Date of This Version
May 2007
Abstract
We examine an incentive scheme for a group of agents, where all agents are rewarded if the group meets its target. If the group does not meet its target, only the agents that meet their individual target are rewarded. In environmental policy, the EU burden sharing agreement and the UK Climate Change Agreements feature this incentive scheme. There is only a difference in outcome between group and individual rewards if emissions are stochastic. Group rewards generally lead to higher expected emissions than individual rewards. The attraction of the group reward scheme may lie in its fairness and its tough-looking targets.
Recommended Citation
Dijkstra, Bouwe and Rübbelke, Dirk T.G., "Group Rewards and Individual Sanctions in Environmental Policy" (May 08, 2007). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers. Paper 37.
https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper37