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Home > FULLERTONWEST

Public Finance Solutions to Vehicle Emissions Problems in California

 

, Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712

, Department of Economics, Macalester College, 1600 Grand Avenue, St. Paul, MN 55105

December 2003; 106 pages


Download Front-matter Only (352K, PDF)
Includes Executive Summary, Table of Contents, List of Figures and Tables, and Acknowledgements.

Download the Complete Monograph (1.4 MB, PDF)

  Executive Summary
  Table of Contents
  List of Tables and Figures
  Acknowledgements

  1. INTRODUCTION
  2. VEHICLE POLLUTION IN CALIFORNIA: TRENDS, ATTAINMENT, AND COSTS
  3. CURRENT VEHICLE POLLUTION POliCIES IN CALIFORNIA
  4. THEORY OF OPTIMAL POLLUTION CONTROL
  5. ALTERNATIVE MARKET-BASED INCENTIVES
  6. CALCULATIONS OF UNIFORM TAX RATES
  7. DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS OF TAXES ON GAS OR CARS
  8. POliCY IMPliCATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

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  • Public Finance Solutions to Vehicle Emissions Problems in California by Don Fullerton and Sarah West

    Public Finance Solutions to Vehicle Emissions Problems in California

    Don Fullerton and Sarah West

    All urban centers in California violate the Federal standard for ozone. So far, the State has addressed vehicle emission problems with a variety of mandates. In contrast, economic theory suggests that costs of achieving air quality can be minimized by the use of incentive policies such as permits, taxes, or subsidies. The purpose of the research described in this monograph is to explore incentive programs that might be added to the State’s repertoire of effective vehicle pollution reduction policies. The monograph is not very technical in nature, but it explains our theoretical approach, numerical simulation model, and statistical estimation.

    We find that a single rate of tax on emissions is most efficient. A vehicle-specific gas tax or a miles-specific vehicle tax can attain the same efficient outcome. Uniform rates that incorporate heterogeneity are "second-best". A combination of three uniform rates can attain 71 percent of the gain from the emissions tax. A gas tax alone can attain 62 percent of the emissions tax gain. A subsidy to new vehicles would be regressive. A tax on gasoline is not regressive across the lowest incomes but is regressive from middle to high incomes.

 
 
 

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