Date of This Version
May 2010
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate a channel through which social (or civic) capital may improve economic wellbeing and the functioning of institutions: political accountability. The main idea is that voters who share values and beliefs that foster cooperation are more likely to base their vote on criteria of social welfare rather than narrow personal interest. We frame this intuition into a simple model of political accountability with retrospective voting and heterogeneous endowments of civic attitudes. We then take this conjecture to the data using information on the Italian members of Parliament in the postwar period (1948–2001). The empirical evidence shows that the electoral punishment of political misbehavior is considerably larger in electoral districts with high social capital, where political misbehavior refers to receiving a request of criminal prosecution or shirking in parliamentary activity, and social capital is measured by blood donation (or by non-profit organizations and electoral turnout). Accordingly, political misbehaviors are less frequent in electoral districts where civic attitudes are widespread.
Recommended Citation
Nannicini, Tommaso; Stella, Andrea; Tabellini, Guido; and Troiano, Ugo, "Social Capital and Political Accountability" (May 25, 2010). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers. Paper 447.
https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper447