) |
| Globalization*national identification | .028(.012)** |
| Country level variance | .047 | .048 |
| Individual level variance | .560 | .560 |

Notes: Unstandardized coefficients. Robust standard error in parentheses. 
N=27547, Countries=33. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; Source: ISSP 2003
Table 2. Multilevel regression for the effects of conflicts on chauvinism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models:</th>
<th>2.1</th>
<th>2.2</th>
<th>2.3</th>
<th>2.4</th>
<th>2.5</th>
<th>2.6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.003(.000)***</td>
<td>.003(.000)***</td>
<td>.003(.000)***</td>
<td>.003(.000)***</td>
<td>.003(.000)***</td>
<td>.003(.000)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.108(.008)***</td>
<td>-.108(.008)***</td>
<td>-.108(.008)***</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.108(.008)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National identification</td>
<td>.149(.017)***</td>
<td>.158(.014)***</td>
<td>.158(.014)***</td>
<td>.158(.014)***</td>
<td>.158(.014)***</td>
<td>.158(.014)***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Country level variables:
- Conflict (dummy) | -.042(.098)
- Conflict (dummy) *national identification | .031(.023)
- Terror attacks | .177(.260)
- Terror attacks *national identification | .023(.043)
- High casualty terrorist attacks | .015(.003)***
- High casualty terrorist attacks *national identification | .000(.000)
- Negative relations with countries | -.017(.060)
- Negative relations with countries*national identification | -.003(.012)
- Death from conflicts | .233(.137)^
- Death from conflicts*national identification | -.006(.018)
- Military expense | .025(.005)***
- Military expense*national identification | -.002(.001)
- Military personnel |
- Military personnel*national identification |

Country level variance | .048 | .048 | .048 | .043 | .040 | .033
Individual level variance | .563 | .563 | .563 | .560 | .560 | .560

Notes: Unstandardized coefficients. Robust standard error in parentheses. N=27547, Countries=33. ^p<.1. *p<.05. **p<.01, ***p<.001; Source: ISSP 2003
Table 3. Multilevel regression for the effects of economic and social fractionalization on chauvinism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>3.1</th>
<th>3.2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.003(.000)***</td>
<td>.003(.000)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.108(.008)***</td>
<td>-.108(.008)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National identification</td>
<td>.158(.012)***</td>
<td>.159(.012)***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Country level variables:

| Economic inequality | .005(.004) |
| Economic inequality *national identification | -.003(.001)*** |
| Ethnic diversity | .009(.160) |
| Ethnic diversity*national identification | -.162(.072)* |
| Country level variance | .048 |
| Individual level variance | .560 |

Notes: Unstandardized coefficients. Robust standard error in parentheses. N=27547, Countries=33. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; Source: ISSP 2003
Figure 1. Correlations between national identification and chauvinism

Source: ISSP 2003
Figure 2. Slope differences for national identification under the effect of globalization (Model 2.2)
Figure 3. Plot for the relation between national identification and chauvinism correlation and globalization.
## Appendix A. Description of the study variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Source/items</th>
<th>Mean (SD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td>56.17 (19.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Highest degree of education (0-5)</td>
<td>2.68 (1.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National identification</td>
<td>How close do you feel to your country”; “To feel [respondent’s country]” (1-5)</td>
<td>3.39 (.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chauvinism</td>
<td>“[Respondent’s country] should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts with other nations”; “International organizations are taking away too much power from the [respondent’s country] government”; “Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in [respondent’s country].” (1-5)</td>
<td>3.42 (0.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization</td>
<td>KOF Index of globalization</td>
<td>77.78 (10.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>0.27 (0.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terror attacks</td>
<td>Global Terrorism Database</td>
<td>104.15 (178.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High casualty terrorist attacks</td>
<td>High Casualty Terror Bombings</td>
<td>161.81 (613.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative relations with countries</td>
<td>Global Peace Index</td>
<td>1.58 (0.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death from conflicts</td>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>80.90 (274.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expense</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>6.48 (4.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military personnel</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>1.18 (0.072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fractionalization</td>
<td>Alesina et al. (2003).</td>
<td>0.25 (0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income inequality</td>
<td>The Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Solt 2009)</td>
<td>32.53 (8.92)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>