The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment

Authors

Richard Schmalensee, Howard W. Johnson Professor of Economics and Management, Emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research
Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government at the Harvard Kennedy School, a University Fellow of Resources for the Future, and a Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic ResearchFollow

Date of This Version

October 2012

Abstract

Two decades have passed since the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 launched a grand experiment in market-based environmental policy: the SO2 cap-and-trade system. That system performed well but created four striking ironies. First, by creating this system to reduce SO2 emissions to curb acid rain, the government did the right thing for the wrong reason. Second, a substantial source of this system’s cost-effectiveness was an unanticipated consequence of earlier railroad deregulation. Third, it is ironic that cap-and-trade has come to be demonized by conservative politicians in recent years, since this market-based, cost-effective policy innovation was initially championed and implemented by Republican administrations. Fourth, court decisions and subsequent regulatory responses have led to the collapse of the SO2 market, demonstrating that what the government gives, the government can take away.

Recommended Citation

Schmalensee, Richard and Stavins, Robert N., "The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment" (October 15, 2012). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers. Paper 711.
https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper711