Bounded Rationality and Voting Decisions Exploring a 160-Year Period

Authors

David Stadelmann, University of Fribourg, Department of Economics, CREMA—Center for Research in Economics, Management and the ArtsFollow
Benno Torgler, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, EBS Universität für Wirtschaft und Recht, EBS Business School, CREMA—Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts

Date of This Version

October 2012

Abstract

Using a natural voting experiment in Switzerland that encompasses a 160-year period (1848–2009), we investigate whether a higher level of complexity leads to increased reliance on expert knowledge. We find that when more referenda are held on the same day, constituents are more likely to refer to parliamentary recommendations in making their decisions. This finding holds true even when we narrow our focus to referenda with a relatively lower voter turnout on days on which more than one referendum was held. We also show that when constituents face a higher level of complexity, they listen to parliament rather than interest groups.

Recommended Citation

Stadelmann, David and Torgler, Benno, "Bounded Rationality and Voting Decisions Exploring a 160-Year Period" (October 18, 2012). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers. Paper 721.
https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper721