VOLUME 2 (2007), ISSUE 1, Frontiers in Economic History and the Economic Approach to Law     Next Frontiers in Economic History and the Economic Approach to Law>

Símbolos, Señales y Normas Sociales

Eric A. Posner, University of Chicago Law School

Translated by: Francisco González de Cossío

Eric A. Posner (2007) "Símbolos, Señales y Normas Sociales", The Latin American and Caribbean Journal of Legal Studies: Vol. 2: No. 1, Article 1.

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This article uses a signaling model to explain the role of symbols in people's behavior and beliefs, with special attention to legal manipulation of symbols. It is argued that certain actions become symbolic because they have the proper cost structure and because they are, for historical or psychological reasons, focal. The cost structure enables people to obtain advantages by revealing information about themselves in separating equilibrium. The focal character of the action removes ambiguities about the motives for engaging in it. The government can in theory use standard legal instruments (which mainly affect the costs of the signal) to change equilibrium behavior and belief. The use of the law in this way is likely to have unpredictable effects because of multiple equilibria and of the sensitivity of behavior to parameters, but it occurs frequently because lobbying and other actions that influence lawmaking can become signals themselves, and the law is simply an equilibrium outcome.

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