Date of This Version
2-26-2018
Abstract
This paper studies strategic interaction in networks. We focus on games of strategic substitutes and strategic complements, and departing from previous literature, we do not assume particular functional forms on players' payoffs. By exploiting variational methods, we show that the uniqueness, the comparative statics, and the approximation of a Nash equilibrium are determined by a precise relationship between the lowest eigenvalue of the network, a measure of players' payoff concavity, and a parameter capturing the strength of the strategic interaction among players. We apply our framework to the study of aggregative network games, games of mixed interactions, and Bayesian network games.
Recommended Citation
Melo, Emerson, "A Variational Approach to Network Games" (February 26, 2018). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers. Paper 1230.
https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1230